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ABSTRACT  
The ways in which legal and political principles obtaining within 
states can profitably be transferred to the relations of states are 
among the contentious issues in the study of international relations, 
and the term 'domestic analogy' is used to refer to the argument which 
supports such transfer. The 'domestic analogy' is analogical reasoning 
according to which the conditions of order between states are similar 
to those of order within them, and therefore those institutions which 
sustain order within states should be transferred to the international 
system. 
However, despite the apparent division among writers on international 
relations between those who favour this analogy and those who are 
critical of it, no clear analysis has so far been made as to precisely 
what types of proposal should be treated as exemplifying reliance on 
this analogy. The first aim of this thesis is to clarify the range and 
types of proposal this analogy entails. 
The thesis then examines the role the domestic analogy played in 
ideas about world order in the period between 1814 and 1945. Particular 
attention is paid to the influence of changing circumstances in the 
domestic and international spheres upon the manner and the extent of 
the use of this analogy. In addition to the ideas of major writers on 
international law and relations, the creation of the League of Nations 
and of the United Nations is also examined. 
The thesis then discusses the merits of the five main types of 
approach to world order which emerge from the preceding analysis. 
Each embodies a distinct attitude towards the domestic analogy. The 
thesis shows that there are weaknesses in the approaches based on the 
domestic analogy, but that ideas critical of this analogy are not 
entirely flawless, and explores further the conditions under which 
the more promising proposals may bear fruit. 
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Introduction  
According to Hans Morgenthau, '/tJhe application of domestic legal 
experience to international law is really the main stock in trade of 
modern international thought') Charles Beitz made a related point when 
he remarked: 'Most writers in the modern tradition of political theory, 
and many contemporary students of international politics, have conceived 
of international relations on the analogy of the nobbesiani state of 
nature', and that 11)1erceptions of international relations have been 
more thoroughly influenced by the analogy of states and persons than 
by any other device.' 2 What these writers are pointing to is the 
prevalent influence upon international thought of what is in this thesis 
called the 'domestic analogy'. Hedley Bull has given a brief account of 
this analogy as follows: 
/It is/ the argument from the experience of individual men in 
domestic society to the experience of states, according to which 
the need of individual men to stand in awe of a common power in 
order to live in peace is a ground for holding that states must 
do the same. The conditions of an orderly social life, on this 
view, are the same among states as they are within them: they 
require that the institutions of domestic society be reproduced 
on a universal scale.
3 
This analogy, however, has had its critics, Bull prominent among them. 
As will be indicated by a brief survey in Chapter I, the validity or 
otherwise of the domestic analogy has in fact been one of the central 
issues in the tradition of speculation about how best to organize the 
world. 
Nowadays, to be seen to be using the domestic analogy is not a very 
respectable thing among the professional writers on International 
Relations. This analogy is associated with 'all that was wrong' about 
the theory and practice of international relations before E.H. Carr 
wrote a well-known critique of the League-of-Nations approach to the 
problem of world order. 4 There is, moreover, something less than fully 
satisfactory about the use of analogy in what aspires, within the limits 
of possibility, to be a scientific pursuit. In addition, those who 
endeavoured to win for International Relations the status of an 
academic discipline saw in the modern states-system unique qualities 
which, in their judgement, could best be appreciated if the habit of 
thought cultivated for the understanding of domestic social phenomena 
could be discarded.
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The unpopularity of the domestic analogy within the discipline of 
International Relations is particularly pronounced from about the late 
nineteen-thirties, although a tendency to regard inter-state relations 
as fully comprehensible only through the rejection of this analogy had 
existed among some political philosophers and legal theorists long 
before International Relations came to be treated as a special branch of 
academic enquiry. 
Against the apparent intellectual legitimacy of the belief in the 
defectiveness of the domestic analogy particularly among the academic 
specialists of International Relations, there lingers the notion that 
perhaps some form of domestic analogy is acceptable after all. More 
strongly, it is sometimes suggested that we cannot do away with the 
domestic analogy altogether since some concepts we use in theorizing 
about international relations must necessarily originate in our domestic 
social experience. 
As recently as in l982, Andrew Linklater stated that 'a progressive 
development of international relations necessitates the transference 
of understandings of social relations from their original domestic 
setting to the international arena.' And Moorhead Wright, in his 
review of Linklater's book, criticized him for a heavy reliance on 
the 'problematic analogy between domestic and international society. '6 
Thus, if what may be called the 'domestic analogy debate' can be said 
to continue today, what is curious about this 'debate' is that no 
attempt has been made so far to clarify what precisely the 'domestic 
analogy' is. Thus, although a cursory survey tends to create the 
impression that the contributors to this debate are divided into those 
'for' and 'against' this analogy, such a clear division cannot be 
presumed since what is to count as an instance of this analogy has not 
been clearly defined. Hedley Bull, as we noted above, has given a 
brief explanation of what this analogy is, but, as will be revealed in 
Chapter II, his definition is far from unambiguous. 
In Chapter II, therefore, an attempt is made to analyse the concept 
of domestic analogy. This is done by examining the range and types of 
ideas for world order which this analogy may encompass. Particular 
attention is paid to arguments which are close to, or easily mistaken 
for, the analogy. 
Chapters III - VII will then investigate in what ways the domestic 
analogy has been employed or rejected by thinkers on world order 
against the historically changing backgrounds in the domestic and 
international spheres. 
The following passage from Hans Morgenthau's Scientific Man versus  
Power Politics most succinctly accounts for the periodization in terms 
of which the materials are arranged in Chapters III - V: 
While domestic liberalism converted public opinion in the 
eighteenth century and conquered the political institution of 
the Western world during the nineteenth, it was not before the 
end of the Napoleonic Wars that important sectors of public 
opinion demanded the application of liberal principles to 
international affairs. And it was not before the turn of 
the century that the Hague Peace Conference made the first 
systematic attempt at establishing the reign of liberalism 
in the international field. Yet only the end of the first 
World War saw, in the League of Nations, the triumph of 
liberalism on the international scene. 7 
If for 'liberalism' in the above passage we substitute its important 
manifestations such as 'constitutionalism' or 'the idea of the rule 
of law', the relevance of Morgenthau's remark to the present study will 
become clearer. Although the application of 'domestic liberalism' to 
international relations is not the only way in which the domestic 
analogy has been used, Morgenthau's periodization is useful for this study. 
This is because liberalism has been a major force in the field of 
activity which concerns this thesis although with the failure of the 
League of Nations and the decline in the credibility of nineteenth-
century liberalism within the sphere of domestic politics, some important 
writers of the mid-twentieth century began to criticize the application 
of laissez-faire ideology to international relations. 
Thus, in line with Morgenthau's periodization, we shall discuss in 
Chapter III the use of the domestic analogy in proposals for world order 
which were produced in the period after the end of the Napoleonic Wars 
and before the Peace Conferences at the Hague at the turn of the century. 
This was the period in which liberalism made advances within the domestic 
sphere while the international system, despite a number of ad hoc 
conferences under the Concert of Europe, remained relatively unorganized 
in terms of its formal structure. Chapter IV will examine the writings 
of the Hague Conferences period, in which, internationally also, there 
began a rapid development in the attempt to enhance the rule of law. 
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But the optimism of the Hague Conferences period was soon to be shattered 
by the outbreak of the Great War. The impact of this war upon the 
attitudes towards the domestic analogy and use of this analogy by those 
who were influential in the creation of the League of Nations will be 
examined in Chapter V. 
The League of Nations, however, soon began to show its inadequacies, 
while, within the domestic sphere, old liberalism had lost much of its 
credibility. Chapter VI will therefore examine attitudes towards the 
domestic analogy in the face of the failure of the League, and explore 
what ideas were developed against the new international and domestic 
backgrounds. Chapter VII will then go on to assess which particular 
lines of thought discussed in Chapter VI shaped the new world 
organization, the United Nations, and examine what part the domestic 
analogy played in its establishment. 
In the light of the recurrence of similar ideas across different 
historical periods as well as the diversity in the character of 
proposals which these periods have shown, an attempt is made in Chapters 
VIII and IX to classify proposals for world order into dominant types. 
Each of these types embodies a distinct attitude towards the domestic 
analogy, and within each type there are many different varieties. The 
assumptions and arguments which support these major types are examined 
in turn. Then, in Conclusion, the major approaches are put in 
perspective, and a further investigation is conducted on the conditions 
under which some of the more promising proposals may bear fruit. 
Chapters III - VII may be considered as an attempt to write a history 
of ideas. In exploring the history of ideas in a relatively well-defined 
practice or discipline, such as physics, chemistry, mathematics, 
philosophy or theology, it is reasonable to confine our attention to the 
ideas of the leading practitioners in the field. It is, moreover, 
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relatively uncontroversial who these are. But in the area of activity 
which concerns this thesis, it is more difficult to agree on who the 
'leading practitioners' might be, since it is not very much of an 
exaggeration to say that almost everyone has some ideas about how the 
world should be organized. 
What this thesis aims at is to examine in some detail the attitudes 
towards the domestic analogy shown by a number of well-known writers 
on international law and relations in different historical periods since 
the early part of the nineteenth century up to the middle of the 
twentieth century. These writers have been chosen chiefly from those 
treated in major secondary works on peace projects. These include: 
F.H. Hinsley's Power and the Pursuit of Peace, Walter Schiffer's 
The Legal Community of Mankind, A.C.F. Beales' The History of Peace, 
S.J. Hemleben's Plans for World Peace through Six Centuries, P. Renouvin's 
L'Idge de Federation Europgenne dans la Pensee Politique du XIXe Sicle, 
Walter Phillimore's Schemes for Maintaining General Peace, and Theodore 
Marburg's Development of the League of Nations Idea. The writers from 
the more recent period discussed in this thesis are chosen from among 
those familiar to the students of International Law and Relations 
particularly in the English-speaking world. 
The publicists whose proposals are examined in this thesis are those 
from the above, and other related sources, and they have been chosen 
because their attitudes towards the domestic analogy illustrate in an 
accentuated way the effects of the domestic and international 
circumstances against which proposals are formulated. However, in 
contrast to these writers' approach, and to redress the balance, those 
whose views of world order and attitudes towards the domestic analogy 
are relatively unaffected by the historical changes in the domestic and 
international spheres are also included in our survey. The views of 
authors examined in this thesis may or may not be 'typical' of each 
historical period in the statistical sense: it is the distinctive 
features of their views that attract our attention. 
None of the secondary sources listed above, with the exception of 
Beales' work, examines proposals after the creation of the League of 
Nations, and even Beales' book does not treat fully the period since 
1919. This thesis, by contrast, devotes two chapters to the period 
between 1919 and 1945. The ideas of this period are particularly 
important since, as will be shown, they provided the bases of 
international thinking today. Since this thesis is concerned with 
the period between 1814 and 1945, proposals for world order produced 
after 1945 are not investigated in the following. However, those ideas 
expressed since 1945, which are of particular significance for the 
purpose of examining the validity of the domestic analogy in pre -1945 
proposals for world order, will be introduced freely at various points 
in the following discussion. 
Of the several secondary works listed above, Hinsley's and Schiffer's 
books are by far the most important in terms of their range and depth 
of analysis. The other items, with the exception of Renouvin's work, 
which, unfortunately, is only a short essay, are mainly descriptive in 
character. While these serve as a useful source of reference they lack 
the historical and analytical depth of the works by Hinsley and Schiffer. 
However, neither Hinsley's nor Schiffer's book is without certain 
shortcomings which this thesis endeavours to overcome. 
The two chapters of Hinsley's work, dealing with nineteenth century 
proposals, which provide the basis of investigation for Chapters III - V 
below, contain a number of factual inaccuracies. Hinsley does not 
appear to have studied his sources with care in writing these chapters. 
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Since this is a rather serious accusation to make against a standard 
work by a distinguished historian, it may be permitted to substantiate 
the claim by enumerating some factual errors and inaccuracies encountered 
therein. 
For example, on page 97 Hinsley implies that Cobden wrote in 1842 
an essay entitled Free Trade as the Best Human Means for Securing  
Universal and Permanent Peace. Such a work is not found in Cobden's 
Political. Writings, however.
8 
J.A. Hobson's book, Richard Cobden, the  
International Man, which Hinsley refers to in his footnote as his source 
of information regarding the alleged Cobden piece, reveals that 'in 1842 
(Cobden] proposed to Mr. Ashworth the offering of a Prize Essay on 
"Free Trade as the Best Human Means for Securing Universal and Permanent 
Peace" ' . 9 It does not appear that Cobden himself wrote such an essay. 
On page 103, Hinsley enumerates followers of Saint-Simon and their 
works. Among these he lists 'Pierre Leroux's Organon des vollkommen  
Lic7 Friedens (1837)'. 	It is curious that a Frenchman should choose to 
publicize his views in German. Hinsley's source is Renouvin's 
aforementioned essay, and this reveals that the work in German was in 
fact written by Johann Sartorius, a nrich lawyer, who won for it the 
Geneva Peace Society Prize. Renouvin mentions this one paragraph before 
his reference to Leroux, and Hinsley somehow seems to have got badly 
confused.
10 
On page 134, James Lorimer is said to have proposed that a successful 
international organization must be based on the loosest possible bonds, 
and on page 136, he is said to have proposed an international legislature 
consisting of government representatives. Similarly, on page 135, 
J.C. Bluntschli is said to have proposed an international legislature of 
government delegates. As will be shown in Chapter III below, Hinsley's 
descriptions here are very inadequate and misleading. In addition, we 
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may note that Hinsley's use of the terms, 'international government', 
'federal' and 'super-state' on pages, 134, 143 and 143 respectively, 
are not very precise. 
On page 144, we find that in 1918 A.J. Jacobs proposed a 'world 
state', but that his idea consisted mainly of the prohibition of 
neutrality. A proposal so minimalist as this cannot at the same time 
suggest the creation of a 'world state'. Jacobs in fact never did. It 
appears that Hinsley got confused when he studied Phillimore's afore- 
mentioned work from which he gathered information about Jacobs' 1918 plan. 
Jacobs' ideas are treated by Phillimore straight after the proposal of 
August Schvan, to whom Hinsley also refers, and Schvan is said by 
Phillimore to have proposed a world state.
11 
On page 145, we are told that Bryce's group envisaged the Executive 
and the Legislature as being dominated by the six European Great Powers, 
the United States and Japan, and Hinsley's footnote suggests that this 
information is based on page 143 of Hemleben's work. Not only is there 
no such point made on that page by Hemleben, but the Bryce Group never 
in fact proposed an International Legislature. Moreover, while the 
Great Powers were to be given a predominant role in the Council of 
Conciliation, the Bryce Group report explicitly stated that 'the 
functions of the Council are conciliatory only, and not executive.' 12  
While each of these may be a minor error, cumulatively they tend to 
undermine the overall credibility of Hinsley's exposition. Needless to 
say, care is taken in this thesis to present all the proposals to be 
examined accurately without relying on secondary sources as Hinsley 
has done. 
Schiffer's work is without careless errors of the kind just enumerated. 
His argument, however, appears a little one-sided. The gist of his 
contention is as follows. 
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Ordinarily, the existence and the binding force of legal rules 
presuppose the state. But the Natural Law doctrine that there is law 
independent of any connection with a state made it possible to hold the 
view that the relations of states are governed by law despite the 
absence of universal state-like organization above the states. This 
idea was inherited by certain positivist writers despite their explicit 
rejection of the Natural Law doctrine. The essence of the modern 
patterns of thought concerning world organization is that international 
law and order can be maintained by a League-type institution, i.e., by 
an association of sovereign states which is not itself a state. Such a 
pattern of thought could not have arisen unless it had been assumed that 
there existed or could exist a legal order binding upon independent 
states. Such an assumption has its historical origin in the Natural Law 
doctrine, and, when combined with the idea of progress, contributed to 
the emergence of the League of Nations.
13 
It is true, as Schiffer points out, that Natural Law theorists 
advanced the idea that, despite the absence of a state-like organization, 
the relations of sovereigns or sovereign states were governed by a set 
of normative principles. It may also be true, although Schiffer does 
not show this historical link, that the Natural Law theorists' ideas 
initially helped sovereigns and their officials to accept in practice 
the notion that their mutual conduct was governed by the law of nations. 
It is also true, although Schiffer does not make this point precise 
enough, that unless such a notion had been accepted by the sovereign 
states themselves, it would not have been possible for anyone to argue 
that a League-type world organization could maintain law and order in 
international society.
14 
Unless international law were assumed by 
states to be binding upon them, no League-type organization could come 
into existence, for such a body would have to be constituted by a 
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treaty, and this would presuppose the principle of pacta sunt servanda  
embedded in the law of nations. Moreover, unless states believed that 
they were bound by international law, there could not be any 
international law to be maintained by a League-type organization. To 
this extent, therefore, we may agree with Schiffer in seeing the link 
between the doctrine of Natural Law and the modern approach to world 
organization as represented by the League of Nations. 
Moreover, certain similarities are found between the prescriptions 
of the Natural Law writers and those of the advocates of a League-type 
organization. First, neither of them think the establishment of the 
world state as a necessary condition for world peace. Second, the 
advocates of the League-type organization favour the prohibition of the 
use of force by statesor at least the circumscription of the conditions 
under which states can legitimately resort to force. This corresponds 
to the bellum justum principle of the Natural Law writers. However, not 
all Natural Law writers fully supported the bellum justum principle. 
Dattel, in particular, in effect abandoned it.
15 
Moreover, none of the 
classical Natural Law writers, even Grotius, argued that states have an 
obligation to aid the victim of aggression.
16 
It is precisely the 
absence of such an obligation in international society that many 
advocates of a League-type world organization were most concerned to 
rectify. 17 
However, in arguing for such a transformation of international society, 
what many of the schemers of world organization had in mind was the way 
in which domestic society is organized. Indeed, compared to the near 
universal, and conscious acceptance by the peace schemers of the 
assumption that what is needed in the international sphere is the 
borrowing of some basic organizing principles from the domestic sphere, 
the cases where they actually think of themselves as relying on the 
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tradition of Natural Law appear extremely rare. 
The Natural Law theory, as Schiffer contends, may have made the 
modern idea of world organization possible. But, as this thesis will 
show, what actually shaped the idea of world organization, which when 
the conditions were ripe led to the establishment of the League of 
Nations and the United Nations in the present century, was the 
assumption that international society should become more closely 
analogous in its structure to domestic society. In what ways and to 
what extent international society should become more like domestic 
society was a question to which there were many different answers 
depending on how the 'domestic analogy' was used. And this in turn, as 
will be shown, often depended on the changing international and domestic 
circumstances under which proposals were formulated. Thus, to complement 
Schiffer's argument, this thesis contends that it is because peace-
schemers in the period of our concern already lived in separate states, 
and were invariably familiar with domestic institutions, that they 
conceived of a world organization in the ways they did. 
A line of argument similar to this contention was advanced by 
Hedley Bull in his 'Grotian Conception of International Society'. 
However, in this article Bull contrasts Grotius' De Jure Belli ac Pacis  
and Oppenheim's International Law as representing opposing attitudes 
towards the domestic analogy. Grotius, Bull maintains, makes important 
concessions to this analogy while Oppenheim's system is free of it.
18 
The juxtaposition of these two writers is not entirely satisfactory 
since one is concerned primarily, though not exclusively, to reveal 
Natural Law prescriptions while the other is concerned with the 
exposition of Positive Law. 19 Had the Grotian Natural Law prescriptions 
been transformed into the Positive Law of Nations, then it would have 
made sense to compare that system with Oppenheim's, and to suggest 
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that the Grotian system was more analogous than Oppenheim's to a 
domestic model. However, as they stood, the two systems were 
incommensurate. More importantly, as will be shown laterin more 
detail, it is doubtful whether the thought process of such early 
writers as Grotius involved analogical reasoning. At the same time, 
as will be noted, Oppenheim in his own proposals for world order did 
make a great deal of concession to the domestic analogy, which Bull 
has failed to note. Thus, Bull's work is also inadequate from the 
viewpoint of an accurate presentation of the history of ideas regarding 
the domestic analogy. 
The authors whose ideas and proposals will be discussed in the 
following are chiefly from English-speaking writers on international 
law and relations, although, when helpful, German- and, exceptionally, 
French-speaking writers have been consulted. Thinkers from the English-
speaking world have contributed much to the growth of international 
institutions, as well as to the development of International Law and 
Relations as academic subjects. Therefore, it is reasonable for us to 
focus our attention chiefly on these writers. Some prominent publicists 
on international law and relations in the English-speaking world, 
however, are Germanic in origin, and the study of their writings in 
some cases inescapably directs us to the works of other writers from 
the German-speaking world. This explains partly why a number of 
German writers, not very well known in the English-speaking world, are 
included in the following discussion. 
The publicists whose ideas will be examined in the following are not 
confined to academic writers. Particularly in dealing with the impact 
of the Great War and the birth of the League of Nations, it is necessary 
to study the ideas of those who were close to the process of its 
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creation, and these include statesmen and government officials of the 
period. This step is indispensable, despite the general direction of 
this thesis to deal with academic writers, so as to reveal the extent 
to which the domestic analogy had guided the creation of the League. 
This in turn is a necessary step in the discussion of this thesis as 
will be revealed in Chapter VI. As it happens, some of the statesmen 
and government officials influential in the formation of the League 
were also academics or intellectuals, for example, President Wilson 
and General Smuts. 
The episode of the creation of the United Nations will be discussed 
in Chapter VII in relation to the main patterns of thought which arose 
in response to the failure of the League. Here again, the ideas of those 
politicians and officials who directly influenced the eventual outcome 
will be investigated. 
The main reason why the writers dealt with in this thesis are academics 
or intellectuals is that their ideas are relatively easy to identify 
through their publications. Moreover, their professional skill enables 
them to express their views articulately. Furthermore, unlike government 
officials, their views may be less directly influenced by the concern for 
a particular country's national interests. In other words, we may expect 
to find more genuine instances of 'proposals for world order' in their 
writings. 
Naturally there are some academics and intellectuals who advance an 
argument whose nationalistic bias is easy to detect. Moreover, the 
concern for a particular social value, such as 'world order', may be an 
unconscious reflection of the position of the country to which a given 
author belongs. These are important points to bear in mind, but will 
not foredoom an attempt to explore ideas about world order held by the 
type of thinkers included in this thesis. What is important is not to 
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lose sight of the possible national and ideological biases of their 
proposals. Indeed, part of the aims of the discussion which follows 
is to unravel these very biases on the part of the major writers on 
world order. 
As will be clear from the foregoing, the main objectives of this 
thesis are as follows. First, to analyse what the domestic analogy is, 
and to clarify the range and types of proposal which arguments involving 
this analogy may entail. Second, to explain how changing domestic and 
international conditions influenced the extent to which and the ways 
in which well-known planners of world organization from the early part 
of the nineteenth century to the middle of the twentieth century resorted 
to the domestic analogy, and how some writers on international law and 
relations attempted to remove this analogy from their ideas and 
proposals. And third, to classify the proposals discussed into major 
types in the light of their attitudes towards the domestic analogy, 
and to evaluate the merits of the main approaches which underlie these 
proposals. We shall begin, however, by taking a brief look at the 
'domestic analogy debate' in the next chapter. 
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Chapter I 	The Domestic Analogy Debate 
Before we embark on the major issues of this thesis, it is 
desirable to acquaint ourselves with an outline of what might be called 
the 'domestic analogy debate'. This will indicate how the validity or 
otherwise of this analogy has been among the contentious issues in the 
history of international thought, and will thereby enable us to place 
our enquiry on the map of intellectual traditions in the field. In the 
following, we shall first glance at those who made critical remarks about 
the domestic analogy, and then move on to those who appear to have 
supported, it. This may seem deliberately to reverse the proper order of 
presentation, but the procedure is not in fact an unnatural one, for, in 
the contemporary (post-World-War-Two) study of international relations, 
we tend to encounter the critics of the domestic analogy rather more 
frequently than its adherents. 
Indeed, among some writers on International Relations, the rejection 
of the domestic analogy seems to have become enshrined as a guiding 
principle of their thoughtand enquiry. Thus we see it stated very often 
nowadays that the domestic analogy is misleading, that it hinders our 
accurate comprehension of international relations, and that, in the end, 
we must abandon it, or use it with greatest care. The very term 
'domestic analogy' is somewhat pejorative in that an analogical mode of 
reasoning is thought not to have the validity or firmness of logical 
deduction or scientific induction. 
While the mode of reasoning here labelled the 'domestic analogy' has 
had a broad range of supporters and critics, the label itself is relatively 
uncommon. One of the early instances of its use is found in the writings 
of C.A.W. Manning. He has some claim to be one of the founders of 
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International Relations as an academic discipline in Britain, and perhaps, 
more broadly, in the English-speaking world. 1 It does not appear to be 
a pure coincidence that a man who devoted much of his life to the 
establishment of International Relations as a unique subject, dependent 
on, but separate from, Politics in particular, should also have been a 
critic of the domestic analogy. If international phenomena could be 
understood sufficiently well through the application of the existing ideas 
about domestic phenomena, then the claim for International Relations as a 
separate subject would be undermined. 2 
Manning's reference to the term 'domestic analogy' appears in the 
Lecture entitled, 'The Future of the Collective System', which he delivered 
in 1935, at the Geneva Institute of International Relations. Having stated 
that a problem of promoting international order through international law 
and organization is a problem sui generis, 'one where analogies drawn 
from domestic experience may admit, at best, of only the most hesitant 
application', he remarked: 
An now let us finally ask what will be the true, the only 
possible, foundation for any effectively functioning collective 
system? For once, I'll accept the domestic analogy. What, 
ultimately, is the basis of orderly coexistence within the local 
community? Nobody has put it more simply than Professor MacIver. 
You'll remember his phrase --- 'the will for the State' --- that is, 
the sufficiently prevalent disposition, if not to approve, then 
anyway to tolerate, the retention of those social arrangements 
that form the constitutional regime. Correspondingly, if the 
Collective System is ever to have the strength of the domestic 
order, it will be upon the foundation of an adequate 'will for 
the Collective System'.
3 
Here the term 'domestic analogy' is used in its natural, and somewhat 
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open-ended, sense: analogy drawn from domestic experience, from within 
the state. 
A rather more specific definition of the term is given by Hedley Bull, 
upon whom Manning's thought exerted some influence.
4 
Bull's ideas about 
international relations are widely known, and it may not be an 
exaggeration to say that he is one of the best-known critics of the 
domestic analogy in the English-speaking world today. According to him, 
as we saw, the 'domestic analogy' is: 
the argument from the experience of individual men in 
domestic society to the experience of states, according to 
which'  he need of individual men to stand in awe of a common 
power in order to live in peace is a ground for holding that 
states must do the same. The conditions of an orderly social 
life, on this view, are the same among states as they are 
within them: they require that the institutions of domestic 
society be reproduced on a universal scale. 5 
Two of Bull's essays, both contained in Diplomatic Investigations, and 
his more recent work, The Anarchical Society, exhibit his long-standing 
concern to comprehend what he regards as the sui generis problem of 
international order with as little concession as possible to the domestic 
analogy.
6 
Bull's acknowledged position on the question of the domestic analogy 
among contemporary writers is seen, for instance, in Ian Clark's Reform  
and Resistance in the International Order,  where Bull's explanation of 
this analogy quoted above is reproduced, and some of his critical remarks 
about 'idealism' in general, and the 'domestic analogy' in particular, 
are also quoted.
7 	
Bull's ideas about the domestic analogy contained in 
the essays mentioned above are also referred to by Michael Walzer in his 
Just and Unjust. Wars, and by Richard Falk in his Legal Order in a Violent  
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World.
8 
David Fromkin's The Independence of Nations praises Bull for 
many services he has performed, and treats the domestic analogy disdainfully 
as 'false', although Bull's name is not mentioned in that context. 9 
The tendency to regard inter-state relations as fully comprehensible 
only through the rejection of the domestic analogy, however, had existed 
long before International Relations came to be treated as an academic 
discipline. The idea that relations between states are not fully 
analogous to those between individuals is found in an embryonic form 
already in Hobbes. 
As is well known, Hobbes used international relations as an example 
to illustrate his contention that the state of nature was the state of war. 
However, it seems, he needed to explain why the state of nature among 
states (the international state of nature) had not led to the creation of 
a 'greater Leviathan' when, according to him, the state of nature among 
individuals (the pure state of nature) would result in the emergence of 
the state. He argued, therefore, that the state of nature among states 
was less intolerable to men than the pure state of nature. He wrote: 
But though there had never been any time, wherein particular 
men were in a condition of war one against another; yet in 
all times, kings, and persons of sovereign authority, 
because of their independency, are in continual jealousies, 
and in the state and posture of gladiators; having their 
weapons pointing, and their eyes fixed on one another; that is, 
their forts, garrisons, and guns upon the frontiers of their 
kingdoms; and continual spies upon their neighbours; which is 
a posture of war. But because they uphold thereby, the industry  
of their subjects; there does not follow from it, that misery, 
which accompanies the liberty of particular men.
10 
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It is instructive to note that Frederick Schuman, who was critical 
of the states system, when quoting the above and the subsequent 
paragraphs from Hobbes, deleted the underlined sentence, replacing it with 
a few dots.
11 
Those, like Schuman, who see in the fragmentation of the 
world into sovereign states the main cause of the unmitigated power 
struggle between peoples tend to identify the international state of 
nature with the pure state of nature without incorporating Hobbes's own 
qualification in this respect. 
But the Hobbesian qualification, embryonic in his own writing, became 
developed into a standard argument in the theory of international 
relations, that the conditions of social order among states are not 
identical with the conditions of order among individuals. This line of 
thought had been adopted and expanded by Spinoza, Pufendorf, Wolff and 
Vattel, some of whom clearly influenced Bull's conception of international 
law and relations.
12 
In addition, among some international lawyers particularly of the late 
nineteenth century and the early twentieth century, there was a tendency 
to regard international law as sui generis, although not all those who 
adhered to this view of international law rejected the domestic analogy 
entirely.
13 	
In fact, the view of international society held by Manning, 
Bull and others who share their position, is in some respects similar to 
the doctrine of the specific character of international law advanced by 
those international lawyers. Thus Georg Jellinek, who was influential 
among the German adherents of this doctrine, characterized both 
international law and the community of states (Staatengemeinschaft) as 
'anarchisch', a description shared by Hedley Bull's The Anarchical Society.
14 
Here we may outline Bull's argument to reveal the underlying rationale 
of the position against the domestic analogy. 
The starting point of his analysis is that security against violence, 
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observance of agreements and stability of property are the three 
primary goals of society.
15 
This is so, according to Bull, not only 
with any existing society, but also with the postulated world society 
of mankind.
16 
To protect these goals a state is required, although, 
as Bull notes, primitive stateless societies are in their own ways also 
capable of maintaining order in the sense of the tolerable degree of 
satisfaction of these primary goals.
17 
But, as the classical writers 
used to say, when states have come into existence, there is no over-
whelming necessity for them to leave the international state of nature.
18 
This is because, Bull argues, 'anarchy among states is tolerable to a 
degree to which among individuals it is not.' 19 
There are four grounds for this assertion. First, unlike the 
individual in the Hobbesian state of nature, the state does not find its 
energies so absorbed in the pursuit of security that the life of its 
members is that of mere brutes. The same sovereigns that find themselves 
in a state of nature in relation to one another have prOvided, within 
their territories, the conditions in which refinements of life can flourish. 
Second, states in the international state of nature are free from all kinds 
of vulnerability to which individuals in the pure state of nature are 
subject. Third, to the extent that states are vulnerable to external 
attacks, they are not equally so: the vulnerability of the great power is 
qualitatively different from that of a small state. This can be contrasted 
to the Hobbesian state of nature where men are so little different in their 
individual physical abilities that even the weakest could have a fair 
chance of killing the strongest. Fourth, compared to individual human 
beings, states are much more economically self-sufficient. Thus states 
can survive without a high degree of economic co-operation much more 
successfully than can individuals among themselves.
20 
When Bull maintains that anarchy among states is tolerable to a degree 
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to which among individuals it is not, it is unclear to whom. Bull's 
first point, noted above, is that the international state of nature is 
not so intolerable to individuals as, to them, is the pure state of 
nature. Yet in his other three points, he is comparing the conditions 
of 'life' of the personified states in the international state of 
nature with the conditions of life of individual persons in the pure 
state of nature. 
Since such a term as 'vulnerability' or 'economic self-sufficiency' 
means different things when applied to individual persons and to 
personified states, it is doubtful whether there is much sense in 
comparing the two cases. Bull's point, therefore, may not be that states 
in the international state of nature are less vulnerable or more  
economically self-sufficient than are individuals in the pure state of 
nature, but rather that categories like 'vulnerability' and 'economic 
self-sufficiency' which we may use to characterize the life of individual 
persons do not apply in the same sense to personified states. 
At any rate, on the four grounds noted above, Bull argues against the 
notion that what Hobbes suggested men in the state of nature would do, 
should be done in the international state of nature. As will be 
discussed more fully in the next chapter, a social contract among 
sovereign states to leave the international state of nature can be of 
two types, corresponding to what we shall call in this thesis the two 
basic forms of the domestic analogy. According to one, the domestic 
analogy leads to the advocacy of a world state, and according to the 
other, it leads to the argument that certain basic principles of 
domestic society should be transferred to the international sphere 
without thereby altering the nature of international relations as a 
system of sovereign states. Bull is opposed to both, and argues against 
the substitution of a world state for the present sovereign states system, 
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and, within the present system, against those elements of international 
law relating to the control of force which have been introduced to the 
system in the twentieth century under the influence of the domestic 
analogy. Against these alternatives, Bull advances an elaborate 
argument to the effect that states can maintain ordered relationships 
among themselves through the operation of what he calls the 'institutions 
of international society', namely, the balance of power, international 
law, diplomacy, war and the special role played by the great powers 
through their co-operation. 21 According to him, a world government may 
undermine individual liberty, and is no guarantee of peace and security 
where mutually hostile communities have to coexist; and the international 
law of the twentieth century, as embodied in the Covenant of the League 
of Nations, the Kellogg-Briand Pact and the Charter of the United Nations, 
is not only ineffective in the control of force, but also positively 
harmful to the maintenance of international order since it interferes 
with the operation of other institutions of international society, the 
balance of power and war, in particular.
22 
Bull acknowledges that the goals of economic and social justice, and 
of the efficient control of the global environment are hard to attain 
within the framework of the sovereign states system. However, in his 
judgement, even with respect to these goals, the states system is an 
acceptable mode of organizing the world. According to him, peace and 
security between separate national communities are a prerequisite for 
any move towards economic and social justice, or towards an improved 
control of the global environment, and the states system is a suitable 
means for obtaining these preliminary goals. Moreover, in his view, 
the states system does in fact make some, not inconsiderable, contribution, 
and might even be expected in future to increase its contribution, 
towards the goals of justice and efficient environmental control. At 
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any rate, according to him, there is no assurance that a world government 
as such can contribute more significantly towards these goals since 
economic and social injustices and environmental problems have much 
deeper causes than the political organization of the world. 23 
To the extent that we can treat Bull's argument as revealing the 
implicit assumptions and attitudes of those who oppose the domestic 
analogy, we can see that their position stems from a number of 
inter-related factors. Among them are: confidence in the sovereign states 
system to cope with multifarious problems facing mankind; a conservative 
inclination to prefer small adjustments within the system to its radical 
structural alterations; a clear differentiation between intra-societal 
and inter-societal human relationships, and a tendency to see the state 
as a different kind of person from the individual; a relatively low 
estimation of the degree to which the moral standards of human relation-
ships at the international level can be brought up to those of the 
domestic sphere; a belief in the priority of security, order and peace 
to economic justice and social welfare; and the distrust of legalism. 
Against the critics of the domestic analogy, going back as far as 
Hobbes and other classical writers, and coming down through certain 
international lawyers, to Manning, Bull and a number of other contemporary 
writers on International Law and Relations, there is the opposite 
tendency, to uphold the domestic analogy, which has been shared by a 
vast number of writers through generations. The period of the First 
World War, leading to the creation of the League of Nations, teems with 
arguments based on this analogy as will be shown later in this thesis. 
But even before the Great War, many thinkers had advanced arguments 
based upon it. 
For example, James Lorimer, an Edinburgh Professor of Public Law and 
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the Law of Nature and Nations, who put forward one of the most detailed 
proposals in Britain in his time for an international government, stated 
that the ultimate problem of international jurisprudence was to find 
international equivalents for the factors known to national law as 
legislation, adjudication and execution. 24 
Lorimer conceded that future ingenuity of man might discover 'a 
self-adjusting balance of power, a self-modifying European Concert, or 
some other hitherto unthought-of expedient which, in the hands of 
diplomacy, [would] act as a cheaper guarantee against anarchy than' 
could international institutions built on the analogy of municipal law.
25 
However, he maintained that, in the domestic sphere, the harmonious action 
of the three factors, legislation, adjudication and execution, had been 
found universally to be inseparable from the existence of the body 
politic. 26 He argued that, in the international sphere, all the methods 
which had been suggested as being capable of creating and preserving 
order, but did not involve the establishment of an international government, 
for example, the balance of power or free trade, could be shown to be 
unsatisfactory.
27 
Thus, in Lorimer's view, an international government, 
embracing the functions of legislation, adjudication and execution was 
indispensable. 
Lassa Oppenheim, who wrote a generation after Lorimer, is thought by 
some to belong to the other camp, the critics of the domestic analogy.
28 
Indeed, he was opposed to an unlimited use of the analogy, and especially 
before the First World War, he was against the idea of organized sanctions 
in international law.
29 
Nevertheless, he associated himself with the 
supporters of the domestic analogy when he stated in his well-known 
textbook that the progress of international law depended to a great 
extent upon 'whether the legal school of International Jurists prevail[ed] 
over the diplomatic school.' 3° The legal school, according to Oppenheim, 
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desired international law to develop more or less on the lines of domestic 
law, 'aiming at the codification of firm, decisive, and unequivocal 
rules of International Law, and working for the establishment of 
international Courts for the purpose of the administration of international 
justice.' 31 On the other hand, 'the diplomatic school', wrote Oppenheim, 
'consider&V International Law to be, and preferftel7 it to remain, 
rather a body of elastic principles than of firm and precise rules.'
32 
According to him, the diplomatic school opposed the establishment of 
international courts 'because it considernd7 diplomatic settlement of 
international disputes, and failing this arbitration, preferable to 
international administration of justice by international Courts composed 
of permanently appointed judges.'
33 
Among the better-known international lawyers of this century, one of 
the staunchest critics of the tenets of the diplomatic school was Hersch 
Lauterpacht, a Cambridge Professor and judge at the International Court 
of Justice. 
Lauterpacht expressed his ideas on the problem of world order through 
a number of scholarly writings, the first of which, Private Law Sources  
and Analogies of International Law, appeared in 1927. In this book, 
he revealed the extent to which the concepts, rules and institutions of 
contemporary international law were derived by analogy from domestic 
private law sources. However, the correspondence between private law 
and international law broke down in one important respect. Within a 
domestic system the use of force is generally prohibited, while in the 
international system the freedom of states to resort to force had 
traditionally been regarded as being outside the concern of positive law. 
Consequently, the acquisition of territory by conquest, and, more 
broadly, the imposition of treaties under duress, were permitted by the 
traditional system of public international law, while private law does 
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not recognize such a mode of acquiring property or making contracts.
34 
Lauterpacht held that this lack of correspondence should not be 
regarded as an inevitable feature of the law of nations. He characterized 
this dissimilarity as a 'missing link' of the two systems of law, and 
remarked as follows: 
The development of international law towards a true system of 
law is to a considerable degree co-extensive with the 
restoration of the missing link of analogy of contracts and 
treaties, i.e., of the freedom of will as a requirement 
for the validity of treaties, and with the relegation of 
force to the category of sanctions. The Covenant of the 
League'of Nations, which, in its Article 10, safeguards the 
political independence and territorial integrity of the Members 
of the League from acts of external aggression, may be 
regarded as containing, in gremio, the elements of this 
development.
35 
It was probable, he speculated, that a body of rules might evolve which 
closely corresponded to public law within the municipal sphere, for 
instance, to constitutional and administrative law.
36 
However, such a 
development was hindered, he thought, by the influential doctrine of the 
specific character of international law.
37 
In the field of adjudication, 
this doctrine manifested itself as that of the inherent limitations in 
the judicial process in international law, for the refutation of which 
he wrote another major work, The Function of Law in the International  
Community. 
Lauterpacht's view that international law should not be treated as a 
type of law intrinsically different from municipal law was clearly 
stated in the following passage in this book: 
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The more international law approaches the standards of 
municipal law, the more it approaches to those standards 
of morals and order which are the ultimate foundation of 
all law.... It is better that international law should 
be regarded as incomplete, and in a state of transition 
to the finite and attainable ideal of a society of States 
under the binding rule of law, as generally recognized 
and practised by civilized communities within their 
borders, than that, as the result of the well-meant 
desire to raise its formal authority qua law, it should 
be treated as the perfect and immutable species of a 
comprehensively diluted genus proximum.
38 
It is with this line of thought in mind, and possibly even with this 
particular passage in mind, that Manning, a critic of the domestic 
analogy and one-time colleague of Lauterpacht at the London School of 
Economics, was later to remark: 
It is more realistic to see international law as law of 
a different species, than as merely a more primitive form 
of what is destined some day to have the nature of a 
universal system of non-primitive municipal law.
39 
The line of thought followed by Lauterpacht, as was noted at the 
outset, appears now to be somewhat out of fashion, and even in its heyday 
there were some who never fully subscribed to it, or were critical of it. 
The idea that the domestic analogy is misleading has become so well-
established, it seems, that even those, like Richard Falk, who are 
progressivist in their outlook, warn against the reliance on this 
analogy.
40 
This does not mean that the domestic analogy has totally disappeared 
from contemporary international thought. A recent book by Carey Joynt 
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and Percy Corbett, Theory and Reality in World Politics, for example, 
endorses the domestic analogy as being essentially correct.
41 
However 
unfashionable in comparison to the first half of this century, there 
are still many advocates of international federalism and of world peace 
through law.
42 
Moreover, the domestic analogy may be said to form part 
of the assumptions of any contemporary writer on international affairs 
who attributes the instability of the international system to its 
anarchic, de-centralized structure.
43 
Just as the critics of the domestic analogy can claim, so to speak, 
a distinguished pedigree in the classical tradition of political and 
international thought, so can the supporters of this analogy. This of 
course does not mean that a pattern of thought with a distinguished 
ancestry is inherently superior. But it does suggest that the validity 
or otherwise of the domestic analogy has been one of the central 
concerns in the history of international thought. 
When early instances of the domestic analogy are sought in the 
classical literature on international theory, it is sometimes suggested 
that they are to be found in the early writings on international law. 
Indeed it is well-known that Natural Law writers of the early modern 
period freely borrowed principles and concepts from municipal law 
sources, the Roman ius gentium in particular, and applied them to their 
new subject-matter.
44 
In the words of T.E. Holland, the law of nations 
'is an application to political communities of those legal ideas which 
were originally applied to the relations of individuals.' 45 
It is questionable, however, that very early writers considered 
their legal reasoning as being analogical when they asserted that certain 
principles governed the relations of sovereigns. These principles, 
in their view, were axiomatic and governed human conduct universally. 
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It was because of this universal validity that, in their view, Natural 
Law governed international relations. Thus, according Joynt and Corbett: 
'For the earliest writers, the law of nations ... was world law equally 
binding upon governments and individuals. The sovereigns and the 
common man were alike members of a world community and, in their 
different stations, subjects of its law.' 46 
The difference between analogical reasoning and the application of 
axioms to particular instances will be explored further in Chapter II. 
In Natural Law tradition, the transfer of principles from the 
municipal to the international sphere was largely in the area of private 
law, although an element of public law was also transposed to the 
international sphere. Thus, as Michael Donelan points out, in the 
Natural Law tradition, war was often conceptualized as a process 
whereby sovereigns were to act as judges.
47 
The idea that sovereigns should act as judges, or as if they were 
judges, however, differs from a proposal for establishing an international 
court in which there are judges. Although some Natural Law writers 
commended arbitration and conferences, it was not their primary 
concern to advocate the re-organization of international society by 
transferring domestic constitutional institutions, such as the court 
of justice. 48 
The writings of those who considered it to be their primary task to 
propose a plan for the re-organization of international society may be 
said to form a separate genre from the works on Natural Law. F.H. Hinsley's 
Power and the Pursuit of Peace, and a number of works concerned to 
exhume the precursors of the League of Nations ideas record many 
projects for the re-organization of the European, or international 
society. 49 
Within this body of literature, we encounter, for instance, the 
- 35 - 
project of Saint-Pierre, who, according to Murray Forsyth's study, was 
inspired by the domestic analogy. In Forsyth's judgement, Saint-Pierre 
believed that 'the kind of argument that Hobbes had used to demonstrate 
the necessity for men to unite into states, could be transposed one 
stage further to demonstrate the necessity for states themselves to form 
a universal union.'
50 
 Furthermore, according to Forsyth, it is clear 
from Saint-Pierre's writings that 'the Swiss Confederation, the United 
Provinces of the Netherlands, and above all the Germanic Empire, provided 
the guidelines for the kind of organization that he wished to see 
established at the European level.' 51 
It may.be noted here that a somewhat technical question arises as to 
whether a project derived from a confederal model, such as the old Swiss 
Confederation, can be said to be based on the domestic model at all, 
given that a confederation is not, strictly speaking, a state. This 
question will be discussed in Chapter II. 
Here it may also be noted that the domestic analogy entered the 
theoretical discourse on international relations when sovereigns or 
sovereign states came to be regarded as co-existing in the pre-societal 
state of nature. There is a clear tension between such a view of 
international relations and the older view that 'sovereigns and common 
man were alike members of a world community and, in their different 
stations, subjects of its law'. The use of the domestic analogy 
indicated both the decline in the assumption of the universal moral 
community as a foundation of international theory and the felt need to 
reconstruct the international system so as to enhance co-operation 
between states or to realize the potential unity of mankind. 
Statements along the lines of the domestic analogy are also found in 
Kant who built on the works of Saint-Pierre and Rousseau.
52 
In the 
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oft-quoted passage from Idea for a Universal History from a Cosmo-
political Point of View, Kant states as follows: 
What avails it to labour at the arrangement of a 
Commonwealth as a Civil Constitution regulated by 
law among individual men? The same unsociableness 
which forced men to it, becomes again the cause of 
each Commonwealth assuming the attitude of uncontrolled 
freedom in its external relations, that is, as one 
State in relation to other States; and consequently, 
any one State must expect from any other the same sort 
of evils as oppressed individual men and compelled them 
to enter into a Civil Union regulated by law.
53 
We shall have an opportunity to come back to this remark later in this 
thesis. 
In a later work, The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, Kant also wrote: 
Inasmuch as the state of nature among nations, just 
like that among individual men, is a condition that 
should be abandoned in favour of entering a lawful 
condition, all the rights of Nations and all the 
external property of Nations that can be acquired or 
preserved through war are merely provisional before 
this change takes place; only through the establishment 
of a universal union of states (in analogy to the 
union that makes a people into a state) can these 
rights become peremptory and a true state of peace 
be achieved.
54 
Kant went on to qualify that the unversal union of states could not 
in fact take the form of a world state, but should be a 'permanent 
congress of states'.
55 
According to Forsyth, Kant gradually shifted his 
view on the extent to which justice can be realized within the existing 
- 37 - 
framework of international relations, and, by the time the above 
passage was written, he had come to favour a less radical change than in 
his earlier days when he preferred a somewhat closer union of states.
56 
Nevertheless it remains the case that the basic structure of Kant's 
argument was along the lines of the domestic analogy: states must unite 
into an international body just as it was necessary for individuals to 
unite under separate states.
57 
Throughout the nineteenth century, after the Napoleonic Wars, many 
proposals for European or international organization were put forward. 
As early as 1814, at the time of the Congress of Vienna, Saint-Simon, 
in France, advanced a proposal for the re-organization of European 
society. Towards the middle of the century, in America, William Ladd, 
the founder of the American Peace Society, formulated his plan for the 
Congress and the Court of Nations. Towards the end of the century, there 
was a project by James Lorimer mentioned earlier, and a counter-proposal 
advanced in Germany by J.C. Bluntschli. Proposals by these writers 
are examined in Chapter III. 
Those who appear to support the domestic analogy are not uniform in 
their fundamental assumptions. For example, Saint-Pierre argued along 
the utilitarian lines whereas Kant, by contrast, held it to be a moral 
imperative to overcome the unlawful conditions of the existing states 
system. Yet there are certain common elements in the beliefs and 
attitudes of those who appear to support the domestic analogy. Among 
them are: a general dissatisfaction with the ways in which the 
international system is organized, and, in some cases, an acutely critical 
attitude towards the sovereign states system as such; a belief in the 
possibility, or even the actuality, of the historical progress of mankind 
towards more harmonious relationships; the tendency to regard war as an 
unacceptable institution; the desire to transfonnthe present conditions 
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of international life in which power dominates into a more rational 
system based on free consent, and to expand the realm of the rule of law 
from within the state to the external relations of states. 
Thus we now have a rough picture of the contending intellectual 
dispositions in the tradition of speculation about the system of states. 
On the one hand, the opponents of the domestic analogy appear to 
include: Hobbes, Spinoza, Pufendorf, Wolff and Vattel; certain 
international lawyers of the late nineteenth century and the early 
twentieth century who stressed the specific character of international 
law; Manning, Bull, and those who follow, or agree with, their basic 
tenets about the uniqueness of international society. On the other hand, 
the supporters of the domestic analogy seem to include: Saint-Pierre 
and Kant; Saint-Simon, Ladd, Lorimer, and Bluntschli; Oppenheim, 
Lauterpacht, and those contemporary writers who follow their paths 
either in advancing a proposal or in diagnosing the conditions of 
international life. 
The division of thinkers in terms of these two contending intellectual 
dispositions is not an entirely externally imposed pattern. As 
indicated by Oppenheim's own distinction between the 'legal school' and 
the 'diplomatic school', some thinkers have characterized their own 
views in the light of the division of opinion over the issue of the 
domestic analogy.
58 
 
However, the debate about the domestic analogy has not so far been 
conducted in a very systematic fashion. There does not appear to be any 
agreement in detail over what the 'domestic analogy' is, or any clear 
analysis of its range and types. This may be because a paradigmatic 
instance of the domestic analogy is easy to see, for example, an 
international police idea. It may also be because the term 'domestic 
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analogy', or the idea it signifies, has been used more as a weapon of 
debate than as a tool of analysis. Under these circumstances, cases 
are conceivable where one writer, who claims to favour the use of the 
domestic analogy, and another writer, who claims to be opposed to it, 
turn out, upon closer examination, to be making a similar degree of 
concession to it. Those who in principle endorse the domestic analogy 
may in fact resort to it in such diverse ways that there may be a good 
deal of disagreement among them. Moreover, those who at first appear 
to be using the domestic analogy may turn out to be advancing a type 
of argument which cannot be classified as an instance of this analogy. 
Since this thesis attempts to make sense of, and to scrutinize, 
commonly held ideas about how the world should be organized specifically 
from the viewpoint of their reliance on, or independence of, the 
domestic analogy, our first step must be to examine the range and types 
of this analogy. What types of proposal should be regarded as being 
based on this analogy? What kinds of argument will count as instances 
of the domestic analogy? These are the questions to be discussed in 
the next chapter. Only with some clear ideas about these questions can 
we hope to discuss how the domestic analogy has been used, or rejected, 
in proposals for world order. 
- 40 - 
Chapter II 	The Range and Types of the Domestic Analogy 
It is important to point out at the outset that in the following the 
word 'analogy' is used only in the sense of 'analogical reasoning'.
1 
This has the following form: 
Since with regard to an X or Xs, Y is the case, therefore 
with regard to X', which is like an X, Y must also be the case. 
The Oxford English Dictionary defines this sense of the word as: 
The process of reasoning from parallel cases; presumptive 
reasoning based upon the assumption that if things have 
some similar attributes, their other attributes will be 
similar. 
The term 'analogy', of course, has a number of other related usages. Thus, 
for example, to make the point that a treaty is like a contract, it is 
sometimes said (1) that there is an 'analogy' between treaty and contract, 
or, exceptionally and perhaps incorrectly, (2) that the 'domestic analogy' 
of treaty is contract. In (1), the word 'analogy' means 'correspondence', 
'affinity' or 'similarity', and in (2) it really means an 'analogue', 
'counterpart' or 'comparable object'. This thesis, however, is concerned 
with 'analogy' only in the sense of 'analogical reasoning'. The term 
'analogy' will be used in this sense alone throughout the following 
discussion except where it has otherwise been used in a passage to be 
quoted from other works. 
It must also be pointed out that in the following we are not concerned 
with municipal law analogies in legal reasoning. For example, 
D.W. Bowett has argued that the right of collective self-defence under 
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Article 51 of the United Nations Charter cannot be exercised by a state 
which could not legally have exercised a right of individual self-defence 
in the same circumstances.
2 
This interpretation, as Michael Akehurst 
points out, is based partly on analogies drawn from English law at the 
time Bowett was writing. At that time, English law did not allow one 
person to use force in defence of another unless there was a close 
relationship, for example, a family relationship, between the two persons 
concerned.
3 
To the extent that Bowett's argument is advanced as an interpretation 
of existing international law, it is a legal argument. It is part of the 
practice of law that analogies are employed from time to time. Although, 
admittedly, the boundary between what is to count as an interpretation 
of existing international law and what is in effect an argument 
de lege ferenda may in some cases be obscure, municipal law analogies 
which occur within the framework of legal discourse, purporting to state 
what the law is on a given issue, will not form part of the concern of 
this thesis. 
What then is the precise character of the domestic analogy which 
forms the focus of attention of this thesis? 
According to Hedley Bull's formula noted in the previous chapter, the 
'domestic analogy' in part prescribes that 'the institutions of domestic 
society be reproduced on a universal scale.' 4 However, it may be recalled, 
Manning had conceded that he was resorting to this analogy 'for once' 
when he argued that, as in the domestic sphere, a system at the 
international level required for its effective functioning a sufficiently 
prevalent disposition, among its constituent units, at least to tolerate 
the system.
5 
No matter how broadly the term 'institutions' in Bull's 
formula may be interpreted, it is clear that the disposition to tolerate 
a system cannot itself be an 'institution'. Therefore, although Manning 
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had himself admitted that he was resorting to the domestic analogy in 
the above context, he cannot be regarded as having done so if, as our 
criterion, we take Bull's narrower conception of it. 
In fact, most of those who discuss the 'domestic analogy' appear to 
do so in Bull's sense of the term, and we may therefore take his 
formula as a guideline for our investigation. An unexpectedly large 
number of complex questions arise, however, as to Bull's seemingly 
innocuous remark that, according to this analogy, the institutions of 
domestic society should be reproduced on a universal scale. An 
examination of these questions provides us with one effective way of 
elucidating the range and types of the domestic analogy, and this is 
what we aim to do in this chapter. Before we embark on this task, 
however, it is necessary to return once again to Manning's contention 
noted above in order to reveal an important feature of the analogy. 
The argument below rests on two points: that the domestic analogy 
involves an analogical inference from an empirical statement supported 
by domestic experience; and that this analogy should be distinguished 
from an argument based on logical deduction from a necessarily true 
proposition. It will be contended that Manning's argument, which he 
considered as an instance of the domestic analogy, is not in fact an 
analogical argument at all, but that on closer examination it turns out 
to be a case of logical deduction from an axiom. To clarify this point, 
we may compare the following two arguments adapted from Lorimer and 
Manning respectively, and presented schematically to facilitate contrast. 
Argument (I) 
1. Universal experience shows that individuals, in order to 
enjoy an orderly social life among themselves, require a 
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government consisting of the legislative, judicial 
and executive branches. 
2. States are like individuals. 
3. Therefore, states, in order to enjoy an orderly 
social life among themselves, require an 
international government consisting of the 
legislative, judicial and executive branches.
6 
Argument (II) 
1. In order for a social system to function effectively, 
there has to be a sufficiently prevalent disposition 
among its units at least to tolerate it. 
2. In the international sphere, we at present have a 
system commonly known as the 'Collective System'. 
3. Th'erefore, in order for the 'Collective System' to 
function effectively, there has to be a sufficiently 
prevalent disposition among states at least to 
tolerate it.
7 
Argument (I) fits the formula stated at the beginning of this chapter, 
and is clearly 'analogical'. Moreover, it is important to note that 
Argument (I) proposition 1 is a statement purported to be a universal 
generalization on empirical matters. Its plausibility rests on the 
strength of empirical evidence, and hence it is not axiomatic. The 
first proposition of Argument (II), by contrast, is not an empirical 
statement at all. It is in fact a statement which must be necessarily 
true. This is because, a social system being at least partly a 
human-operated thing, it cannot function effectively unless there is a 
human disposition to operate it effectively. How much disposition there 
has to be, if at all meaningful, is a difficult empirical question. 
But that this disposition be 'sufficiently prevalent' is necessarily 
true because here 'sufficiency' cannot but be measured in terms of the 
disposition's ability to make the system function effectively. 
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Therefore proposition 1 is just as necessarily true as a statement that 
for someone to finish reading this chapter, there has to be a sufficiently 
strong disposition on his or her part so to do. 
If Argument (II) proposition 1, like its counterpart in Argument (I), 
were an empirical statement, then we could not rule out the possibility 
of us one day encountering a social system with regard to which 
proposition 1 would not hold. But this cannot be the case as Argument (II) 
proposition 1 is necessarily true, and hence it must be true of any 
social system. If it is true of any social system, then it must be true 
of the 'Collective System', which is a social system, and which, just 
like any other social system, is at least partly human-operated. Thus, 
Argument (II), which is Manning's, is an instance of a logical deduction 
from an axiomatic statement, and, unlike the case of Argument (I), it 
does not involve an analogical inference from an empirical statement. 
It will perhaps be objected that by a 'social system' should be 
understood a society of individuals and that, therefore, the 'Collective 
System' is not actually a 'social system': it is like a 'social system'. 
This appears to be what Manning had assumed in suggesting that he was, 
for once, accepting the domestic analogy. 
However, whether Manning was aware of it or not, Argument (II) 
proposition 1 is structured so as to apply to any social, at least 
partly human-operated, system. Thus, there seems no reason to insist 
that the term 'social system' in this statement should only mean a 
society of individuals. Indeed, to do so would be to draw an 
unnecessary demarcation line between 'social' and 'international'. It is 
on the basis of this demarcation, which is unnecessary in the context of 
proposition 1, that Manning appears erroneously to have conceived of his 
reasoning as being 'analogical'. This may be an instance where his 
determination to see international phenomena as sui generis clouded 
- 45 - 
his power of analysis. 
We may now turn to the main task of this chapter, which is to examine 
a set of questions arising from Bull's remark that, according to the 
domestic analogy, the institutions of domestic society should be 
reproduced on a universal scale. Our first question relates to the purposes 
of those proposals which can legitimately be described as being based on 
this analogy. This will be followed by an investigation into the means 
suggested by this analogy. 
When Manning used the term in the passage discussed above, he was 
referring to the conditions of orderly coexistence in the domestic and 
international spheres. Similarly, Hedley Bull has explained the domestic 
analogy as the argument which holds the conditions of an orderly social 
life to be the same among states as they are within them. However, 'order' 
is not the only subject-matter with regard to which we may argue about 
the validity or otherwise of the domestic analogy. Although Bull himself 
distinguishes not only between 'order' and 'justice', but also between 
'order' and 'peace', it would be unreasonable if he were to insist that the 
domestic analogy should be about the conditions of order, and not about 
any other social goals.
8 
Thus, it will be understood in the following that the domestic analogy 
is an argument based on experience from within the state as regards the 
conditions of order, and other related social goals, such as peace, 
security, welfare and justice in international society. This last phrase, 
'in international society', however, needs to be looked at with caution. 
Typically, a proposal based on the domestic analogy will suggest, for 
example, that just as order among individuals within a state requires a 
police force, so order in international society requires an analogous 
institution, an international police. There will be little hesitation 
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in characterizing such a proposal as one dependent on the domestic 
analogy.
9 
A proposal, however, may suggest, for example, that an international 
police should be used for the maintenance of order not only in 
international relations, but also in suppressing rebellion against the 
existing national regimes. Saint-Pierre's project noted earlier 
contained a similar idea.
10 
In this type of project, the institution being proposed may be said to 
serve the goal of order in two realms, international and domestic. 
Nevertheless, to the extent that the institution being proposed is 
analogous to a domestic institution (in this case, the police), and to 
the extent that the purpose of the proposed institution is at least 
partly, and perhaps chiefly, the maintenance of international order, it 
would be reasonable to say that such a proposal was dependent on the 
domestic analogy. This is because a proposal of this type does involve 
the assumption that domestic order and international order require a 
similar type of institution. 
What can be said, however, if a proposal for an international 
institution, which is in some way inspired by a domestic model, aims 
chiefly at the simultaneous attainment of a certain goal within each 
member-state? 
For example, it may be proposed that the problem of unemployment 
cannot be solved without an authority which can co-ordinate the economic 
policies of separate states. An institution proposed on such an 
assumption may have been inspired by a domestic institution, for example, 
an economic planning agency, but will be designed chiefly for the purpose 
of creating jobs for the citizens of separate states. 
Such a plan can be contrasted with the case noted above where an 
international police, based on a domestic analogue, is designed to serve 
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the purpose of maintaining international order. In that case, the 
entities intended by the proposal to enjoy order are states as such in 
their mutual relations, unlike in the case noted here, where it is not 
the states as such which the proposal aims to create jobs for. Clearly, 
it is absurd to speak of states as being employed or unemployed, while 
they can meaningfully, though metaphorically, be said to enjoy an 
orderly social life among themselves. 
A proposal for the solution of an unemployment problem of the kind 
being considered here assumes that the problem of economic and social 
welfare within the sphere of each state can be dealt with more effectively 
if the level of control is upgraded from the domestic to the international. 
The reasoning which underlies such a proposal is qualitatively different 
from the_domestt -Cail-O4TO'd15er—since,- unlike-the latter,-the- former 
does not involve the personification of the state. 
If we can interpret this kind of proposal as being intended for the 
enhancement of the general welfare of personified states in international 
society through the reduction in unemployment within each, then the 
proposal may be said to involve the domestic analogy. This is so because 
such a proposal assumes that just as a domestic economic planning 
authority serves the general welfare of individual citizens within a 
domestic sphere, so an international economic planning authority serves 
the general welfare of personified states in international society. 
However, it may in practice be difficult to determine whether a proposal 
can be said to involve this form of analogical reasoning. 
To complicate matters somewhat, a proposal for an international 
control of the internal problems of separate states is also sometimes 
intended to serve the goal of creating more harmonious relationships 
between them. Thus, for example, a proposal for an international 
institution designed to solve the problem of unemployment in each of the 
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member-states may at the same time be intended to contribute towards 
the goal of peace among them through the removal of the economic causes 
of war. A number of proposals produced in the middle of the twentieth 
century, in the aftermath of the Great Depression, falls into this 
category as will be discussed later in this thesis. 11 To the extent 
that the aim of these proposals is partly to create order between states 
by the establishment of those institutions inspired by a domestic 
experience, it may perhaps be thought that these proposals involve a 
domestic analogy. 
This is not necessarily so. If a proposal for an international 
economic planning authority is based on the assumption that international 
order presupposes international economic justice (a fair distribution of 
wealth among states or between classes of states) just as domestic order 
is dependent upon economic justice within a state (a fair distribution 
of wealth among citizens or between classes of citizens), then the 
proposal clearly involves an analogical reasoning based on experience 
from domestic society. If, however, the proposal assumes that by solving 
economic problems of each state through an international authority, we 
will remove the economic causes of war, then no analogical reasoning is 
involved in the argument at all. 
The type of proposal under consideration, exemplified by an advocacy 
of the creation of an international economic planning agency for the 
solution of economic problems within each member-state, will not be 
excluded from our discussion which follows, but the nature of the reasoning 
which underpins the proposal will be clarified. 
The foregoing analysis is based on the distinction between 'national' 
and 'international' purposes, and it may be objected that this distinction 
is unwarranted. Indeed it is well known that there is no such thing as a 
matter which is intrinsically within the domestic jurisdiction of a state. 
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As soon as a given issue becomes an object of international regulation, 
it ceases to be a matter of domestic jurisdiction in international law. 
In a similar vein, it may be argued that what is apparently a domestic 
issue, such as the problem of unemployment, is in fact an international 
issue to the extent that its full solution can be had only through the 
co-operation of states. If so, it may be argued, a proposal for an 
international economic planning agency, inspired by the domestic 
experience, is intended to solve an 'international' problem proper, just 
as much as a project for an international police. Consequently, it might 
be thought inappropriate to draw a demarcation line, as we have done, 
between the two types of proposal. 
This is indeed an interesting line of argument which points us to the 
danger of 	unconscious reliance on the mental image of the state as a 
solid spatial object with an internal structure and external relations. 12 
None the less, it has to be repeated, the subjects intended by a proposal 
for an international police to enjoy order can meaningfully be said to be 
states, although the citizens of these states may enjoy security in their 
own lives as a result. By contrast, the subjects of economic and social 
welfare in the case of the other type of proposal are primarily individual 
men and women living in separate states, although these states, as a 
result of the successful operation of the proposed institution may claim 
higher standards of national well-being. To clarify this distinction, it 
may be said that the purpose of the one type of proposal is 'international' 
while that of the other is 'cross-national'. According to this terminology, 
the legitimate purposes of a proposal based on the 'domestic analogy' are 
International', although those proposals whose purposes are 'cross-national' 
will not be excluded from our discussion which follows. 
From the investigation into the purposes, we may turn to the means: 
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what means are suggested for the kind of purposes noted above by those 
proposals which we can justifiably regard as involving the domestic 
analogy? According to Bull, the means offered are the 'reproduction of 
the institutions of domestic society on a universal scale'. But, first 
of all, what is meant by 'institutions' here? 
Perhaps it is natural to assume that here Bull has in mind legal 
institutions of a state, institutions found within a state expressed in 
a legal form. But the term 'institutions' has a somewhat broader 
connotation than legal arrangements or devices, and includes rules, 
practices, and conventional techniques of a society which are not 
expressed in the form of law. Bull himself includes under the category 
of 'institutions' conventional rules and practices which are non-legal.
13 
The point made, for example, by Inis Claude is relevant here. He is 
critical of the domestic analogy exercised in a legalistic fashion, 
particularly where the argument is based on the criminal law model. 
But he is not opposed to borrowing political techniques for the 
management of power from within the sphere of domestic politics to apply 
to the international domain. Thus, in his view, what we can fruitfully 
learn from our domestic experience is not how a government deals with 
individual robbers, but how, through 'sensitive and skillful operation 
of the mechanism of political adjustment', it deals with the problem of 
maintaining order among conflicting groups.
14 
A similar view is 
advanced by E.H. Carr and J.L.Brierly.
5 
Sensitive and skillful operation', on the part of a government, 'of 
the mechanism of political adjustment' is a rather vague phrase. None 
the less, whatever may be meant by it, it seems doubtful that one can 
be said to be resorting to the domestic analogy unless the guiding 
principles of such an 'operation', whose application to the international 
sphere one is proposing, belong primarily to the realm of domestic 
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politics. This point may be clarified by the following example. 
One of the most essential techniques for the management of power, of 
the non-legal kind, is, in some writers' view, the balance of power. 
This is treated by some writers not only as the most fundamental, but 
also as a distinctive, institution of international society. 16 However, 
there are also some, like J. Allen Smith, who see the balance-of-power 
idea in international relations as 'merely an application of the check 
and balance theory of the state to international politics.
17 
Thus, 
according to one view, an argument in favour of the balance of power as 
a means of creating and maintaining international order will not count as 
an instance of the domestic analogy while, according to another view, it will 
As we noted above, however, a proposal can only be regarded as an 
instance of the domestic analogy if the institution in question belongs 
primarily to the domestic sphere. The balance of power does not seem to 
satisfy this condition since it is a device or technique found both in 
the domestic and in the international spheres. Moreover, as Martin 
Wight, a well-known author on the subject pointed out, the balance of 
power is a practice which statesmen had operated in inter-state relations 
long before the idea began to be formulated in theoretical terms.
18 
Thus, while some theorists may have argued, along with J. Allen Smith, 
that the balance of power in international relati66S- 1 -S- an-application of 
a domestic political theory and practice, this does not seem to provide 
a sufficient ground for saying that a proposal for the maintenance 
of international order through the balance of power is essentially an 
. 	 •• 
instance of the domestic analogy. However, if the argument which 
supports the proposal is explicitly based on a domestic model, it will 
be difficult to deny that in that particular instance its author is 
resorting to the domestic analogy although it was unnecessary to have 
done so. 
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Let us return to the Bull formula of the domestic analogy as there are 
a number of other points which require clarification. In Bull's view, 
the 'domestic analogy' holds that 'the institutions of domestic society 
be reproduced on a universal scale.' It has been noted above that here 
Bull probably has in mind 'the legal institutions of domestic society'. 
However, he could not have in mind all the legal institutions of domestic 
society in this context. However much we may be used to thinking of 
states as though they were persons, not all legal institutions relating 
to natural persons are relevant to entities which are persons only by 
imputation:19 
Thus Bull may be saying that, according to the domestic analogy, all 
or most of the important legal institutions of domestic society, which 
can meaningfully be applied to international relations, should be 
reproduced on a universal scale. According to this criterion, there 
would be little doubt that James Lorimer, for example, was using the 
domestic analogy since he advocated the creation of an international 
government consisting of the legislature, judicature and executive. 
One important question arises here, however. If, for example, one 
advocates the necessity for an international legislature and judicature, 
but argues against the necessity for an international executive organ, 
can one still be said to be using the analogy in question? The answer 
must be in the negative, if by the domestic analogy is understood an 
argument in favour of creating all or most of the important institutions 
of domestic society which can meaningfully be applied to international 
relations, for clearly an executive organ is one of such institutions. 
In fact, some writers stress the absence of an executive organ from 
their proposals as one of their distinctive features. Oppenheim, for 
example, was emphatic that his proposed international organization was 
un-state-like precisely because of this feature.
20 
Bull, as we saw, 
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has remarked that according to the domestic analogy 'the need of 
individual men to live in awe of a common power in order to live in 
peace is a ground for holding that states must do the same'. 21 The 
Hobbesian phrase 'in awe of a common power' suggests that, like 
Oppenheim, Bull may be of the opinion that a proposal which does not 
involve the creation of an international executive authority does not 
count as an instance of the domestic analogy. 
However, there is an important distinction to be drawn between the 
proposition that one's proposed international organization is 
un-state-like, and the proposition that there is no element of the 
domestic analogy in one's proposal. In the first place, however 
un-state-like, the proposed body may have some affinity with the state. 
After all, no organization is perfectly state-like unless it is actually 
a state. Secondly, regardless of the degree of affinity which may exist 
between the organizational structure of the state and that of the 
proposed body, one's argument in support of the proposed body may be 
based on analogical reasoning derived from domestic experience. 
Thus, the absence of a particular domestic-type institution from a 
proposed entity does not by itself seem to be a good ground for 
concluding that the proposal is free of the domestic analogy. Oppenheim's 
own project gives a good illustration here, because, despite his claim 
that his proposed body was un-state-like, he very clearly based his 
advocacy for the establishment of an international court and courts of 
appeal upon the experience of the judicial system in the domestic sphere.
22 
This seems to lead us to a tentative conclusion that even if one's 
proposal is far more modest than, for instance, James Lorimer's, and 
even if it only suggests, for example, that arbitration should become 
an international practice in the place of war, the proposal must be said 
to involve the domestic analogy. This is because an international 
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system equipped with an arbitration treaty is more analogous to a 
domestic system than is an international system not so equipped. 
Moreover, however negligible the affinity between the proposed body and 
a domestic system, the proposal may nevertheless be based explicitly 
on the domestic analogy. Thus, for example, although the proposal 
advanced in the middle of the nineteenth century by William Jay was, as 
a practical first step, simply to insert an arbitration clause in the 
next treaty between the United States and France, he must none the less 
be said to have resorted to the domestic analogy since he wrote as 
follows in support of his plan: 
Individuals possess the same natural right of 
self-defence, as nations, but the organization of 
civil society renders its exercise, except in very 
extreme cases, unnecessary, and therefore criminal.... 
Instead ... of resorting to force, he [a citizerg 
appeals to the laws. His complaint is heard by an 
impartial tribunal, his wrongs are redressed, he is 
secured from further injury, and the peace of 
society preserved. 
No tribunal, it is true, exists for the decision 
of national controversies; but it does not, therefore, 
follow that none can be established.... It is obvious 
that war might instantly be banished from Europe, 
would its nations regard themselves as members of one 
great society, and, by mutual consent, erect a court 
for the trial and decision of their respective 
differences.
23 
The same type of question as arose in relation to the balance of power 
earlier may arise in the case of arbitration. Is 'arbitration' primarily 
a domestic institution? The problem here is that the practice of 
arbitration could be traced back to ancient Greece. Thus, it may be 
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argued that arbitration is not primarily a domestic institution on 
the grounds that the ancient Greeks resorted to it in solving disputes 
between their city-states.
24 
This appears to be a rather strained argument, however. Arbitration 
has not always been a well-established institution of international 
relations. Thus there does not seem to be a strong enough reason to 
insistthat- an argument in favour of arbitration in the international 
sphere does not count as an instance of the domestic analogy, unless, of 
course, the argument specifically uses as models examples from the inter- 
national sphere, such as the practice of arbitration between Greek city-states. 
It ought perhaps to be stressed here that, for a proposal to count as 
an instance of the domestic analogy, it is sufficient that the institution 
concerned is found primarily in domestic society. The institution need 
not be an essential institution of domestic society in the sense of being 
a defining condition of a state. There are a number of institutions found 
primarily, or even exclusively, within the domestic sphere which are not 
integral to the concept of state. The arbitral tribunal, as opposed to 
a judicial authority, may itself be among them. The institution of the 
courts of appeal is another. A parliament is not integral to the concept 
of state, and even the institution of police is a relatively modern 
invention. 25 It would be unreasonable to insist that a proposal for the 
reproduction of any of these institutions in international society was 
not an instance of the domestic analogy merely because they were not 
essential to the concept of state. 
This leads us to another problem which arises from the Bull formula. 
He refers to the 'institutions of domestic society', but what precisely 
is domestic society? The term 'domestic' indicates that the society, 
the transfer of whose institutions into the international sphere is in 
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question, should itself be a state. Hence Bull's own remark that, 
according to the domestic analogy, the conditions of social order are 
the same 'among states as they are within them.' 
But what is the state? Some difficulty can arise here because it is 
usual to consider 'unitary states' and 'federations' as instances of 
'states', but to exclude 'confederations' from the category of 'states'. 
The German terms 'Bundesstaat' and 'Staatenbund' express this point well. 
A federation (Bundesstaat) is a state (Staat), but a confederation 
(Staatenbund) is a union of states (Staaten). To put it another way, a 
federation is a sovereign state whereas a confederation is a union of 
sovereign states, and not itself a sovereign state.
26 
If a peace-schemer argues that the institutions of a certain 
confederation be transferred to international society, in other words, 
if the schemer's model is a confederation and hence not a state, he may 
well claim that no domestic analogy is involved in the scheme. In an 
intellectual environment where the domestic analogy is treated with 
suspicion, a claim not to be using the domestic analogy, because the 
model employed is confederal, is one which a peace-schemer may well advance. 
Here it is important to note that whether a peace-schemer's model is 
a confederation, a federation or a unitary state may make little 
difference to the legal character of the body being proposed. To clarify 
this point, it is necessary to refer to another ambiguity in the Bull 
formula. This relates to the expression 'reproduced on a universal scale' 
which his formula contains. 
'Reproduction', in this context, can take one of the two basic forms, 
one retaining the sovereignty of the states involved, the other removing 
their sovereignty altogether. 
If it is proposed that the sovereign states system should remain 
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intact, but that the relations between legally independent political 
communities should now be governed by a legal system containing a set of 
principles more analogous to those of municipal law than at present 
embodied in international law, then the proposed reproduction of the 
domestic institution is of the first form. By contrast, if the suggestion 
is that the new entity should be organized in such a way that it will 
itself count as a sovereign state, then the proposed reproduction is of the 
second kind. The first form of reproduction is less far-reaching than the 
second, entailing, at most, the creation of a confederation, international 
government or organization, whereas the second type involves the creation 
of a world state, whether unitary or federal.
27 
In the second case, the 
sovereign states will transform into provinces or member-states of a 
federal union. 
Between these two basic types, it is possible to think of an intermediate 
type. This involves the creation of a supra-national organ, directly 
controlling the citizens' activities in certain limited areas which at 
present are controlled by separate national governments.
28 
Paradoxically perhaps, there is a case for saying that between the two 
basic types only the first form of reproduction should count as an instance 
of the domestic analogy. As a corollary, whether the intermediate 
type can be said to involve this analogy may depend on whether it is 
treated as a sub-category of the first type of reproduction. 
The argument that only the first type of reproduction counts as an 
instance of the domestic analogy rests on the following consideration. 
To the extent that the domestic analogy is interpreted as an argument 
which holds the conditions of order to be the same either within or 
among sovereign states, in each case requiring the same type of 
institutions, the argument can be understood to hold that the type of 
institutions in question must govern sovereign states as such, that is, 
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without affecting their legal independence. Therefore, on this view, 
the second basic form of reproduction under consideration, inasmuch as it 
advocates the replacement of the sovereign states system by a universal 
sovereign state, cannot count as an instance of the domestic analogy. 
Thus, for example, when Frederick Schuman argued that reforms within the 
framework of the states system were unsatisfactory, and that peace 
required the replacement of the sovereign states by a world state, his 
advocacy, on this view, was not an instance of the domestic analogy.
29 
However, this view of the domestic analogy may be considered as a 
little too narrow. The difference between the two basic types of 
'reproduction' may be seen as a matter of degree inasmuch as the two 
types of body resulting from them, seen from the viewpoint of formal 
structure, are different only in terms of the degree of centralization 
It may of course be objected that we must not obscure the fundamental 
difference in the political and sociological underpinnings of the two 
types of entity by simply choosing to see them in the light of the degree 
of centralization. On the other hand, if the 'domestic analogy' is 
defined as an argument according to which domestic-type institutions be 
employed to govern the relations of communities at present divided into 
sovereign units, then it can be made to encompass both types of proposal. 
If this broader definition is adopted, the claim made earlier that a 
proposal, in order to count as an instance of the domestic analogy, must 
aim at goals which are 'international', as opposed to 'cross-national', 
in character, requires a corresponding modification. The goal of order, 
peace, security, welfare or justice, which a proposal seeks, need no 
longer be 'international' in the sense of 'pertaining to the relations 
of sovereign states'. It is sufficient that it aims to establish one or 
more of these goals in the relations of communities which are at present  
divided into sovereign states. 
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It is interesting to note here that Bull himself seems to have no 
hesitation in considering as an instance of the domestic analogy an 
argument in favour of the replacement of the sovereign states system by 
a single, universal state.
30 
In fact, it even appears that our first 
form of reproduction, in Bull's view, is not actually an argument based 
on the domestic analogy, but one which makes 'concessions to it'. 31 
At any rate, the two basic types of proposal share similarities, and 
it seems unwise to remove from our purview a set of proposals which are 
akin to those based on the domestic analogy in a narrower, and perhaps 
strict, sense. Thus, in the following discussion, the two basic types 
of proposal will be included in our survey, together with the intermediate 
type, although the distinction between them will be borne in mind. 
The foregoing analysis shows that a peace-schemer's proposed entity 
may take various forms. It may be a state, unitary or federal. It may be 
a confederation, international government or an international organization, 
with or without supra-national organs. In its weak form, it may simply 
be an international court of arbitration. What is important to note is 
the fact that the legal character of the proposed entity is not necessarily 
identical with that of the model upon which the proposal is based. Thus 
it is possible that a unitary state is used as a model for a project where 
the proposed entity is itself a confederation, or even a loose form of 
international organization. Indeed, if the first form of reproduction 
noted above is used, the proposed entity cannot be more centralized than 
a confederation because, by this mode of reproduction, the sovereignty 
of the member states is to remain intact. The legal character of the 
proposed entity depends on how a model is used as much as on what a 
model is. 
This leads us back to the question we left earlier. If the model is 
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confederal, can we still say that the project involves the domestic 
analogy? 
Because the legal character of a peace-schemer's model, that is, 
whether it is a confederation, federation, or a unitary states, does not 
necessarily determine the legal character of the proposed body, there is 
a case for saying that, for the purpose of our discussion, it is inadvisable 
to draw a sharp demarcation line between the confederal and federal 
models. 
Let us suppose that a peace-schemer A uses a confederal model and 
produces a blue-print for an international organization X, and that a 
peace-schemer B uses a federal model and produces a blue-print for an 
international organization Y. Let us also suppose that X and Y involve 
a similar degree of centralization in the structure. Such a situation is 
easy to imagine. Depending on how a model is used, even a unitary-state 
model could produce a project for a confederation or a looser form of 
international organization. Indeed, some will insist that an argument 
based on the domestic analogy proper cannot, by definition, produce a 
plan for a body more centralized than a confederation. 
It appears that in such a hypothetical situation, little could be 
gained by insisting that A had not, and B had, used the domestic analogy. 
A might of course insist that, given the 'international' nature of his 
model, it would be unfair to class him together with B whose project was 
derived from a genuine domestic model. To this we may reply that a 
confederal model, while it is, strictly speaking, not a domestic model, 
is not a genuine 'international' model either. A confederation embodies 
institutions which are either borrowed from, or similar to those of, the 
domestic sphere. Thus, a confederal model is, so to speak, a second-order 
domestic model. Because of this it would seem more advisable to include 
in our purview those cases where confederal models are used than to 
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exclude them from it entirely. Here it may be noted that Oppenheim 
included in his scope of 'state-like' entities not only unitary and 
federal states, but also confederations.
32 
The ambiguity arising from the case where the model used is confederal 
is not of marginal significance. It directs our attention to the degree 
of artificiality involved in separating institutions into those of the 
domestic sphere and those of the international sphere. The division 
between the two types of institution is somewhat obscured by the presence 
of confederations in the middle. Another factor which can obscure the 
division is the historical development of international institutions. 
We may suppose that since the time Saint-Simon put forward his proposal 
for the re-organization of European society, the principles which govern 
inter-state relations have become somewhat more analogous to those 
pertaining to the domestic sphere. Disregarding for the moment the 
effectiveness of those institutions which have been transferred from the 
domestic to the international sphere since the time of Saint-Simon, and 
especially since the end of the First World War, we may say that 
institutional grafting has already taken place to some extent. This 
means that a peace-schemer, unlike in earlier times, may no longer have 
to depend on the domestic analogy explicitly. This point can be 
illustrated by comparing the arguments of William Jay, whom we noted 
earlier, and those of the Bryce group for the establishment of a League 
of Nations. 
As we saw, writing in the middle of the nineteenth century, Jay, in 
a relatively unambitious proposal for the eventual creation of an 
international tribunal, had argued explicitly on the basis of domestic 
experience. But, by the time the First World War was fought, international 
society had seen some degree of institutionalization. Thus, rather than 
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turning to strictly domestic experience, the Bryce group, in the period 
of the Great War, could propose the establishment of a League of Nations 
on the basis of existing international institutions, such as the 'Bryan 
Treaties' and the Hague system of arbitration, although, admittedly, 
'teeth' were to be added to them. The Bryce group argued that they were 
building upon existing facts and tendencies of international life, and 
claimed that they were not advocating a revolutionary change, but an 
orderly development. This claim had some plausibility because the suggested 
change was small enough by the standard of that time to enable the plan to 
be explained more economically as a generalization and systematization of 
existing international institutions than in terms of any domestic model.
33 
This does not mean that the Bryce group proposal was not in the end 
based on the domestic analogy. What this example shows is that a dividing 
line between the institutions of domestic society and those of international 
society is historically variable. This point will be discussed further 
in relation to the Bryce group proposal itself in Chapter V. The question 
of what may count as a case of the rejection of the domestic analogy will 
be discussed in Chapter IV. 
The foregoing discussion reveals that the domestic analogy has a very 
wide range of instances. It will be useful to conclude this chapter by 
summarizing the major points which have been noted. 
The domestic analogy is an analogy drawn from domestic experience, and 
it must be distinguished from deduction from axioms. It is a pattern of 
thought, or mode of reasoning, concerning the conditions not only of 
order, but also of such other related social goals as peace, security, 
welfare and justice. 
The purposes of a proposal based on this analogy must in principle 
primarily be 'international', as opposed to 'cross-national', in 
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character, although the proposal may at the same time aim at the 
attainment of certain social goals within each state. If, however, the 
achievement of goals within each state is the sole purpose of a proposal, 
it is doubtful whether the proposal can be said to involve a domestic 
analogy. The last point, however, will be dealt with more fully when we 
encounter concrete examples. 
According to the domestic analogy, the institutions of domestic society 
i.e., those which are found primarily in the domestic sphere, should be 
transferred to the international sphere. For a proposal to count as an 
instance of the domestic analogy, however, the institutions to be 
transferred to the international sphere need not be essential institutions 
of domestic society in the sense of being part of the defining conditions 
of the state. 
The institutions to be transferred may encompass all or most of the 
important institutions of domestic society, which can meaningfully be 
transferred to the international sphere, but this need not be the case. 
A body proposed on the basis of the domestic analogy can take various 
forms. According to a narrower, and perhaps strict, definition, a proposal 
for the creation of a state, unitary or federal, in the place of the 
existing sovereign states will not count as an instance of the domestic 
analogy. However, this analogy might be defined as an argument according 
to which domestic-type institutions be employed to govern the relations of 
communities at present divided into sovereign units. If this broader 
definition is adopted, the earlier claim that a proposal, in order 
justifiably to be regarded as an instance of the 'domestic analogy', must 
aim at goals which are 'international' in character, requires a 
corresponding modification. 
A claim not to be using the domestic analogy because the model being 
employed is confederal or because the proposed institution is no more 
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than a slightly modified version of what already exists in the 
international sphere creates some difficulty. However, a confederal model 
is not a genuine international model, and can be interpreted as a 
second-order domestic model. Whether or not the domestic analogy is being 
used where the proposed organization is merely a slightly modified version 
of what already exists in the international sphere is a question which 
should best be examined when we face a concrete example. 
In the following, proposals to be examined are frequently referred to 
as proposals for world order, or characterized as falling into that 
general category. This should not be taken to mean that we are excluding 
proposals for peace, security, welfare or justice. As it will be tedious 
to have to spell out each time that we are talking about proposals for 
order or other related social goals such as peace, security, welfare or 
justice, we will use the term 'world order' as a convenient shorthand 
for all. 
Nor shall we exclude from our discussion those proposals which do not 
encompass the whole world. Historically, schemes designed to cover all 
the nations of the world are relatively rare. A large proportion of them 
are concerned with major countries of the world, chiefly European nations 
and America. In some cases, proposals were formulated for a small 
number of states with a clear expectation that the number would gradually 
increase. In other cases, authors appear to have thought that if order 
could be achieved between the major countries of the world, the problem 
of 'world' order would largely be solved. In some other cases, especially 
in an earlier period, some European writers may have been sufficiently 
Eurocentric not to be concerned with problems outside Europe: to them 
Europe was the world. In any case, it is only in the recent period that 
proposals to encompass the whole world began to be advanced, and hence 
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the necessity began to be felt to distinguish between schemes for 
'regional' organization and those for 'global' organization. Although 
from today's standpoint this distinction is significant, its utility as 
a tool of analysis is limited when we consider proposals from an earlier 
period as this thesis intends to do. In the following discussion, 
therefore, unless there is a special reason, for the purpose of exposition, 
to characterize a proposal as one for 'regional' order as opposed to 
'world' order, it will be treated as belonging to the general category of 
'proposals for world order'. 
It should be added here that, in the following, 'world' order and 
'international' order are used interchangeably unless otherwise specified. 
It is of course possible to draw a distinction between the two along the 
lines suggested, for example, by Hedley Bull. According to him, the units 
which enjoy 'international' order are sovereign states while the units of 
'world' order are individuals.
34 
However, most authors discussed in the 
following use terms such as 'international peace and order', 'world 
peace', 'peace and welfare of nations', 'liberty and happiness in Europe' 
and so on without abiding by any clear common linguistic convention. 
Moreover, some proposals aim at the attainment of social goals among 
sovereign states and within them at the same time. Even where a proposal 
is intended specifically for an international goal, such as the 
maintenance of order in the external relations of sovereign states, its 
author is at least implicitly committed to the view that the proposed 
international institution, in conjunction with certain domestic institutions, 
would ensure the achievement of 'world' order in Bull's sense of the term. 
Therefore, as a part of the characterization of the-proposals in the 
following, we shall treat the terms 'world' and 'international' as though 
they were interchangeable. 
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Chapter III 	Some Nineteenth Century Examples 
This chapter is concerned with the use of the domestic analogy in 
proposals for world order which were produced in the period after the end 
of the Napoleonic Wars and before the Peace Conferences at the Hague at 
the turn of the century. The next chapter will examine the writings of 
the Hague Conferences period, which will be followed by Chapter V where 
the impact of the Great War upon the use of the domestic analogy will be 
discussed. Chapter VI will go on to examine attitudes towards the 
domestic analogy in the face of the failure of the League of Nations to 
preserve peace. 
The authors chosen for examination here are Saint-Simon, William Ladd, 
James Lorimer and J.C. Bluntschli. They have been selected chiefly 
because their proposals give a valuable insight into the use of the 
domestic analogy in proposals for world order. Apart from partly confirming 
Morgenthau's general statement, noted in the Introduction, that during the 
nineteenth century important sectors of public opinion demanded the 
application of liberal principles to international affairs, the four 
writers considered here also reveal in a striking manner the extent to 
which one's choice of a particular domestic model is influenced by one's 
immediate domestic political experience. Moreover, the four authors share 
a number of common characteristics which it is interesting to compare with 
those of other groups of thinkers from other historical periods. 	• 
The similarity of methods used by these authors, which will be revealed 
in the following, is particularly noteworthy when contrasted with the 
divergence in the legal character of the bodies they proposed. Saint-Simon's 
project appears to involve the federal integration of Europe, Ladd's scheme 
envisages a very loose association of states, and Lorimer's and Bluntschli's 
solutions, despite their disagreements, were confederal. Thus, 
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F.H. Hinsley, in his Power and the Pursuit of Peace, has treated these 
writers among others as representing the three distinct approaches of 
the nineteenth century to the problem of world order, each dictated by 
the specific tradition and historical circumstances.
1 
Their approaches, 
from the viewpoint of the legal character of the bodies proposed, are 
indeed mutually exclusive, and conjointly close to being exhaustive 
of the general categories. The selection of these authors in our survey 
is therefore easy to justify, particularly when, in addition, there are 
certain important similarities in their attitudes towards the domestic 
analogy which can be distinguished from those of certain other writers 
from other historical periods. 
Saint-Simon wrote his De la Reorganisation de la Societe Europgenne in 
collaboration with Augustin Thierry in the autumn of 1814 as the Congress 
was assembled at Vienna.
2 
Having lived through the great upheaval of 
the Revolution and Wars, he was deeply concerned with the problem of how 
to create a stable order not only in France but also in Europe as a whole. 
But such a goal, in Saint-Simon's view, could not be achieved by the 
Congress. This was because, he wrote, 'figone of the members of the 
congress [would have the function of considering questions from a 
general point of view; none of them [would]be even authorized to do so.' 3 
 The problem, he thought, required a much more radical solution. 
Saint-Simon's own plan was based on the view that the peace and 
prosperity of Europe, or the liberty of the Europeans, could not be attained 
without the establishment of a common government for Europe, which was in 
the same relation to the different peoples as national governments were to 
individuals. Moreover, he insisted, the best possible constitution that 
the contemporary state of human knowledge could reveal would have to be 
applied to all the national governments as well as to the common 
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government.
4 
His own theoretical explanation of the principles of the best possible 
constitution is so confused and misleading that it need not detain us 
here.
5 
Suffice it to note that, in his judgement, the English 
constitution embodied these principles, and that therefore all the 
national governments as well as the common government of Europe would 
have to be modelled on that constitution. 6 On the basis of these 
preliminary considerations, Saint-Simon proposed the establishment of a 
European Parliament consisting of the King of Europe, Houses of Peers 
and Commons.
7 
The work of 1814, however, was incomplete. Saint-Simon postponed the 
discussion of the choice of the King of Europe to a sequel, but this 
appears not to have materialized.
8 
Nor did he, in his 1814 essay, discuss 
the constitutional position of the King outside the parliament, except 
to say that the King should be hereditary and should be the first to take 
up office in order to enable, under his initiative, an orderly formation 
of the two Houses.
9 
Moreover, while the European parliament was also to 
function as a judicature, Saint-Simon failed to make explicit how 
international disputes were to be adjudicated.
10 
Furthermore, he failed 
to clarify the jurisdictional relationships between the proposed common 
government and the national governments of Europe.
11 
Despite these flaws, the outline of the proposed European Parliament 
was clear enough, an outline which, according to Saint-Simon's own account, 
was drawn from the English model. There were, however, at least two 
points at which his European Parliament deviated significantly from the 
actual English constitution. 
First, Saint-Simon's three legislative authorities, the King, Peers 
and Commons, were to be equal in their power, each having the right of 
initiating, and vetoing, any legislative measures.
12 
This was not the 
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case with the actual English constitution.
13 
Second, Saint-Simon 
introduced an original provision as regards the election of the members 
of the European House of Commons. This was original in that the proposed 
method of election was neither in line with the actual English 
constitution nor based on what Saint-Simon claimed was the case with that 
constitution. He wrote: 
For every million persons in Europe who know how to 
read and write there should sit as their representatives in 
the House of Commons of the great parliament, a man of business, 
a scientist, an administrator, and a lawyer. Thus, assuming 
that there are six million men in Europe who know how to read and 
write, the House will be composed of 240 members. The election 
of members will be made by the professional body to which they 
belong. They will be elected for ten years. Every member of 
the House must possess 25,000 francs income at least, from 
landed property.
14 
Saint-Simon's own justification for devising such a method of election 
to the European House of Commons was as follows. 
He argued that institutions moulded men, and hoped that the European 
parliament, once established would foster 'patriotism beyond the limits 
of one's own fatherland' or the 'habit of considering the interests of 
Europe instead of national interests. '15 However, Saint-Simon contended 
that an institution could not take root if men were not adapted to it 
beforehand, for, in his view, it was also the case that men made 
institutions.
16 
Thus, in order for the European parliament to function well, it was 
necessary that its members be motivated by European patriotism. It was 
patriotism that enabled a national government to have a 'corporate will', 
and the same would be the case with the European government, he argued.
17 
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Saint-Simon remarked, however, that European patriotism was to be 
found only in a certain class of people, and maintained that men of business, 
scientists, magistrates and administrators belonged to that class 
because of their wider contacts, emancipation from purely local customs 
and their occupations which were cosmopolitan in aim rather than national.
18 
Thus, according to Saint-Simon's own account, the special provision 
noted above was necessary for the election of the European House of Commons, 
for otherwise it would not function as one body. However, it seems wrong 
to suppose that Saint-Simon's sole purpose in proposing such a form of 
election was to foster unity in the European House of Commons. This point 
can be explained on the basis of the following three considerations, 
and these in turn will reveal what Saint-Simon really had in mind when he 
argued that an English-type constitution should be applied to the 
European government. 
First, the type of person to be elected to the European House of 
Commons was what could be regarded as the leading members of the 
bourgeoisie.
19 
Although Saint-Simon himself did not explain the composition 
of the House in these terms, it would be reasonable to suppose that he was 
aware of this distinctive feature of the House he was proposing. 
Second, this House was to coexist, on an equal footing, with two other 
authorities, the King of Europe, and the European House of Peers. The 
Peers were to be nominated by the King without limitation of numbers, and 
every Peer was to possess at least 500,000 francs income from landed 
property. Peerage was to be hereditary.
20 
Thus, the European House of 
Peers can be considered as representing the views and interests of the 
European aristocracy as a whole. 
Third, Saint-Simon must be regarded as having overstated his case when 
he argued that whatever common interests existed in the European community 
could be traced to the sciences, arts, law, commerce, administration and 
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and industry.
21 
The interests of these professions, which, in 
Saint-Simon's view, transcended national parochialism, were to make the 
European House of Commons function as an effective organ. But his 
proposal undoubtedly presupposed the transnational solidarity not only 
of the social stratum to be represented in the House of Commons but also 
of the aristocratic class of Europe who were to provide the House of 
Peers. Otherwise, his European parliament could not consistently be held 
to be workable, for one of its branches, lacking in solidarity, would 
have to be admitted to be as incapable of reaching any decision as he 
considered diplomatic conferences to be.
22 
It must be remembered here 
that Saint-Simon's European parliament was to enact laws through the 
concurrence of decisions among its three branches. If any one of them 
could not reach a decision, then the whole system would be immobilized. 
Therefore, in order to be consistent, Saint-Simon could not have 
thought that the only social stratum, which had transnational solidarity, 
consisted of scientists, artists, lawyers, businessmen and so on. 
This last point somewhat weakens the supposition that Saint-Simon's 
sole aim in proposing his original method of European Commons elections 
was to foster unity in the House. If unity had been the sole purpose, 
he could equally well have suggested that the European parliament be 
unicameral consisting of the Peers of Europe, for at least implicitly 
he was committed to the idea that they too had transnational solidarity. 
Combined with this point are the first two considerations noted above. 
These seem to point to the idea that what Saint-Simon really had in mind 
was the creation of a stable social order in Europe through the balancing 
of social classes across borders. In other words, the theory of 
domestic politics which he was trying to apply to Europe as a whole was 
that of the mixed constitution. 
This theory, like the theory of the separation of powers popularized 
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by Montesqueiu, used to be associated with the English constitution, 
although the former had a far longer history than the latter in Western 
political thought. 23 Its basic tenet was that a constitution was good 
which combined and balanced the elements of monarchy, aristocracy and 
democracy in such a way that the state was governed conjointly by the 
king, nobles and people. 
Bolingbroke, for example, explained the English constitution in the 
light of this theory when he stated: 
It is by this mixture of monarchical, aristocratical and 
democratical power, blended together in one system, and by 
these three estates balancing one another, that our free 
constitution of government hath been preserved so long 
inviolate.
24 
It is true that Saint-Simon did not explicitly advance the theory of 
the mixed state. Nor did he explain the excellence of the English 
constitution in the light of that theory, although he betrayed its 
influence upon him when he characterized the function of the English 
House of Lords essentially as a balancer of monarchic and democratic 
forces.
25 
Working backwards from his project itself, however, it is possible to 
conjecture that Saint-Simon was in fact trying to create a mixed 
constitution at the European level, and to balance the interests of the 
King-to-be, the aristocratic class, and the rising professional classes 
of Europe by a new institutional arrangement. 
There are a few remarks scattered in the latter part of his essay 
which partly confim that he favoured the idea of a mixed constitution. 
Thus, he expressed his dislike of the despotism both of a single man and 
of the people: the former would lead to tyranny, the latter to democratic 
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anarchy. Therefore, he argued, 'the moderate part of the nation' was 
needed to restore social order.
26 
What is important to note here is the particular political circumstances 
of France at the time of his drafting the proposal. Napoleon had 
abdicated in April 1814, and was at that time in Elba. Louis XVIII, who 
had been in exile in England, was restored to the throne in the 
following month, and in June that year he bestowed on his subjects the 
Charte Constitutionnelle. This Charter was based on a compromise 
between the principles of the Ancien Regime and those of the Revolution. 
Thus, although a great deal of power was left in the hands of the King, 
the Charter did introduce a parliamentary system along the lines of the 
English constitution. The Parliament was bicameral, the Chambers of Peers 
recruiting its members largely from the old Imperial Senate, and the 
Chamber of Deputies from the Legislative Body of Napoleon's days. Like 
the English House of Commons in those days, the Chamber of Deputies was 
to be subject to election on the basis of property qualifications. 27 
This Charter was undoubtedly an attempt to maintain a balance among 
the restored Bourbon Dynasty, the aristocracy and the middle classes, 
and shows some striking resemblances to Saint-Simon's project for a 
common government of Europe.
28 
It is safe to assume that he was 
familiar with this Charter. Thus it would not be a wild conjecture that 
ibis immediate model was in fact the French Charter itself, although 
this in turn was modelled on the English constitution. 
It must also be noted here that Saint-Simon was convinced that England, 
France and Germany all faced an internal crisis, which could lead to a 
revolution in each country.
29 
This could be obviated, he thought, if 
these countries were to unite under the constitution he was proposing. 
Apparently, it was not sufficient, in his view, that each country be 
equipped with a good, English-type, constitution; unless a common 
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government was also established, international conflict and intrigues 
would continue, which would in turn destabilize the internal order of 
those countries.
30 
This then was Saint-Simon's grand design, however incomplete, for the 
creation of a stable social order both within and between the nations of 
Europe. What he applied to the international level in his 1814 proposal 
was a theory of domestic politics which was implicit in the model or 
models he employed. He did not identify this theory by name, but it was 
one which undoubtedly appealed to him as a means of re-establishing order 
in Europe in the aftermath of the French Revolution and the Napoleonic 
Wars. 
Because he did not clarify the jurisdictional relationships between 
the proposed common government and the national governments, it is not 
possible to determine unequivocally the legal status of the proposed 
union. However, his European parliament was not like the legislative 
body of a confederation, despite his reference to the proposed union by 
that term.
31 
Unlike many other proposals for an international assembly 
designed basically to be regular meetings of governmental representatives 
acting in accordance with a set of common procedural rules, Saint-Simon's 
proposal involved a full-scale merger of the existing sovereign states 
into one single polity at least in so far as his legislature was 
concerned. The function of the proposed parliament was consequently very 
broad, and included even the codification of national and individual 
ethics. 32 Given the structure and function of the proposed common 
parliament, his European Confederation may fall into the category of a 
unitary or federal state. 
If so, the proposed 'reproduction of the institutions of domestic 
society' in his case was the latter of the two basic types we noted in 
Chapter II.
33 
Therefore, there is a sense in which Saint-Simon cannot 
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be regarded as having resorted to the domestic analogy: his advocacy 
was rather an extension of the existing domestic institutions to cover 
the whole of Europe than an application of the principles of domestic 
society to the relations of sovereign states as such. Nevertheless it 
remains the case that his choice of the domestic model was a reflection 
of one of the most important domestic political issues of contemporary 
France, the creation of stable social order in the period after Napoleon. 
Saint-Simon was a prolific writer and was a powerful source of 
inspiration for many of the prominent thinkers of the nineteenth century 
in the field of social theory.
34 
He also stimulated writings on the 
unification of Europe, particularly in France.
35 
In the Anglo-Saxon 
world, however, the exploration of the road to peace in the aftermath 
of the Napoleonic Wars had a different source of inspiration: Christian 
pacifism. This soon became an organized movement also on the European 
Continent.
36 
Early pacifist thinkers of the nineteenth century were, however, 
concerned primarily with the conversion of individuals to the doctrine 
of non-violence.
37 
If such an approach could be termed 'first image' 
pacifism, after Kenneth Waltz's well-known work, 'third image' pacifism, 
seeking a solution at the international level while also adhering to 
the doctrine of non-violence, was soon to develop.
38 
The proposal 
advanced in the middle of the century by William Ladd, the founder of the 
American Peace Society, was an early example of this approach, and was 
an influential one in the nineteenth century peace movement.
39 
 We shall 
now turn to his work to see how he used the domestic analogy, and how 
his choice and use of the domestic model reflected the American theory 
and institutions of domestic politics of his time. 
Ladd was familiar with the works of Natural Law writers on the Law 
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of Nations, such as Grotius and Vattel. However, while appreciating 
the beneficial influences these writers had exerted on mankind, he noted 
that there were many serious disagreements over details among them, and 
thought that it would be better if periodic meetings of ambassadors 
could be arranged to settle disputed principles of international law, and 
to conclude treaties to promote the peace and welfare of nations.
40 
This 
was his idea of a Congress of Nations, which was later to be realized, in 
a somewhat more unstructured way, in the form of the Hague Peace 
Conferences. 
According to Ladd, the distinctive characteristic of his project was 
that, in addition to this Congress, which he regarded as a legislature, 
there was to be established, as a separate body, a Court of Nations, a 
judicature: the executive functions were to be left entirely to the 
strength of world public opinion, which he trusted.
41 
Ladd's argument for the establishment of a Court of Nations was based 
explicitly on the domestic analogy.
42 
Moreover, he relied, unexpectedly 
perhaps, on the argument from domestic experience even in his attempt 
to show the redundancy of an executive organ at the international level. 
His point was that, even in the domestic sphere, the effectiveness of 
law did not depend on 'the sword of the magistrate'. In his judgement, 
'fear of disgrace' was the most important source of the effectiveness 
of law, and therefore a Court of Nations could function without the 
support of an executive. 'If it is disgraceful to go to war when there 
is a regular way of obtaining satisfaction without,' he wrote, wars 
would be as rare as duels in New England, where they are disgraceful ' .
43 
Despite his explicit reliance on the domestic analogy, Ladd's Congress 
and Court of Nations were dissimilar to their domestic counterparts in 
certain important respects. 
Without a doubt, his Congress could be said to resemble a domestic 
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legislature to the extent that it was designed as a permanent organ 
whose members were to hold a periodic session to enact laws in accordance 
with a set of established procedural rules, and that, therefore, one 
session was to have structural continuity with another. However, his 
Congress differed from a domestic legislature in that the unanimous 
consent of the nations represented at the Congress, as well as ratification 
by their governments, were to be required for any legislative enactment.
44 
Furthermore, it differed even from a federal-type legislature in that the 
Congress was to have nothing to do with the 'internal' affairs of nations.
45 
Likewise, his Court of Nations, while resembling a domestic judicature to 
some extent, fundamentally differed from it in that his Court was not 
equipped with the power of compulsory jurisdiction, though, in this 
respect, Ladd compared his Court to a Chamber of Commerce to show that a 
domestic counterpart could be found.
46 
It is in line with the relatively unambitious nature of Ladd's proposed 
international organization that he did not argue for a ban on the use of 
force by states. Thus, one of the major functions of the Congress of 
Nations was to be the settlement of disputed principles of international 
law chiefly in the area of the laws of war.
47 
However, it was in keeping 
with his progressivism that Congress was to consider whether a nation, 
unless attacked, had a right to declare war against another or to make 
reprisals until it had resorted to all other means of obtaining justice. 48 
 If, after the establishment of the Congress, its members were to decide 
to renounce such a right, then the international organization, based on 
Ladd's proposal, would become more analogous to domestic society, where 
there is also a general ban on the use of force. However, as it stood, 
the similarity between his proposed organization and an ordinary 
domestic society was very limited. 
It might be supposed that, in advancing this relatively unambitious 
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proposal, Ladd perhaps used a confederal model, and that the deviations 
of his proposed organs from their counterparts in the domestic sphere 
resulted from this. Indeed, he maintained, in support of his plan, that 
the 'civic part' of the Helvetic Union, which was a confederation, was 
the 'nearest working model' of his Court and Congress.
49 
Ladd's knowledge of the Helvetic Union, however, was rather limited. 
He did not show in any detail the similarities between his Court and 
what he called 'the court of judges or arbitrators'
50 
of the Helvetic 
Union. The truth was that the sources of information he referred to 
did not provide him with sufficient knowledge on the subject. Moreover, 
what little information he managed to obtain regarding the 'court' of 
the Helvetic Union was misleading. It was not entirely his fault to 
have believed that his proposed Court resembled the 'court' of the 
Helvetic Union, but a brief survey of those few basic treaties 
constituting the Union, mentioned in Ladd's sources, shows that there 
never was a judicial or arbitral 'court' specifically designed to deal 
with inter-cantonal disputes in the period of Swiss history which his 
sources were concerned with.
51 
Ladd managed to obtain a little more substantial information regarding 
the Diet of the Helvetic Union, and his description of it shows that he 
was aware of some important similarities that actually existed between 
the Swiss Diet and his proposed Congress: neither of them was concerned 
with the 'internal' affairs of the member states, and both of them 
worked essentially as a regularized form of the conference of ambassadors.
52 
Thus, taken as a whole, Ladd's knowledge of the Swiss Confederation 
might have helped him to form his conception of the Congress and Court 
of Nations, but it is not likely to have been the original source of his 
inspiration. It appears that Ladd's ideas were in fact more closely 
linked with his experience at home. Here we are in the realm of 
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speculation, but not in an entirely unfounded one. 
There are some remarks which Ladd made in his essay which tend to 
confirm the view that his actual model was American. Thus, in order to 
form a Congress, ambassadors were to be sent to 'a convention', which 
would then adopt rules and regulations necessary for the Congress — 
a procedure reminiscent of the birth of the U.S. Constitution.
53 
The 
permanency of his Court was compared by him to that of the U.S. Supreme Court, 
and the periodic nature of the sessions of his Congress to the case of the 
Congress or Senate of the United States.
54 
Finally, Ladd compared the 
ability of the U.S. Supreme Court to settle inter-state boundary disputes 
with what a Court of Nations, when established, could achieve.
55 
Moreover, in omitting an executive organ from his scheme, Ladd might 
have taken note of the fact that in inter-state disputes the 1787 
Constitution does not provide for the execution of the Supreme Court 
decisions by force.
56 
Ladd's proposed Congress, however, might have 
been modelled on the Congress of the United States under the Articles of 
Confederation. 57 
The idea that Ladd's proposal was inspired by the experience of the 
United States is supported by J.B. Scott in his preface to Georg 
Schwarzenberger's book, William Ladd. According to Scott, Ladd was 
'well-nigh contemporary with the young republic' as the Articles of 
Confederation (1777) came into force when Ladd was three (1781), and the 
new Constitution of the United States was drawn up when he was nine (1787). 
Scott suggests that Ladd was permeated with the constitutional ideas of 
America and was fully informed of her institutions.
58 
Central to the constitutional ideas of America was the notion of the 
separation of powers. The 1776 Declaration of Independence itself, while 
not using the term 'separation of powers' explicitly, accused George III 
of his tyrannical deeds, among the most serious of which was stated to 
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be his refusal to acknowledge the independence of the legislative 
and judiciary powers from his authority over the colonies. He abolished, 
according to the Declaration, 'the free system of English laws in a 
neighbouring province, establishing therein an arbitrary government'.
59 
Moreover, apart from its enshrinement in the Constitution of the 
United States of 1787 itself, the principle of the separation of powers 
was accepted by the various state constitutions. One notable example, 
the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780, stated: 'In the government of 
this commonwealth, the legislative department shall never exercise the 
executive and judicial powers, or either of them: The executive shall 
never exercise the legislative and judicial powers, or either of them: 
The judicial shall never exercise the legislative and executive powers 
or either of them'.
60 
This constitution, which built on the constitutions 
of certain other states, was itself soon to be copied by the second 
constitution (1784) of New Hampshire, where Ladd was born.
61 
It seems almost without doubt then that Ladd's taken-for-granted 
attitude towards the idea of the separation of powers, which shaped the 
framework of his plan, derived from his close familiarity with the 
constitutional history of America. The idea was in the air. It is true 
that Ladd did not stress, along with the doctrine of the separation of 
powers, that it was the liberty of nations that was at stake in 
separating the Court from the Congress. However, he did remark that one 
of the main weaknesses of the regional confederations in the past had been 
the union of the three powers in one body, and that this had caused 
'intrigue, ambition, and many other baleful passions and practic e s. '62 
The sufficiency of Ladd's historical knowledge may be doubted in such a 
statement, but it does indicate his implicit acceptance of the liberal 
doctrine. 
The foregoing discussion suggests that Ladd's reference to the 
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constitution of the Helvetic Union, his knowledge of which was limited, 
was chiefly for the purpose of making his plan appear more relevant to 
international problems. Other things being equal, a union whose 
constituents are more diverse is naturally more valuable as a model for 
an international organization, for the latter will have to overcome wider 
national differences than any regional unions. Ladd therefore may have 
thought the Swiss example to be more impressive than the American model 
in this respect. He stressed differences 'in language, religion, laws, 
forms of government, manners and customs', which existed among the 
members of the Helvetic Union, and argued that no 'good reason rcould7 
be given why a plan, which Ehaq7 worked so well on a small scale, fmightJ 
not be extended, so as to embrace all Christian and civilized nations.'
63 
Whatever his actual model, it seems clear that Ladd's proposal reflected 
one of the most important doctrines of domestic politics in the United 
States of his time. 
It should be noted that, unlike Saint-Simon's 'European Confederation', 
Ladd's proposed international body was not itself a state. This was due 
to the fact that, unlike Saint-Simon, Ladd used the domestic analogy in 
accordance with the first of the two basic modes of 'reproduction of the 
institutions of domestic society' discussed in Chapter II. Ladd's units 
of international organization were sovereign states. 
It may finally be noted that, in reproducing some of the domestic 
institutions at the international level, Ladd seems to have been clear 
that the principles underlying these institutions need to be modified 
substantially. However, this appears, in the case of Ladd, to have 
resulted from his consideration of practicability rather than from the 
view that the inherent nature of international law made it impossible 
for it to become analogous to a municipal legal system beyond a certain 
point. 64 This view, or the doctrine of the specific character of 
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international law, will be discussed in the next chapter. There is no 
trace in Ladd's writing of his adherence to such a doctrine. 
Saint-Simon's European reorganization plan and Ladd's Congress and 
Court of Nations stood at the opposite ends of a spectrum. The former 
emphatically dismissed the method of diplomatic conference, and 
envisaged a merger of Europe into a single polity. The latter, being 
more optimistic about the ability of states to behave reasonably towards 
one another, and being more practically minded, held that only two 
institutions would be sufficient for the creation of international order: 
a regularized form of diplomatic conference to determine the law, and a 
machinery to settle international disputes on an entirely voluntary basis. 
Between the two approaches of Saint-Simon and Ladd, there was a third: 
one which envisaged an international government less centralized than 
Saint-Simon's ideal, but more closely organized than Ladd's proposed 
institutions. This intermediate vision was held, among others, by James 
Lorimer, whose position on the domestic analogy has already been noted 
briefly in the first chapter. 65 
Lorimer's scheme was published in 'The Ultimate Problem of International 
Jurisprudence' written as the final part of his The Institutes of the Law  
of Nations (1884). This was in substance the same as his earlier essay, 
'Le Problm Final du Droit International' (1877), but contained some 
further explanations, in view of its critical reception by the members of 
the Institut de Droit International, in whose journal the essay had 
appeared.
66 
Among his critics was Johann Caspar Bluntschli, a Heidelberg Professor 
of International Law and Political Science, who, in reply to Lorimer, 
had written, in a popular journal Die Gegenwart, an essay entitled, 
'Die Organisation des EuropRischen Statenvereines' (1878).
67 
However, 
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Bluntschli's own plan, while less centralized than Lorimer's„ was also 
of the intermediate kind, not involving the unification of Europe under 
one sovereignty, but envisaging nevertheless a far-reaching alteration 
in the international legal framework of Europe. The works of these two 
writers will be examined below to see what their domestic models were, 
and how, despite their disagreements, their use of the domestic analogy 
reflected the domestic political concerns of the period in Great Britain 
and the newly unified Germany. First, let us clarify their disagreements. 
According to Bluntschli's criticism, Lorimer's mistake was to have 
gone too far in his attempt to apply domestic political institutions to 
the international sphere. He accused him of attempting to create a 
European federal republic on the principle of a representative government 
and the separation of powers borrowed from the Anglo-American 
constitutional doctrine and practice.
68 
To this Lorimer replied that 
his proposed international body was not a federal republic, and that the 
closest existing parallel to the functions which it would be called upon 
to discharge would be found 'in those assigned to the "Delegations" by 
the constitution of the Austro-Hungarian Empire --- the international 
executive corresponding to the central Ministry of War.
,69 
 In this 
debate, neither side was entirely correct as will be shown below. 
The correspondence, in structural terms, between the 'Delegations' 
system and the Ministry of War of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, on the 
one hand, and Lorimer's proposed international legislative and executive 
bodies, on the other, were negligible. Moreover, the functions of 
Lorimer's proposed bodies were more extensive than those of their 
supposed counterparts of the Empire. It is therefore somewhat doubtful 
that Lorimer had modelled his project on the Austro-Hungarian 
Constitution. 7° 
A closer examination reveals similarities, and in some cases almost 
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verbal correspondence, between the articles of Lorimer's project and 
certain legal provisions of England, the United States, and the Swiss 
Confederation. Thus, Lorimer's judicature was similar in a number of 
ways to the English system, and his bicameral legislature was close to 
the English Parliament, though some of the procedural rules proposed 
resembled the American model. Lorimer's executive branch, however, 
showed similarities with that of the Swiss Confederation under the 
Constitution of 1874.
71 
Bluntschli, therefore, was correct to point out the similarities 
between Lorimer's proposal and the Anglo-American principles. It is 
curious that Bluntschli, himself a Swiss, did not mention the Swiss 
Confederation as one of Lorimer's likely models.
72 
On the other hand, Lorimer was right to insist that his proposed 
international body was not itself a state. The main reason for this is 
that his legislature was designed to enact international law, and that, 
although ratification was to be unnecessary, there was no provision in 
his scheme suggesting that the international legislature could enact 
73 
laws directly binding on the citizens of a member state. 	Thus, 
although Lorimer's international government came close to being a 
federal government, it appears in fact to have lacked one of the 
distinctive characteristics of a federation. Therefore, Bluntschli's 
assertion that Lorimer's project entailed the creation of a European federal 
republic cannot be accepted. 
By contrast with Lorimer's far-reaching scheme, Bluntschli claimed 
that his own project was based on the 'indispensable principle' of 'the 
careful preservation of the independence and freedom of the associated 
states', particularly, those of the Great Powers.
74 
As an application of this principle, questions concerning the existence, 
independence and freedom of states, or matters of 'high politics', were 
- 85 - 
to be treated as 'non-justiciable'. Thus, in Bluntschli's view, it was 
only for the solution of relatively unimportant matters, such as commerce, 
communication, transport, hygiene, weights and measures, extradition 
and so on, that an arbitration clause might be adopted, permanent 
international tribunals set up, and an international court of justice 
established. 75 
Also as an application of the above principle, the 'College of the 
six Great Powers' was proposed in the place of Lorimer's highly 
centralized international executive, of which Bluntschli was very 
critical.
76 
Thus, according to Bluntschli, any enforcement measures 
were to be conditional, among other things, upon the unanimous consent 
of the six Great Powers, namely, Germany, France, Great Britain, Italy, 
Austria-Hungary, and Russia.
77 
Lorimer's highly centralized international 
executive was based on the assumption that proportional disarmament 
had been undertaken as a preliminary step, but Bluntschli rejected such 
an assumption as unrealistic: according to him, disarmament would come 
about gradually only after Europe had been re-organized along the lines 
of his proposal.
78 
Despite these differences between the two writers, there were also 
some basic agreements. Both writers stressed the inevitability of 
change in international relations, and considered a mechanism for 
peaceful change as indispensable.
79 
Moreover, they both recognized the 
fact of inequality in the power of states, and believed it necessary for 
the new organization of Europe, in order to be effective, to take this 
into consideration.
80 
But, most important, Bluntschli praised Lorimer 
for having realized the necessity of popular representation in the 
running of international affairs, and consequently, for having 
incorporated this idea in the proposed European organization. 81 
 Bluntschli's criticism of Lorimer on this point was that he had gone 
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too far.
82 
The difference of opinion here between Lorimer and Bluntschli 
can be fully appreciated when we compare the structure of legislatures 
proposed by the two writers respectively, and to this we now turn. 
Lorimer's international legislature was bicameral, consisting of 
the Senate and the Chamber of Deputies. Popular representation in the 
running of international affairs, he thought, could be achieved if a 
direct link could be established between the national legislatures and 
the proposed international legislature.
83 
Thus, the Senators were to 
be chosen by the Crown or other chief authority, acting along with the 
upper house, of each state; or, in states where there was no upper house, 
by the central authority of the state. In a parallel fashion, the 
Deputies were to be chosen by the lower house of each state where there 
was a lower house; in states where there was but one house, by that 
house; and in states where there was no representative government, they 
were to be nominated by the Crown or other central authorities of the 
state.
84 
Lorimer expected the Senate to consist of those who already attained 
to high position and fortune, but there was no such expectation as 
regards the Chamber of Deputies.
85 
Lorimer seems to have held that the 
national will could be best represented in an international legislature 
if the will of the upper class was represented separately from, but on 
the same footing as, that of the rest of the society. In this respect, 
Lorimer appears to have intended to transfer the basic structure of the 
English Houses of Parliament to the international sphere. It seems 
very likely, moreover, that Lorimer's concern to introduce the principle 
of popular representation into his proposed international government 
was prompted by the gradual democratization which had been taking place 
in the government of Britain throughout the nineteenth century.
86 
Bluntschli's proposed legislature was also bicameral. But, unlike 
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Lorimer, who applied the principle of popular legislation to both 
chambers of the proposed international legislature, Bluntschli 
combined this principle with the traditional principle of international 
practice: the diplomatic representation of the will of the sovereign 
(executive) authority. 
Bluntschli's bicameral legislature was therefore a hybrid between 
Lorimer's international legislature and Ladd's Congress of Nations. 
On the one hand, there was to be a House of Representatives or Senate, 
whose members were to be selected by national legislatures, and who were, 
therefore, to be expected to represent the peoples of Europe. On the 
other hand, there was to be the Council of Confederation (Bundesrath), 
which was to be in essence a regularized form of a conference of 
ambassadors sent and instructed by the government (the executive authority) 
of each member state.
87 
In presenting such a form of legislature, Bluntschli appears to have 
used the German Imperial Constitution of 1871 as his model. This can be 
surmised from the following points of correspondence between the two 
institutions. 
As in Bluntschli's project, the German Imperial legislature was 
bicameral, consisting of the Reichstag and the Bundesrath. The members of 
the German Reichstag represented the German people as a whole: like 
Bluntschli's Senators, who were to represent the peoples of Europe, they 
were not bound by instructions from their national governments. On the 
other hand, like Bluntschli's Bundesrath, the German Bundesrath consisted 
of diplomatic agents, appointed by, and voting under the instructions 
from, their respective governments.
88 
Moreover, as in Bluntschli's proposal, the majority of votes in both 
chambers was necessary and sufficient for any legislative enactment of 
the German Empire, although, unlike the legislature of Germany, the law 
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to be enacted by Bluntschli's legislature was to have the character of 
international law.
89 
It may also be noted here that according to the 
German Imperial Constitution, an inter-state constitutional dispute, 
for which no competent judicial authority was found in either of the 
contestants was to be 'amicably arranged' by the Bundesrath or settled 
through Imperial legislation. 90 This provision is reminiscent of 
Bluntschli's suggestion that the question of 'high politics' within the 
proposed European Confederation, being non-justiciable, should be 
entrusted to the Bundesrath, and that recourse might be had to legislative 
solutions.
91 
Unfortunately for our argument, Bluntschli himself remarked that the 
German Empire was unsuitable as a model for the European organization. 
However, the source of his objection was that European nations could not, 
in his view, allow one single state to become the leading partner of their 
confederation, as Prussia was of the German Empire.
92 
A union of states, 
such as the German Empire, where one member had a dominant consitutional 
position, Bluntschli called a Bundesreich, and distinguished it from an 
ordinary confederation of states (Staatenbund).
93 
A Bundesreich-type 
structure, he thought, was unsuitable for Europe. 
Nevertheless, in his proposed European Confederation, Bluntschli did 
give a constitutionally dominant position, not to any single state, but 
to the six Great Powers conjointly.
94 
It appears therefore that, despite 
his express denial of so doing, Bluntschli did in fact model his 
European legislature on that of contemporary Germany, and that, in so 
doing, he substituted the principle of Hexarchy for that of Prussian 
supremacy. 
It must be noted here that Bluntschli had been called to the 
University of Heidelberg five years before the outbreak of the Austro-
Prussian War. He was made a Privy Councillor by the Grand Duke of Baden, 
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where liberal and democratic attitude was more strongly rooted in 
comparison to many other parts of Germany characterized by autocracy. 
Bluntschli himself was a liberal parliamentarian, and was instrumental 
in the constitutional reform of Baden in 1864. He represented Baden in 
the Tariff Parliament of 1867, and did much to prepare the way for the 
union of North and South Germany. He was therefore very closely involved 
in the development of German constitutional history in the latter part 
of the nineteenth century.
95 
Given this background, Bluntschli's remark 
that the proposed unification of Europe could not be more difficult than 
had been the unification of Germany is specially noteworthy.
96 
It would 
not be surprising if he was thinking that the new Imperial Constitution 
could offer some useful ideas for the re-organization of Europe. 
The foregoing examination shows that Lorimer and Bluntschli probably 
employed the same method in working out a major part of their respective 
proposals. This was to transpose certain basic constitutional principles 
of their respective countries to the international sphere. This is 
particularly true of their proposed legislatures. In applying these 
principles to the international system, neither of them advocated the 
replacement of the sovereign states system by a single sovereign state, 
federal or unitary, although, in some respect, Lorimer's proposed 
international body was close to being a federation. 
It is particularly interesting to observe that both these writers 
appear to have been significantly affected by what was at that time regarded 
as among the most vital issues of domestic politics in their own countries. 
Their use of the domestic analogy was therefore affected by their interest 
in the rise in the power of the representative legislature vis-a-vis the 
executive authority. What they advocated was an extension of this tendency 
or idea to the international sphere, rather more fully in the case of 
Lorimer than Bluntschli. 
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Reflecting the limitations on the representative character of the 
English Parliament, Lorimer's proposed Senate was to consist of those 
who had already attained to high positions and fortune. Reflecting 
the special circumstances of Germany, which had been unified after a 
long period of confederal division, Bluntschli's proposed legislature 
was to combine the principle of democratic legislature with that of 
diplomatic conference. Here then, after Saint-Simon and Ladd, we have 
two more cases which illustrate the extent to which one's choice of a 
domestic model is influenced by one's immediate domestic political 
experience. 
It may be observed that while the proposals of these four writers 
stimulated speculation among many thinkers on the future organization 
of international society, the formal framework within which foreign 
relations were conducted remained more or less unchanged throughout 
the nineteenth century. But at the turn of the century, a remarkable 
event took place, the Peace Conferences at the Hague. This appeared 
to many writers on world order to signify the arrival of a new era in 
the history of international relations. In the next chapter, we 
shall examine the views of those who wrote against this new background. 
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Chapter IV 	Contending Doctrines of the Hague Conferences Period 
The writers of the nineteenth century, whose ideas we examined in 
some detail in the previous chapter, had a number of intellectual 
dispositions in common. Among these were their belief in the progress 
of human civilization, and their confidence in certain existing forms 
of government. 
The belief in progress was clearly expressed by Saint-Simon and 
William Ladd.
1 
Even Lorimer, who did not believe his project to be 
realizable in his own generation, was confident that proportional 
disarmament, which was to be the preliminary condition for the 
establishment of his proposed international government, would sooner 
or later be undertaken, and that the boundless progress of human 
civilization ensured the eventual formation of the proposed government 
itself.
2 
Bluntschli, who had in fact written that he did not know if 
or when his project could be put into practice, nevertheless stated that 
his proposed European Confederation would be easier to form than was the 
German Empire whose establishment he had himself witnessed.
3 
One of the factors which led these writers to hold a progressivist 
view of history was their judgement that the political conditions of 
some states had shown marked improvements in the recent past. The 
domestic experience of these writers was not like that of the earlier 
writers.
4 
France was now equipped with the best, 'English-type', 
constitution,said Saint-Simon.
5 
In civilized nations, force was no 
longer regarded as an honourable means for obtaining justice, wrote 
Ladd.
6 
Satisfaction with certain existing domestic legal systems is 
implicit in Lorimer's claim that universal experience proved domestic 
social order to depend on the harmony of legislation, adjudication and 
execution. ? Bluntschli, too, appears to have been satisfied with 
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certain political developments in Germany.
8 
It is little wonder then that these nineteenth century writers 
believed that there was something to be learned from their domestic 
experience. Whether they were right in applying it to the international 
sphere in the way they did is open to question. But it is clear that 
they were all favourably impressed by the advances made in the domestic 
sphere of some states, saw this as a mark of human progress, and thus 
thought it right to apply the relevant principles of domestic 
organization to the hitherto comparatively underdeveloped area of 
international relations. 
It is important to note that the international system of the period, 
in which these writers produced their plans, was largely lacking in 
formal international organizations. International administrative 
organizations began to emerge in the final quarter of the nineteenth 
century. But these institutions do not appear to have attracted the 
attention of peace-schemers till later. There was of course the 
diplomatic practice of ad hoc conferences, the Concert of Europe. But 
Saint-Simon, seeing no merits in diplomatic conferences as such, would 
have been dismissive of it. Ladd briefly referred to the Holy Alliance, 
but his knowledge of it was thin. He was more concerned to praise its 
supposed Christian basis than to use it as a model for his Congress of 
Nations. James Lorimer was very critical of the Concert, and only 
Bluntschli saw it somewhat more positively as an embryonic international 
organization. 9 The relative lack of formal organization at the 
international level may explain why these writers relied rather 
conspicuously on concrete domestic models. There was little in the 
international system itself which they could point to as a foundation 
for future progress towards peace, while there were certain domestic 
institutions which in their view were successful, and therefore 
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appealed to them as good models. 
The situation was markedly different for the writers at the 
beginning of the twentieth century. While the earlier writers' attempts 
to transfer all at once to the international sphere those domestic 
institutions, which they considered as necessary for the achievement of 
world peace, had proved futile, international law nevertheless began to 
show signs of step-by-step progress at the turn of the century. 
The Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 produced a large 
number of conventions and declarations, and established a Permanent 
Court of Aribitration. 10 The Geneva Convention of 1906 amplified that 
of 1864, and eliminated certain obscurities in the laws of war.
11 
A 
Naval Conference met in London in 1908 and 1909, and drew up laws of 
naval warfare with the view to providing the International Prize Court, 
proposed at the second Hague Conference, with necessary legal criteria. 12 
 The Hague Court of Arbitration was used on several occasions, and more 
than one hundred arbitration treaties were negotiated in the first decade 
of the twentieth century.
13 
Textbooks of international law were revised 
and updated to incorporate such rapid developments, and the authors 
expressed hopes for its further improvements.
14 
But such hopes were soon to be shattered by the outbreak of the war in 
the summer of 1914. This experience brought about a radical shift in the 
opinions of many of those who were concerned with the problems of world 
order. George Keeton wrote: 
Whereas only a few years before many publicists thought that 
the Hague Peace Conferences had ushered in a new era in 
international relationships, during which mankind could 
look forward to long periods of unbroken peace and steady 
progress, and while they were unanimous that the respect for 
international law was firmly based upon a public opinion 
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whose censure would be sufficient to deter the 
potential lawbreaker, the war had made it necessary 
to abandon these doctrines, which were in fact no more 
than a late outcrop from the School of Jurisprudence 
whose underlying philosophy was the progressive evolution 
of the human race towards increased law-abidingness.
15 
And in a similar vein David Mitrany wrote: 
The generations of the Second World War can hardly realise 
what a shock that earlier event /the First World War7 was —
they had been prepared for violence and conflict by years of 
Hitler and Mussolini, of Bolshevik Revolution and the Spanish 
Civil War. For us 1914 followed a long period of stability 
and liberal optimism, of expanding international trade and 
cultural intercourse, of pacifist movements and efforts --- 
like the Hague Conferences at the turn of the century.
16 
These two contrasting episodes, of peace and war, provide the 
international historical background for this and the next chapter. 
Chapter V will deal with the impact of the Great War, and will examine 
how this event shaped the use of the domestic analogy, and how this 
analogy provided the basis of the League of Nations. But here we are 
concerned with the effects of the development of international law 
and relative peace at the turn of the century. 
In the first part of this chapter, we shall examine the ideas of 
Walther SchtIcking, a Marburg Professor of International Law, and his 
Cambridge counterpart, Lassa Oppenheim. These writers have been 
selected from among the well-known mainly because their projects 
illustrate, in a striking manner, the influences of the development of 
international law and relative peace at the turn of the century upon 
the use of the domestic analogy in proposals for world order. 
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In the latter part of this chapter, we shall study those writers 
on international law who appear to have belonged to Oppenheim's 
'diplomatic school'. Those writers were Oppenheim's contemporaries, 
and wrote against the same historical background of progress in 
international law. Yet, as we noted, this school was said by Oppenheim 
to be opposed to the development of international law along the lines 
of municipal law. 17 
As it turns out, apart from one possible exception, none of the 
authors whom Oppenheim may have considered as belonging to this school 
was well-known or influential. None the less, we shall discuss the 
views of those authors so as not to lose sight of the fact that the 
development of international law at the turn of the century did not 
necessarily produce a uniform response among international lawyers in 
favour of a further approximation of international law to municipal 
law than it had already accomplished by that stage. Indeed it appears 
to have been partly as a criticism of the strong current of 
progressivism among international lawyers that the writers of the 
diplomatic school produced their conservative views. At any rate, an 
examination of their views should clarify what it is to reject the 
domestic analogy while remaining within the confines of what Kenneth 
Waltz has called the 'third image' analysis of international relations. 
One of the major effects of the development of international law at 
the turn of the century was the growth of gradualism based on optimistic, 
progressivist assumptions. Instead of debating on the impracticable 
ideal the writers of this period began to concentrate on the theme of 
the gradual modification of the existing system. The optimistic yet 
gradualist interpretation of the development of international law at 
this time was vividly expressed in relation to the Hague Conferences 
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by J.B. Scott. According to him, they were 'the first truly 
international assemblies meeting in time of peace, for the purpose of 
preserving peace, not of concluding a war then in progress': they 
marked, in his view, an epoch in the history of nations for they 
'showed on a large scale that international cooperation Leas possible 
and they created institutions --- imperfect it may be, as is the work 
of human hands, --- which, when improved in the light of experience, 
will both by themselves and by the force of example promote the 
administration of justice and the betterment of mankind.'
18 
It is not suggested here that gradualism was totally absent from 
nineteenth century proposals. Such a categorical statement is not likely 
to be true in the study of human thought. Thus, we noted earlier that 
William Jay's proposal advanced in the middle of the nineteenth century 
was characterized by gradualism. 19 \There was an element of gradualism 
also in William Ladd's proposal.
20 
However, at the turn of the century, 
gradualism appears to have become much more pronounced among those who 
planned for peace. 
One of the most systematic proposals on peace through law made along 
the lines of gradualist progressivism is found in the work of Walther 
Schticking. His book, Der Staatenverband der Haager Konferenzen (1912) 
contained a complete programme for a step-by-step development of 
international law, from the immediate future, in which the third Hague 
Conference was expected, into the more distant. Such an approach to 
peace-planning was based on a prevailing belief in the unilinear 
progress of mankind towards the goal of peace. 
In Schdcking's view, mankind were not starting from nought in this 
process, as it had in earlier times. As he saw it, the organization of 
the world had already reached the stage of a loose confederation through 
the institution of the Hague Conferences and the laws that were emanating 
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from it.
21 
He thought there was a 'well-known inherent law of things 
that a development once begun increases its pace as it proceeds'.
22 
A further institutional development of this existing confederation into 
a more fully equipped international government, and, if necessary, into 
a world federation was, in his opinion, the line of future progress. 
A more detailed presentation of his proposal reveals how he used the 
domestic analogy in each stage of his argument. 
Among the tasks of the immediate future in Schlicking's programme 
were the conversion of the Hague Conference into a formal legislative 
organ of the international community and the development of international 
judicial organization. In order to heighten the sense of solidarity 
among the participants of the future Hague Conferences, and to formalize 
the hitherto de facto world confederation, the name of the 'Union des 
Etats de la Haye' was to be given to it, and its constitution drawn up.
23 
This constitution, as SchOcking envisaged it, was to establish formally 
a union of sovereign states, which was to be looser than the German 
Confederation of 1815.
24 
There are frequent references in his proposal 
to the constitutional instruments of this confederation (the German Act 
of Confederation of 1815, and the Vienna Final Act of 1820), as well as, 
in minor procedural matters, to the German Imperial Constitution of 1871.
25 
It is beyond doubt that his close knowledge of German constitutional 
history helped him to work out in detail his project for the 'Hague Union'. 
As this stage in Schucking's programme, the proposed world confederation 
stood between the proposals of William Ladd and James Lorimer. It 
resembled Ladd's plan in that they both lacked an executive organ. 
Moreover, SchOcking's legislative body was in essence a regularized form 
of diplomatic conference like Ladd's Congress of Nations. On the other 
hand, the highly developed judicature which Schticking expected to see in 
the 'Union' was more like the judicial department of Lorimer's 
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international government. 26 
Schticking did not stop here, however. There were more developments 
to be made in the next stage of the gradual perfection of the legal 
organization of mankind. 
Among the goals of the more distant future in Schlicking's programme 
were the mutual recognition by the member states of their independence 
and territorial integrity, the renunciation of war, compulsory 
adjudication of all disputes without reservation, and the creation of 
an international executive organ. 27 As for the last of these, Schticking 
incorporated the plan put forward by his contemporary, Cornelius van 
Vollenhoven of Leyden, but considered all these four goals to be 
inter-related, and, in his view, the time was not ripe for their 
realization. 28 
In addition, SchUcking considered as necessary the gradual development 
and systematization, under the Hague constitution, of international 
administrative unions, and the creation of a World Parliament to work 
as a second legislative chamber side by side with the periodic Hague 
Conferences of governmental representatives. 29 
This World Parliament was to be composed, as in the case of Bluntschli's 
proposed European Senate, of delegations from the parliaments of the 
contracting parties. Here Schticking referred not only to the proposal 
of Bluntschli, whose legislature, we argued in the previous chapter, was 
derived from the model of the German Imperial legislature, but also to 
the latter legislative body itself, as well as to some reform projects 
which had been advanced in Germany in the 1850s and 1860s. According to 
Schticking, these projects all clung to the idea of a confederation as 
the type of union desirable for Germany, but at the same time they 
envisaged the creation of a unified assembly as one of its constitutional 
organs. He wished to see the same principle applied eventually to the 
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'Hague Union'. 30 
Schticking went even further. Just as the United States of America, 
Switzerland and Germany grew out of the stage of a confederation into 
that of a federation, it might, in his view, become necessary in the 
very distant future for the whole world to make their bond even closer. 
Eventually, therefore, the 'Hague Union' might develop itself, if such 
necessity should arise, into a world federal state. 31 Here Schticking's 
programme is completed. 
The foregoing exposition reveals that in Schticking's view 
international law could approximate the domestic legal system as much as 
necessary, and could even transform itself into a federal legal system. 
SchOcking himself did not specify any clear threshold which, in its 
gradual approximation towards municipal law, international law would 
have to , cross in order to serve effectively for peace, although there 
were some writers among his contemporaries who did. For instance, 
Vollenhoven, the Leyden Professor of International Law, whoseplan 
Schilcking incorporated in his programme, insisted that the creation of 
an international executive was an indispensable condition of peace. 32 
There were also some writers who thought the federal merger of the 
existing states to be an essential step towards world peace. 33  But 
these views were all accommodated within the gradualist framework of 
Schticking's programme. His was undoubtedly one of the most comprehensive 
of all contemporary projects on peace through law, ordering the rest, from 
the more modest to the radically ambitious, along the time scale of future 
human progress. 
The view that there was no limit to the gradual approximation of 
international law to municipal law was not peculiar to Schucking. For 
example, T.J. Lawrence, a British textbook writer of the same period, 
in his fourth (1910) edition of The Principles of International Law, 
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remarked confidently that an International Prize Court would come into 
existence in the immediate future, a High Court of Arbitral Justice 
would probably follow at no distant date, and, if sanctions were needed, 
something resembling an international police was within the limits of 
possibility.
34 
The rapid development of international law, which he 
was witnessing, appeared to him to ensure the coming of an organized 
international society, equipped with legislative, executive, and 
judicial organs. 35 
However, there were also some writers at the turn of the century, who, 
while concerned to develop international law gradually on the basis of 
its contemporary achievements further along the lines of municipal law, 
stressed that it was unnecessary for the former to approximate the latter 
beyond a certain limit. Lassa Oppenheim is a case in point, to whose 
ideas we shall now turn. 
As we saw in Chapter I, Oppenheim was of the opinion that the progress 
of international law depended to a great extent upon whether the 'legal 
school of International Jurists' prevailed over the 'diplomatic school'. 
The 'legal school', according to Oppenheim, desired international law to 
develop more or less along the lines of domestic law, while the 
'diplomatic school' was critical of such a vision. 36 He did not say 
which particular international lawyers of his day belonged to each of 
these schools, with the exception of John Westlake, of whom he said that 
he was a champion of the legal school.
37 
It should be clear, however, 
that Oppenheim considered himself a member of this school, for otherwise 
it would have been odd for him, as an international lawyer concerned 
for the future of international law, to say that this depended on the 
prevalence of this school over the other. 
Like Schacking and Lawrence, Oppenheim was impressed by the 
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contemporary development of international law. He took the view that 
international law had entered a 'new and pregnant epoch' where the 
beginning of the development was before their eyes, and that, in order 
to create a more peaceful world, any scheme of international organization 
must try to build gradually on the foundation laid at the Hag
u
e.
38 
Oppenheim's heightened confidence in the future of international law 
can be shown by comparing a passage from the first (1905-6) edition of 
his well-known textbook with a corresponding passage from its second 
(1912) edition. In the former, he had stated that international law did 
not object to states waging war, but now in the latter, he qualified this 
by adding .a phrase, 'at present'. Likewise he now held it to be only 
'at present' that eternal peace was an impossibility, whereas earlier he 
had stated this goal to be merely an unrealizable ideal: it now appeared 
to him that this ideal would 'slowl'y but gradually be realized'. 39 It 
would appear that the development of international law which had taken 
place in the intervening years, which had necessitated the revision of 
his book, had itself raised his confidence in the future contribution of 
international law to world peace. 
It is very important to realize, however, that it was international 
law qua 'international' law that he, as a member of the legal school, 
desired to see perfected on the lines of domestic law. To put it more 
fully, there was for Oppenheim a definite line beyond which 'international' 
law could not go, without contradicting its essential nature, in the 
process of its assimilation to a domestic legal system. If international 
law were to be made to approximate a domestic legal system beyond this 
boderline, in Oppenheim's view, it would cease to be 'international' 
law, i.e., the law between sovereign states. 
Therefore, while Oppenheim wished to see international law develop 
'more or less on the lines of municipal law', he was equally opposed to 
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those who desired to develop it beyond that borderline, and, who, in 
Oppenheim's conception, were consequently attempting to substitute a 
'world state' for the sovereign states system governed by 'international' 
law. As we shall see presently in more detail, this borderline consisted, 
for Oppenheim, in the introduction of the idea of organized sanctions 
into international law, which, in his view, would fundamentally contradict 
the 'nature and definition' of that system of law.
40 
Naturally, the mere notion of what is to count as 'international law', 
whether it be a popular or scientific definition, cannot by itself dictate 
to mankind the limit beyond which its global legal system could or 
should not develop. One might accept Oppenheim's criteria as to what 
is to count as 'international law', and yet suggest that 'international 
law' thus defined, however closely it might be made to develop along the 
lines of domestic law, was not good\enough as a means of organizing the 
world. To those who think it essential to bring the global legal system 
even nearer to a domestic model, the scholarly admonition that such a 
system would contradict the concept of international law would be irrelevant. 
What underlay Oppenheim's position was not only his definition of 
international law, upon which his textbook as well as his proposal was 
built, but his confidence in the power of international law thus defined. 
International law, which, by his definition, was incompatible with the 
idea of organized sanctions, appeared to Oppenheim as a satisfactory 
means of organizing the world. The introduction of such an idea would 
be not only logically incompatible with the nature of international law 
as he defined it, but also unnecessary, in his opinion. 
Oppenheim's belief in the redundancy of organized enforcement in the 
international sphere was explicitly grounded on his perception of the 
development of law within the domestic sphere. He wrote: 
- 103 - 
In the internal life of states it is necessary for courts 
to possess executive power because the conditions of human 
nature demand it. Just as there will always be individual 
offenders, so there will always be individuals who will only 
yield to compulsion. But states are a different kind of 
person from individual men; their present-day constitution 
on the generally prevalent type has made them, so to say, 
more moral than in the time of absolutism. The  personal__ 
interests and ambitio,ns_of.sovereigns,_and their passion for 
an increase of their might, have finished playing part in 
the life of peoples. The real and true interests of states  
and welfare of the inhabitants of the state have taken the 
place thereof. Machiavellian principles are no longer 
prevalent everywhere. The mutual intercourse of states is 
carried on in reliance on the sacredness of treaties. 
Peaceable adjustment of states' disputes is in the interests 
of the states themselves, for war is nowadays an immense moral 
and economic evil even for the victor state.
41 
While Oppenheim was therefore of the opinion that organized sanctions 
would be both unnecessary and contrary to the definition of international 
law, he held it to be both necessary and consistent with its definition 
to form an international court of justice, consisting of permanently 
elected judges, and deciding the cases of international disputes laid 
before them in terms of strictly legal criteria. 
In his proposal of 1911, contained in a short work, Die Zukunft des  
VOlkerrechts, he did not argue that this court should be endowed with 
the power of obligatory adjudication, although he was confident that 
this aim would be achieved in the third, or some later, Hague Conference.
42 
In his view, the obligation to submit to the court all or certain types 
of international disputes would be unnecessary, for once the court had 
been established, states would, in his judgement, voluntarily submit 
to it a whole range of cases. The type of cases submitted would, in 
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his view, at first be those of smaller importance, but he was confident 
that as the court's reputation became well-established, more important 
cases would come to be submitted. What was lacking was the machinery: 
once available, it would be used, and its role would expand.
43 
In addition, Oppenheim, like Schticking, suggested the conversion of 
the Hague Conference into a permanent periodic assembly of governmental 
representatives for the codification of international law.
44 
He also 
planned international courts of appeal, to be established at a later 
date, to stand above the international courts of justice, in order to 
make the voluntary acceptance of the judgements more likely.
45 
All these proposed organs were, in Oppenheim's view, both necessary 
to, and consistent with the notion of, international law: anything 
beyond them both unnecessary, and contrary to it. 
At this stage, we may note that we have witnessed at least three 
different ways in the use of the domestic analogy, exemplified by 
Lorimer, Schicking and Oppenheim. 
Lorimer recognized the principles of good government at work within 
the domestic sphere, but saw nothing in the international sphere to build 
on. He therefore advocated the direct transfer of those principles to 
the virgin soil of international relations. Schicking, on the other 
hand, noted within the international sphere a promising, embryonic 
institution in the form of the Hague Conferences. He therefore argued 
that this could be developed gradually along the lines of municipal law 
to its logical end, the creation of a World Federation. Oppenheim, too, 
saw both the principles of good government at work within the domestic 
sphere and embryonic institutions within the international system, and 
his approach was just as gradualist as Schlicking's. But, unlike 
Lorimer and Schticking, he considered that the progress of government 
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in the domestic sphere made it unnecessary for international law to 
develop beyond certain limits along the lines of municipal law. 
Thus, in the case of Lorimer, we find the domestic analogy leading 
to an outright transfer of most of the important domestic institutions 
to the international sphere. In the case of SchOcking, we see an 
extensive, but gradualist use of the domestic analogy. And, in 
Oppenheim, a gradualist, but limited use of this analogy. 
As we noted at the outset, the development of international law at 
the turn of the century did not necessarily produce a uniform response 
among international lawyers in favour of a further approximation of 
international law to municipal law than it had already accomplished by 
that stage. There were those whom Oppenheim had called the 'diplomatic 
school'. In the remaining part of this chapter, we shall attempt to 
identify who belonged to this school and what its views were. What 
follows is somewhat conjectural as unfortunately Oppenheim himself 
did not disclose whom he counted as 'among this school. 
According to the Oxford English Dictionary, a 'school' is a body or 
succession of persons who in some department of speculation or practice 
are disciples of the same master, or who are united by the general 
similarities of principles and methods, and hence, figuratively, a set 
of persons who agree in certain opinions. In describing the 'diplomatic 
school', Oppenheim did not suggest that it was headed by a. particular 
'master', nor did he state that the members of this school were 'united' 
in the sense of seeing themselves as united. Therefore, we may suppose 
that when Oppenheim referred to the 'diplomatic school' he had in mind 
a set of international lawyers of his time whose opinions on certain 
aspects of international law were similar to one another. Their ideas 
were similar, as Oppenheim stated, inasmuch as they were opposed to 
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the creation of an international court of justice composed of 
permanently appointed judges, and they desired international law to 
remain a body of elastic principles rather than to work towards the 
condification of firm, decisive and unequivocal rules.
46 
In fact it is not very easy to find an international lawyer among 
Oppenheim's contemporaries who satisfies his descriptions of the 
'diplomatic school', although there may have been many politicians who, 
from the viewpoint of their respective national interests, were opposed 
to the establishment of an international court of justice or the 
codification of international law in some specific areas. However, an 
extensive survey of the relevant literature reveals that Otfried 
Nippold, a German international lawyer, but citizen of Switzerland, may 
have been among those whom Oppenheim had in mind as the members of this 
school.
47 
This suggestion is based\on the following findings. 
The opposition between the two schools appears to have occurred to 
Oppenheim between 1905 and 1911 or 1912. In 1905, the first edition 
of his textbook was published, but no reference was made to the two 
schools. In 1911, Oppenheim published Die Zukunft des Volkerrechts, 
in which he advocated the creation of an international court of justice. 
In this book, he briefly referred to those who were critical of the 
creation of such an institution, but he did not say who they were.
48 
In 1912, the second edition of his textbook was published in which for 
the first time he referred to the two schools by their labels, and 
described the 'diplomatic school' in terms virtually identical with 
those which he had used in his 1911 work to characterize the opponents 
of an international court of justice. 49 
In this work of 1911, Oppenheim had stated that it was among the 
old champions of arbitration that the most violent opposition was 
raised to the erection of a real court of justice. 5° Nippold fits into 
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this category well. Moreover, importantly for our hypothesis, 
Nippold's major work, in which he stressed the role of arbitration, but 
criticized the idea of adjudication, appeared in 1907, that is, 
between the publication of the first and the second editions of 
Oppenheim's textbook.
51 
Furthermore, in 1908, Nippold published a two-volume work on the 
second Hague Conference, in which he repeated his opposition to the 
idea of an international court of justice.
52 
The copy of the second 
volume available in the British Library of Political and Economic Science 
has an inscription on the title page, showing that it had been given 
personally to Oppenheim by its author. Although the copy of the first 
volume, in which Nippold expressed his opposition to the idea of a court 
of justice, unfortunately, has no indication that it had been given to, 
or read by, Oppenheim, it may well be that he had read both volumes. 
This could well have stimulated Oppenheim to characterize those who 
were opposed to the creation of an international court of justice in 
the way he did in his book of 1911, and, subsequently, to refer to the 
antagonism between the two schools in the second edition of his textbook. 
The reference to the two schools reappears in all the subsequent 
editions.
53 
On such indirect evidence, we may suppose that Oppenheim considered 
Nippold to belong to the 'diplomatic school', and examine the latter's 
view on the conditions of international order as an example of how that 
school treated the subject. 
Curiously enough, the outline of Nippold's argument about the nature 
of international law turns out to be remarkably similar to that of 
Oppenheim. They both stressed the specific character of international 
law. The main difference between the two writers consisted in the fact 
that whereas Oppenheim placed the borderline, beyond which international 
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law could not develop without contradicting its nature and definition at 
the level of creating a mechanism for organized sanctions, Nippold put 
this upper limit of international law at the lower level: the level 
at which states became subjected to an international court of justice 
composed of permanently appointed judges, and acting in accordance with 
its own procedural rules.
54 
Nippold's own plan, moreover, turns out to be a little more far-
reaching than one might expect. He proposed a general treaty which 
obliged states to resort to one of the three peaceful methods: arbitration, 
mediation or inquiry by commission. Neutral states were to be legally 
obliged to remind the contestants of their legal duty to resort to one of 
these peaceful means.
55 
It will have to be accepted of course that the concession he made to 
the domestic analogy was small, and'more limited than the case of 
Oppenheim. Nippold's concession to it consisted in the fact that his 
proposal to impose a system of legal restrictions upon the freedom of 
states to resort to self-help was at least implicitly an attempt to 
emulate to some extent the achievements of a centralized legal order as 
shown within the borders of states. 
The affinity between the two writers leads us to suspect that 
perhaps Nippold stood at the 'legalist' end of the spectrum among the 
'diplomatists' (just as one might suspect that Oppenheim was at the 
'diplomatist' end of the 'legalist' spectrum), and that some writers 
on international law at the time might have rejected the domestic 
analogy rather more fully than did Nippold. The writings of Karl von 
Stengel and Thomas Baty throw some light on this question, and we shall 
examine their ideas for world order in the following. 
Karl von Stengel was a Professor of Law at Munich, and was 
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appointed a member of the German delegation to the first Hague Peace 
Conference. Some of those who knew that he had written a book in praise 
of war and depreciating arbitration seem to have thought it odd that he 
should be among the delegation. 56 Stengel's view of international law, 
however, was similar to that of Nippold.
57 
The main difference between 
them was that Stengel went further than Nippold in protecting the 
existing legal freedom of states to resort to force as a means of 
settling disputes. 
In Stengel's view, an arbitral tribunal could have jurisdiction over 
a dispute insofar as the parties agreed to provide it with such 
jurisdiction. He held that a court of arbitration or justice equippped 
with compulsory jurisdiction was just as incompatible with the idea of 
international law as would be an international legislature capable of 
imposing laws upon states against their will. Should arbitration fail, 
he thought, states would have no other choice but to settle their 
differences by force in accordance with the laws of war.
58 
Stengel's conservativism could be regarded as an instance of the 
rejection of the domestic analogy inasmuch as he was opposed to any 
attempt to move the then existing system of international law closer 
to a domestic model especially in the area of the settlement of 
disputes.
59 
It is not known whether Oppenheim considered Stengel as a 
member of the 'diplomatic school', although Stengel's opposition to the 
aims of the 'legal school' had been noted, for example, by Walther 
SchOcking. 60 If we are right in our judgement that Nippold stood at 
the 'legalist' end of the spectrum among the 'diplomatists', it might 
be that Stengel was at the other extreme within the 'diplomatic 
school'. 
However, in order to appreciate Stengel's view fully, it is vital 
to bear in mind that his position on international law was firmly 
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rooted in German nationalism. In his view, Germany, a late-comer to 
the international struggle, was encircled by hostile nations. They 
were, according to him, bound to start a war against Germany if, under 
the influence of misguided pacifism, she chose to reduce her armaments, 
trusting in the power of international aribitration. Thus, he concluded, 
pacifism would defeat its own aim, and militarism was what was needed 
in Germany at that time: only through the adoption of a militaristic 
policy now, he said, could Germany resort to a peaceable policy in a 
generation hence.
61 
Therefore, if we are to treat Stengel as exemplifying the attitude 
of the '0.plomatic school' towards the domestic analogy, we must not 
forget the fact that his view on this question was derived primarily 
from the viewpoint of protecting the position of one particular nation 
rather than from the viewpoint of wdrld order as such. Although Stengel 
linked these two perspectives together, the overall bias of his book 
was clearly in the direction of German nationalism. 
In contrast to the case of Stengel, there is no clear evidence to 
suggest that Thomas Baty's views on international law, in the area of 
our concern, were rooted in the interests of any one country as he 
perceived them to be, although it is of some interest to note that he 
was a legal adviser to the Foreign Ministry of another revisionist 
power, Japan in the inter-war years, and was a Shintoist. 62 
In the opinion of this little-known British practitioner and scholar, 
international law was a near perfect system as it stood. It was more 
perfect than domestic law because it worked well without a government. 
We have seen that this belief was shared to some extent by Oppenheim, 
but Baty's admiration of international law was something of a different 
order. 
Baty wrote in his book published in 1930: 'It is the special glory 
of the Law of Nations that, so far, it has triumphantly overriden the 
policeman'; 'International law overrides the policeman, and can do very 
well without him. Equally is it able to do without a Legislature --
and not only able, but exultant'; 'Nor does it call for an authoritarian 
Code'; 'the longer it does without [a legislature the better'; 'It 
bows to no sovereign set of managers.'
63 
Baty also argued that as a consequence of the anarchical structure of 
international society, its rules would have to be simple, certain and 
objective, while nevertheless elastic. 64 Baty's emphasis on the 
eleasticity of international law satisfies part of Oppenheim's criteria 
of the 'diplomatic school', although Baty's book appeared two decades 
after Oppenheim's reference to the two schools of thought. 
Baty's earlier work, International Law, however, had been published 
in 1909, and this contained an intOkesting analysis of arbitration, and 
a somewhat unusual chapter on federation. 
Baty's favoured solution in search of a substitute for war was a 
treaty for obligatory arbitration of all disputes without reservation. 
But unlike many elaborate proposals advanced by the peace advocates of 
his time, his plan consisted in a very simple declaration on the part 
of each contracting party 	to bind itself to discover a person in 
whom it would have confidence to come to a just decision in case of 
dispute with another.
65 
The actual choice of the arbitrator and the 
regulations of the procedure would have to be left, he thought, until 
each time the necessity for arbitration arose. This elasticity, in 
Baty's view, was the mark of arbitration, in contrast to adjudication, 
and was for this very reason particularly suited to the international 
environment. He rejected the 'fantastic projects for the composition 
of international courts' as being 'suitable material for undergraduates' 
essays in Political Science' and 'unnecessary to be recommended or 
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adopted.'
66 
Baty defended his preference for a simple and elastic treaty, 
consisting of a mere pledge to refer all disputed questions to arbitration 
by arguing that whether simple or complex, the substitute for war would 
have to be based on exactly the same foundation, i.e., the force of a 
world-wide opinion constraining the observance of treaties. 67 He went 
further still: the moral force of a simpler and freer treaty would be 
greater, for the more 'fair and liberal' an agreement, the more strongly 
68 
would public opinion condemn its breach. 	He concluded: 'If the nations 
are still so prone to war that they will look without disapproval on one 
of their number making a peaceful settlement of a given dispute 
impossible, in defiance of her solemn engagement, it is evident that no 
scheme of obligatory arbitration, however detailed, is likely to succeed.'
69 
Furthermore, Baty went on to warm against the importation into the 
domain of international disputes 'the arts of the advocate' and the 
'sordid and suspicious atmosphere of the law-courts'. 7° Excessive 
legalism, in his view, was harmful to the cause of arbitration. 
Baty's position as regards the role of law for the achievement of 
international peace was thus in perfect accord with Oppenheim's 
description of the 'diplomatic school', and the possibility is not 
ruled out that he was among those whom Oppenheim had in mind. Baty's 
opposition to the establishment of an international court of justice 
was known, for example, to a German writer, Hans Wehberg, who referred 
to Baty's International Law in his Das Problem eines Internationalen  
Staatengerichtshofes(1912), and it would not be an unreasonable 
conjecture that Oppenheim, in England, was also aware of Baty's views.
71 
Baty, however, went beyond the horizon of an ordinary international 
lawyer. He was convinced that the state was becoming obsolete and 
being overtaken by the social classes. This, in his view, might result 
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in a completely different structure of the world. But once the old 
sovereign states system had been broken up, and a long period of 
uncertainty had passed, Baty assumed that local units, much smaller than 
the present nation-states, would gain ascendancy as the centres of true 
patriotism. What he envisaged as the model of a very distant future 
for the global organization of mankind was a 'federation' of these 
minute local units. However, this 'federation', in his view, should 
not be organized on the model of a domestic government: in particular, 
it was not to have a legislature or an executive, for, in his view, 
these organs were becoming the target of ever-growing criticism even 
in the domestic sphere. After all, it was the absence of those organs 
from the international sphere that had rejoiced Baty so much.
72 
As we noted in Chapter II, an advocacy for the conclusion of an 
arbitration treaty between two states could be derived from the domestic 
analogy.
73 
A fortiori, Baty's proposed treaty, which, despite its 
flexibility, was general, and was to cover all disputes, can be said to 
contain an attempt to move the world one step nearer to the conditions 
which obtain within the borders of states. But, on the other hand, 
Baty was emphatically opposed to pushing the world system closer to the 
domestic system than the point at which states pledged to use arbitration 
as a means of settling their disputes. 
Moreover, in many of his remarks about international law and domestic 
systems, we can even detect the reverse of the domestic analogy: not 
that international law ought to emulate a domestic model, but that 
domestic law is inferior to international law, that even within the 
domestic sphere governmental machinery is under attack, and that the 
state will disappear as a unit of global organization in some distant 
future. Thus, in Baty, whether or not he was counted by Oppenheim as 
among the 'diplomatic school', we see the domestic analogy approach 
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the vanishing point, be rejected in most parts and even 'reversed'. 
The analogy was reversed in the case of Baty in the sense that it was 
now international law which was to provide a model for municipal law, 
and not the other way around, even though with respect to arbitration 
he might be classed together with those who made concessions to the 
domestic analogy. 
Because Oppenheim did not clarify who in his judgement belonged to the 
'diplomatic school', it is difficult to know for certain who it 
comprised and what precisely its attitude was towards the domestic 
analogy. It would appear, however, that the 'diplomatic school' was a 
label which Oppenheim had imposed upon a number of international lawyers 
who were unwilling to see international law emulate a domestic model as 
far as he had himself desired. It is not surprising then that the 
difference between Oppenheim and Nippold, for example, was a matter of 
degree. It is nevertheless easy to appreciate Oppenheim's concern to 
draw a sharp demarcation line between himself and someone like Nippold 
for the question which divided them was precisely those which carried 
particular significance in the aftermath of the second Hague Conference, 
the creation of an international court of justice. 74 Within the 'school', 
the attitude towards the domestic analogy was not uniform. Nevertheless, 
we see in their prescriptions general scepticism towards reliance 
on the domestic analogy. 
One observation needs to be added here. Just as gradualist 
progressivism, while particularly pronounced in the early twentieth 
century, was not absent from the nineteenth century, so the ideas 
advanced by the diplomatic school were not confined to the Hague 
Conferences period. There were those who adhered to similar ideas 
before the first decade or so of the twentieth century. Thus, according 
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to Lauterpacht, the idea that a permanent international court would 
be incompatible with the concept of the state (and hence with 
international law defined as law between states) had already been 
expressed by Bergbohm in 1877.
75 
The views, rooted in German 
nationalism, advanced by Stengel were in many ways similar to those 
of Heinrich von Treitschke.
76 
Nevertheless, it remains the case that 
Nippold, Stengel and Baty all produced their works partly as a 
criticism of what they regarded as excessive concessions which a 
significant portion of international lawyers at that time were making 
towards the domestic analogy. 
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Chapter V 	The Impact of the Great War 
It was characteristic of the optimism and self-confidence of the 
early twentieth century that the necessity for coercion in the inter-
national sphere was not very strongly felt among the writers on world 
order. Vollenhoven, who regarded the establishment of an international 
army and navy as a necessary condition of peace, appears in this 
respect to have been in the minority, as he was himself aware. ] His 
plan for an international army and navy was incorporated in Walther 
SchlIcking's long-term programme, but the latter was far from stressing 
the mechanism of coercion as a sine qua non of peace.
2 
Similarly, 
T.J. Lawrence, Schtcking's contemporary, said of an international 
police that it could be established in the distant future, if the 
necessity arose, given the trend of\development in international law. 
His point was not that such an organ was an indispensable condition of 
peace, but rather that international law had reached the point of 
take-off for boundless progress.
3 
Many thinkers on the future of international law and relations, who 
wrote in the aftermath of the Second Hague Conference, did so with 
the Third Conference in mind, which they expected in 1915.
4 
What 
awaited them instead was the outbreak of the First World War a year 
earlier. One of the consequences of this shattering experience was a 
tendency among these writers to converge on one central theme: the 
introduction of the element of coercion into the international system. 
This point is illustrated well by the change of attitude shown during 
the war by those who had previously been firmly opposed to the idea of 
organized sanctions in international law. 
As we saw, Oppenheim was opposed to such an idea before the war, but 
now in his letter of February 1919 addressed to Theodore Marburg, one 
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of the organizers of the American League to Enforce Peace, he stated: 
As regards the question which you raise in your letter, 
namely "whether it is necessary to provide for enforcing 
the judgment of the Court," before the war I was of opinion 
like you that, if we only got the International Court of 
Justice established, no enforcement of its verdicts would 
be necessary.... 	However, the war has changed everything 
... /1.7n case, a party against which a verdict of the Court 
has been given disobeyed the verdict and resorted to hostilities, 
there is no doubt that the [proposed] League would have to take 
the side of the attacked party.
5 
In conformity with such a change of view, Oppenheim also wrote in 
the third edition of his textbook (1929) that the right of neutral states 
to intervene against belligerents violating the laws of war was 
insufficient, and that it should be made a duty of the League of Nations, 
which had by then come into existence, to exercise such intervention. 
Although this edition was produced by Roxburgh, the statement was 
Oppenheim's own.
6 
The third edition also contained Oppenheim's criticism of the League 
of Nations. Among the defects of the League was, in his opinion, the 
fact that it was possible for a member either to withdraw, or to be 
expelled, from it. In his judgement, there ought not to be any such 
possibility, and the recalcitrant member should be coerced by force to 
submit to the decisions of the League, and fulfil its duties. 7 Another 
important weakness of the League, in his view, was the absence of 
compulsory jurisdiction by the Permanent Court of International Justice. 8  
Even at this stage, Oppenheim refrained from joining those who 
criticized the League of Nations for not being a 'super-State'. By a 
duper-State' he meant an international organization equipped with an 
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'international Government', an 'international Parliament with power to 
legislate by a majority' and 'an international Army and Navy'.
9 
But 
the ground for dissociating himself from this type of criticism was 
simply that he did not consider any such advanced organization to be 
realizable. The kind of sharp doctrinal denunciation which one might 
have expected from pre-war Oppenheim was conspicuously missing. He 
simply stated that no state would at that time give its consent to the 
establishment of a League of Nations constituting a 'super-State' in 
this sense.
10 
The example of Franz von Liszt is no less striking. The author of 
one of the best-known textbooks of international law in the German-
,. 
speaking world, he had repeated in ten successive editions of his work 
the view that international law was based on consent between states and 
that the idea of coercion found no place in international law. But in 
the eleventh edition (1918), an important change of opinion is observable. 
International law was now said to be inferior in quality to domestic law 
in that it lacked organized sanctions: it was still at a primitive stage 
in the development of law, which domestic legal systems had long overcome. 
The introduction of coercion to the system of international law was now 
said to be the greatest problem for the future of international legal 
order.
11 
Otfried Nippold, Oppenheim's likely 'diplomatist' critic, too, 
changed his mind through the experience of the war. This was disclosed 
in his Die Gestaltung des Wilkerrechts nach dem Weltkriege (1917). 
Quoting a passage from his own work published in 1907, Nippold 
explained that before the war the idea of coercive measures was contrary 
to his conception of international law. There was no reason, in his 
pre-war view, why international law should require coercion. The fact 
that no state had yet unlawfully refused to accept an arbitral award 
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appeared to him to prove that the advocates of international sanctions 
were unduly underestimating the lofty position of international law: 
lofty because its effectiveness rested entirely on the mutual confidence 
of civilized nations.
12 
But, he now stated, the war had been a severe lesson: many pre-war 
views had to go absolutely by the board, and views on international law 
were no exception. The call of the whole civilized world for more real 
sanctions for international law could not be ignored, he thought, for 
international law could no longer rest on its moral power alone.
13 
In 
his book, he listed a number of writers from many parts of the world 
who joined in this call for a real guarantee in international law.
14 
Thus the prevailing opinion of the international legal writers in 
the period of the Great War was that international law should become 
more analogous to municipal law by accommodating the idea of coercion. 
There were some, like Philip Marshall Brown, a Yale Professor of 
International Law, who still clung to the idea that international law 
was unique and that no coercion was necessary. 15 Likewise, there were 
some who, from the pacifist or other viewpoint, rejected the idea of 
coercion.
16 
But they were less conspicuous. As some former champions 
of the doctrine of the specific character of international law revised 
their pre-war positions, the idea that some form of coercion was as 
necessary in international law as in domestic law was gathering 
momentum as the central theme of those individuals and groups who 
actively participated in the debate about the post-war reconstruction 
of international society. 
Those publicists, associations, and statesmen, particularly those of 
Britain and the United States, whose proposals had a more direct 
influence on the eventual creation of the League of Nations, while 
tending to advocate less radical changes than academic writers, were 
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also in agreement on one fundamental point: that international 
relations could no longer be organized in the nineteenth-century 
fashion, and that the freedom of states to resort to war would have to 
be legally restricted. The ideas formulated for this end included a 
cooling-off period, regular conferences, a security guarantee, the 
principle of the indivisibility of peace, and an international court 
of justice. All these ideas contained an element of the domestic analogy, 
as the examination below will reveal. 
The idea of a cooling-off period was contained in the Bryce group 
proposal, the Fabian Society programme, and was also implicit in the 
proposal advanced by the League to Enforce Peace.
17 
The last of these was headed by ex-President Taft, and it is 
suggestive of the general climate of opinion of this group that he had 
written an article entitled 'United States Supreme Court the Prototype 
of a World Court'.
18 
Marburg, one of the organizers of this association, personally 
favoured the creation of an international army and navy to secure the 
submission of disputes and to enforce its decrees, and considered a 
'super-State', 'dominating the various nations as the Federal Government 
dominates the individual states comprising the American Union', as the 
ideal solution to the problem of peace.
19 
Marburg's correspondence and 
the summary of discussions at the early meetings of the association 
reveal that their idea of a League was closely guided by their under-
standing about the basis of order in the domestic sphere in general, 
and their knowledge of the American constitution in particular.
20 
Dictated by the consideration of practicability, however, what emerged 
as the association's official proposal was along the lines of most other 
middle-of-the-road proposals of the period: compulsory submission of 
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justiciable and non-justiciable disputes to a tribunal and a council 
of conciliation respectively.
21 
Taft explained the idea behind the 
proposal as follows: 
We do not propose in our plan, to enforce compliance either 
with the Court's judgment or the Conciliation Commission's 
recommendation. We feel that we ought not to attempt too 
much. We believe that the forced submission, the truce taken 
to investigate and the judicial decision, or the conciliatory 
compromise recommended will form a material inducement to 
peace. It will cool the heat of passion and will give the 
men of peace in each nation time to still the jingoes.
22 
It may be questioned here whether a proposal for the creation of an 
international institution embodying the idea of a cooling-off period 
can, by virtue of that fact, be regarded as involving the domestic 
analogy. The important point to note in considering this is that the 
idea that a moratorium on the use of force will tend to decrease a 
tension between contestants is an empirical supposition. A peace-schemer 
who favours the introduction of such an institution to the international 
sphere must therefore have some experience in mind in which 'delay' 
actually led to 'cooling off'. Admittedly, such an experience need not 
have taken place within the domestic sphere. However, if the supposition 
is based on the experience of inter-personal and/or inter-factional 
disputes within a state, then there is a case for saying that a proposal 
of this kind is an instance of the domestic analogy. 
The Bryce group proposal poses a rather complex question here, since 
the group borrowed the institution of a cooling-off period not directly 
from domestic sources, but from the so-called Bryan treaties which had 
by then come into existence.
23 
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In Bryan and World Peace, M.E. Curti maintains that it was the 
existing commissions of inquiry in disputes between capital and labour 
that suggested to Bryan the extension of the idea to the sphere of 
international relations.
24 
If Curti is correct, there is therefore a 
case for suggesting that the Bryan treaties were based on a domestic 
analogy and that therefore the Bryce group resorted to this analogy at 
least indirectly. 
However, the first publication of Bryan's proposal for the compulsory 
investigation of all international disputes, accompanied by a 
moratorium on war, was in 1905 and this seems to have predated 
corresponding labour legislation in the United States or elsewhere, 
although such legislation had taken place by the time the Bryan treaties 
were being negotiated.
25 
Nevertheless, according to Bryan's own account, he had for some time 
been advocating a plan for a compulsory investigation of all labour 
disputes when in 1905, during the Russo-Japanese War, it occurred to 
him that the same principle could be applied to the settlement of 
international disputes.
26 
It appears therefore that the Bryan treaties 
were not derived from existing domestic institutions, as Curti suggests, 
but none the less from the ideas which Bryan had himself formulated for 
the solution of domestic (labour) disputes. 
It may, on the one hand, be held to be significant that Bryan had 
originally advocated the plan in relation . to domestic (labour) disputes 
and only later thought of applying the principle to international 
relations. It may thus be said that there was an element of domestic 
analogy in Bryan's own thinking, and that therefore the Bryce group 
proposal, which reflected Bryan's ideas, involved the domestic 
analogy, albeit indirectly. 
On the other hand, it may be objected that the argument that the 
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Bryce group were indirectly resorting to this analogy unduly expands 
the range of circumstances under which this analogy can be said to be 
used. This is a reasonable criticism, and alerts us to the important 
fact that what is to count as a case of the domestic analogy is itself 
a function of the historical development in the institutionalization of 
international society. If the kind of arrangement contained in the 
Bryan treaties were well-established between many sets of states, an 
attempt to unite all these states under one system, incorporating 
the arrangements in question, and perhaps extending it to some other 
states, would probably not impress us as an instance of the domestic 
analogy. 
Nevertheless, in reality, the Bryan treaties had been a relative 
innovation in the international sphere, and could hardly be classed as 
among the distinctive institutions 'of international society. Moreover, 
the Bryce group's inclination not to bring in the domestic analogy in 
explaining their plan could be interpreted as being based on a tactical 
concern. Any impression that the structure of the proposed international 
body is in some way analogous to a domestic legal system could be 
exaggerated and used against it by conservative opponents. The argument 
that the new international body is 'like a state', and that therefore 
to become one of its members means the loss or infringement of 
'sovereignty' is a weapon which those who endeavour to create such an 
institution will not wish their opponents to employ against them. 27 
 It was probably such a consideration that had led the Bryce group to 
refrain from explaining their proposal along the lines of the domestic 
analogy, although this analogy was perhaps in the back of their minds.
28 
The idea of a cooling-off period, contained in a number of influential 
proposals at the time, became incorporated in Article 12 of the 
Covenant of the League of Nations. 
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The element of the domestic analogy was present also in proposals 
for regular conference. For example, a British Foreign Office 
Memorandum of November 1918 and General Smuts' plan were both inspired 
by the conference system of the British Empire. 
The Foreign Office Memorandum suggested that a standing conference, 
equipped with a permanent secretariat, should be established as a 
central organ of the League of Nations for a frank interchange of views 
between the Governments. The foreign secretaries of the Great Powers 
were to meet annually, and those of all the signatories were to meet 
every four or five years.
29 
According to Zimmern, who in his The League of Nations and the Rule  
of Law devoted a chapter to the discussion of this Memorandum, its 
proposal for regular conference was inspired by the model of the British 
War Council and Imperial Conference. ° Since the Memorandum had in fact 
been written by none other than Zimmern himself we can take his remark 
here as authoritative.
31 
The proposal that the foreign ministers of 
the signatories should meet every four or five years is said by 
Zimmern to be 'like the British Imperial Conference', and the Memorandum 
itself also remarks that 'as in the case of the Imperial Conference' a 
report of the proceedings of the conference, with confidential matters 
omitted, should be issued subsequently.
32 
The War Council, which Zimmern mentions as a chief source of inspiration 
for the proposed system of regular conference, had been transformed in 
1914 from the Committee of Imperial Defence. The latter, established by 
Balfour in 1904, was a co-ordinating body for inter-departmental matters 
relative to defence, consisting of the Prime Minister and any other 
persons he chose to invite to its meetings, and was equipped with a 
permanent secretariat. In 1911, it was enlarged to include the Prime 
Ministers of the self-governing Dominions. During the Great War, this 
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British institution served as a model in the creation of the Supreme 
War Council of the Allied Powers.
33 
General Smuts, whose plan attracted much attention on the eve of the 
Paris Conference referred to the conference system as being 'in vogue 
in the constitutional practice of the British Empire', and took this, 
rather than a 'super-State', federation, or confederation of states, as 
the most suitable model for the League of Nations.
34 
What he had in 
mind as the conference system of the British Empire included the 
British Imperial Conference and presumably also the Committee of 
Imperial Defence. What Smuts attempted was the further extension of 
these institutions into a peace-time organization for international 
co-operation on a wider scale. The idea of regular conference equipped 
with its own permanent secretariat became the basis of some of the most 
fundamental Articles of the Covenant.
35 
Proposals for a security guarantee, and for adopting the principle 
of the indivisibility of peace were also derived from domestic sources. 
Here it is necessary to explain the views advanced by President Wilson 
and Colonel House. 
The Great War, in House's opinion, resulted primarily from the lack 
of an organized system of international co-operation. Soon after the 
outbreak of the war, which signified to him the bankruptcy of the 
European diplomatic system, House felt the need to prevent the 
duplication of the mistake in the New World. He urged the President 
to take the initiative in developing a scheme for the preservation of 
peace in the Western Hemisphere. What House had in mind was a loose 
league of American states to guarantee security from aggression and to 
ban the private manufacture of weapons. Taken in conjunction with the 
Bryan treaties which had by then been concluded, House thought that 
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the proposed scheme would be sufficient to preserve peace on the 
American continent, and that it would also serve as a model for the 
European nations when peace had been restored.
36 
According to Colonel House, Wilson, at House's suggestion, wrote 
down the basic principles of the proposed Pan-American Pact in two points: 
1st. Mutual guaranties of political independence under 
republican form of government and mutual guaranties of 
territorial integrity. 
2nd. Mutual agreement that the Government of each of the 
contracting parties acquire complete control within its 
37 
jurisdiction of the manufacture and sale of munitions of war. 
House himself did not explain how Wilson and he arrived at the precise 
wording of the first principle, but it is strongly reminiscent of a 
passage from the American Constitution (Article IV, Section 4): 'The 
United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a republican 
form of government, and shall protect each of them against invasion ...' 
R.S. Baker, President Wilson's biographer, has no doubt that the 
inspiration for this principle came straight from the American 
Constitution. 38 
Here it is interesting to note that Wilson appears at least in 
principle to have favoured the idea of a United States of the World. 
According to R.S. Baker, as early as 1887, (that is, about the time of 
the Lorimer-Bluntschli debate) Wilson had believed that the rapid 
developments of modern politics would ultimately lead to a 'confederation' 
of nations; and, in 1915, Wilson wrote to his college friend, Heath 
Dabney, that he was 'very much interested' in creating a world 
federation.
39 
According to the same source, in July 1917, Wilson 
commented on a former representative from Maryland, David J. Lewis's 
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plan for 'adapting the federal Constitution of the United States to 
the purpose of international organization', and is reported to have 
remarked as follows: 
I quite agree with your iLewis's7 general purposes, but I 
fear that no accomplishment so great as our own Constitution 
can be hoped for. A most happy combination of historical 
conditions alone made that achievement possible. What I do 
hope to accomplish is to establish a structure containing 
the tendencies which will lead irresistibly to the great 
end we in common with all other rightly constituted persons 
desire. But there are going to be difficulties even with this 
modest programme.
40 
What is implicit in this statement is the idea that, despite its 
impracticability in the immediate fUture, the United States of the 
World on the model of the American Constitution was an essentially 
correct and desirable goal. What President Wilson had in mind as an 
immediate post-war goal was the creation of an association of nations 
which could serve as a realistic first step towards a more perfect 
union in the distant future. 
The Wilsonian conception of post-war settlement, however, appears to 
have had at least one other source of inspiration, although here we 
are in the realm of speculation. 
In May 1916, at the first Annual National Assemblage of the League 
to Enforce Peace, Wilson spoke favourably of the idea of a League. In 
his view, although the United States was not herself a party to the war, 
the American people were willing to become a partner in an association 
of nations for peace based on the principle of national self-determination 
and equality of nations if such an association was to be created after 
the war. According to him: 
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... the world is even now upon the eve of a great consummation, 
when some common force will be brought into existence which 
shall safeguard rights as the first and most fundamental 
interest of all peoples and all governments, when coercion 
shall be summoned not to the service of political ambition 
of selfish hostility, but to the service of a common order, a 
common justice, and a common peace.
41 
The expression 'common peace' was repeated in a similar context in 
Wilson's address to the United States Senate on 22 January 1917, and 
T.T.B. Ryder believes that this term was a translation of the Greek, 
koine eirene.
42 
According to Ryder's detailed study, this expression 
was used'by the Greeks in the fourth century B.C. to refer to a special 
type of peace treaty. This type of treaty embraced all the Greek states, 
regardless of whether they had been belligerents in the war which was 
to be terminated by the treaty, guaranteed the independence of these 
states, and was intended to be perpetual in that, unlike other types of 
treaty, the duration of its validity was not specified. 43 
Wilson, as an academic, was well versed in the political history of 
ancient Greece, and it is conceivable that he saw his role as the 
President of a great power, on the analogy of the King's Peace of 
387/386 B.C. or of the Peace of 338/337 B.C. organized by Philip of 
Macedon.
44 
Wilson's earlier proposal for a Pan-American Pact noted above did 
not materialize as Chile and Brazil, two of the three South American 
countries which House had approached, procrastinated until the United 
States entered the European War in the spring of 1917, when the whole 
scheme was pushed to one side in the face of the more urgent problems 
of the day.
45 
However, the idea of security guarantee was incorporated 
in the plan for the League of Nations, which Wilson had requested 
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House to draw up in the summer of 1918.
46 
This idea later became the 
basis of the tenth article of the Covenant itself. 
Colonel House's draft also included the idea that 'A.7ny war or 
threat of war is a matter of concern to the League of Nations, and to 
the Powers, members thereof', which became incorporated in the eleventh 
article of the Covenant.
47 
It appears that House owed this idea, which 
might be termed the principle of the indivisibility of peace, to former 
Secretary of State, Elihu Root. 
Root was among those whom House had invited to discuss how best 
peace could be preserved in the future. The following remarks contained 
in Root's letter to House are noteworthy for their explicit reliance on 
the domeitic analogy, and merit full quotation: 
The first requisite for any durable concert of peaceable 
nations to prevent war is a fundamental change in the 
principle to be applied to international breaches of the 
peace. 
The view now assumed and generally applied is that the 
use of force by one nation towards another is a matter in 
which only the two nations concerned are primarily 
interested, and if any other nation claims a right to 
be heard on the subject it must show some specific 
interest of its own in the controversy,... The requisite 
change is an abandonment of this view, and a universal 
formal and irrevocable acceptance and declaration of the 
view that an international breach of the peace is a matter 
which concerns every member of the Community of Nations --- 
a matter in which every nation has a direct interest, and 
to which every nation has a right to object. 
These two views correspond to the two kinds of 
responsibility in municipal law which we call civil 
responsibility and criminal responsibility. If Z make a 
contract with you and break it, it is no business of our 
neighbour. You can sue me or submit, and he has nothing to 
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say about it. On the other hand, if 	assault and 
batter you, every neighbour has an interest in having me 
arrested and punished, because his own safety requires 
that violence shall be restrained. At the basis of every 
community lies the idea of organization to preserve 
peace. Without that idea really active and controlling 
there can be no community of individuals or of nations. 
It is the gradual growth and substitution of this idea of 
community interest in preventing and punishing breaches 
of the peace which has done away with private war among 
civilized peoples.
48 
Thus one of the main pillars of the League Covenant can be seen to have 
come, via ; House, from an elder statesman who wished to see international 
society organized on the same basic principle as that which underlies 
the community of individuals. 
The House plan also contained an article providing for an inter-
national court, but President Wilson, when he revised the plan, omitted 
this article together with a number of others.
49 
However, an argument 
in favour of a court of justice came from Robert Cecil, who had been 
appointed the head of the League of Nations section of the British 
Foreign Office. Cecil, in formulating his draft proposal, took the 
aforementioned Foreign Office Memorandum as his basis, and combined with 
it much of the British semi-official plan which had been prepared by 
Walter Phillimore's committee.
50 
However, there were some new elements, 
one of which was the idea of a permanent court of justice. He explained 
the necessity for a League equipped with such an organ on the analogy 
of domestic experience, stating that just as the rule of law in England 
rapidly developed after the War of the Roses because there already 
existed courts of law, so must a true court be established in order for 
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international law to become the normal procedure for settling disputes 
under the League.
51 
The idea of a court of justice was incorporated in 
the Covenant, in accordance with the fourteenth article of which the 
Permanent Court of International Justice was established at the Hague 
in 1921. 
The constitutional and criminal law analogies also underlay the 
scheme presented by the Phillimore Committee's French counterpart 
headed by Leon Bourgeois. He had been an ardent advocate of improved 
international organization since the time of the Hague Peace Conferences, 
had represented France there, and was the President of the Association 
franaise pour la Socigt6 des Nations. In the League of Nations 
Commission of the Paris Conference, he fought for his convictions 
persistently, but in vain, against the opposition of Britain and 
America. 52 
Bourgeois's ideas were based on his belief that as the rights of man 
demanded a constitution, so did the rights of nations. In his view, 
peace was only possible if the rights of nations were protected. 
Therefore, international peace, just as peace within the state, 
depended on a 'constitution' defining the law and applying it. But 
law already existed in the international sphere; what was needed, in 
his judgement, therefore, was an additional institutional device to 
turn the international legal system into a true 'constitution'. 
This, according to Bourgeois, involved not the creation of a 'super-
State', but the introduction of obligatory arbitration and organized 
sanctions to punish disobedience.
53 
These ideas penetrated his committee's proposal, which envisaged 
the settlement of all legal disputes by an international tribunal, of 
all non-legal disputes by an international council composed of the 
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heads of Governments or their delegates, the enforcement of decision 
reached by the tribunal or the international council, and the formation 
of a standing international force at the disposal of the League.
54 
Although Phillimore commented on this proposal that it was sufficiently 
similar to that of his own committee to enable a meaningful exchange of 
ideas, it was virtually ignored by the British Foreign Office and 
President Wilson, and had little influence on the final outcome, the 
Covenant of the League of Nations.
55 
To the above list of institutional devices invented as parts of the 
machinery to reduce the freedom of states to resort to war, we may add 
the mandate system. This was proposed by Zimmern's Foreign Office 
Memorandum, adopted and adapted by General Smuts and President Wilson, 
and was eventually incorporated in Article 22 of the Covenant.
56 
The idea of a mandatory, acting on behalf of the League, as a guardian 
of those peoples and territories formerly governed by certain Empires, 
combined the ideals of national self-determination and non-annexation of 
territories with the practical necessity to manage the post-war vacuum 
created by the demise of these Empires. Indirectly, the system was 
aimed at the avoidance of friction among the victorious powers in the 
aftermath of the war.
57 
Although neither Zimmern nor Smuts nor Wilson 
explained the mandate system in terms of a domestic model, it would 
appear undeniable that the very concept of mandate derived from domestic 
sources. 
In the international sphere, there were some precedents, prior to the 
war, where the idea of mandate, and the term itself, were used in regard 
to the government of certain territories in which the administration 
of a country was carried on by a person or a state responsible to 
another body.
58 
However, the legal conception of the mandate originates 
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in the Roman law, and forms part of the modern Civil Codes based on 
that law. The term may have seemed natural to General Smuts who was 
trained in the Roman-Dutch law.
59 
T
h
e essential idea of the League 
mandate, however, is said to be closer to the English conception of 
trust, that is, 'property held by one person on behalf of and for the 
benefit of another, for a particular purpose, and subject to a duty to 
render an account of the administration, when called upon, to a 
tribunal.'
60 
Moreover, the wording of the several paragraphs of 
Article 22 of the Covenant suggests very strongly that the idea of 
mandate was based partly on that of the guardianship of minor persons. 61 
Given that the term 'mandate' had at that time no well-established 
meaning in the practice of international relations while it was, 
together with 'trust' and 'guardianship', commonly used as a technical 
term in the domestic legal discourse, it would be reasonable to suggest 
that the mandate system was yet another instance of the domestic analogy.
62 
It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the domestic analogy 
played a significant part in the minds of those academics, publicists, 
and statesmen who planned for peace during the period of the Great War. 
Because the idea of a League of Nations was an outcome of communal 
thinking, and because its final structure was the product of diplomatic 
bargaining among the governments, it is not possible to state in any 
simple terms how the use of the domestic analogy influenced the shape 
of the new body. Its supporters saw it in different lights, gave it a 
different meaning and justified it in different terms. But it is 
difficult to deny that one of the main themes of this communal thinking 
was the idea which stressed the need to make international society more 
analogous to domestic society by transferring some of its legal 
institutions and principles to the international sphere. 
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It is interesting to note that, whereas the nineteenth century writers 
we discussed in Chapter IN were Invariably concerned with the problem 
of international legislation, and put forward projects for an inter-
national legislature in minute detail, the writers of the Great War 
period were less concerned with that aspect of international organization. 
In advancing their proposals for the reorganization of international 
society, the main concern of the thinkers of the Great War period was 
to devise a system of law whereby contestants would be forced to attempt 
to solve their disputes peacefully before resorting to war. The defence 
of the law was their major preoccupation. 
Of course, it is not altogether true that the drafters of the Covenant 
ignored the aspect of international legislation entirely. Some of the 
major issues which the Third Hague Conference was expected to deal with 
were to some extent covered by the League Covenant itself. 
Thus Article 14 provided for the submission by the Council to the 
League of plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of Inter-
national Justice, and this came into existence in 1921. The Council was 
also charged with the duty by the eighth article of the Covenant of 
formulating plans for the reduction of national armaments for the 
consideration and action of the Governments. Furthermore, Article 19 
provided that the Assembly might from time to time advise the 
reconsideration by the Members of the League of treaties which had 
become inapplicable.
63 
However, in contrast to the nineteenth century 
writers, it was not the chief concern of the drafters of the Covenant 
to create a central international body whose function it was to pass 
law at regular intervals like domestic legislatures. 
Admittedly, the American League to Enforce Peace did propose a 
regular meeting of states to formulate and codify international law as 
part of their project.
64 
But the Bryce group proposal did not insist 
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on this point, nor did the Phillimore plan, which played an important 
role in the creation of the League of Nations.
65 
General Smuts 
suggested that one of the functions of his proposed Council should be 
to formulate general measures of international law for the approval of 
the Governments, but no similar provision is found in the House plan or 
the Wilson drafts.
66 
David Hunter Miller, the American legal adviser, in commenting on 
Wilson's second draft, suggested that an article be added to provide 
for legislation in international law, but this was not incorporated in 
Wilson's subsequent drafts.
67 
Cecil's Draft Sketch of a League of 
Nations contained a suggestion that there might be a periodical congress 
of delegates sent by the Parliament of the States members of the League 
to take over the role of the Hague Conference, but this was excluded 
from his Draft Convention of 20 Jangary 1919. 68 Neither the so-called 
Cecil-Miller draft nor the Hurst-Miller draft contained provisions for 
international legislation or codification as such. 69 
Given that all the proposals and drafts by those groups and 
individuals contained provisions for legal means of settling disputes 
and for sanctions against Covenant-breaking states, the general lack of 
interest among them in the problem of codification and legislation is 
striking, especially when compared with nineteenth century writers. 
Given the historical background both in the domestic and in the 
international sphere, however, the difference . in the focus of attention 
seems understandable. The nineteenth century was a period of relative 
peace in Europe, where, in the domestic realm, there was generally a 
marked interest and advance in the sphere of legislation and law-making 
machinery. At the same time, in the international sphere, there were 
many areas of uncertainty in the law. Thus, whatever else might have 
been needed, it seemed obvious to the nineteenth century writers that an 
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international legislation of some kind would have to be created. By 
contrast, for the writers of the Great War period, it was the absence 
of the machinery which could ensure the peaceful settlement of 
international disputes that had caused the catastrophe they were 
witnessing. In short, the general bias in the use of the domestic 
analogy in the period of the First World War was due to the predominant 
interpretation of the experience of the war itself. 
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Chapter VI 	The Effect of the Failure of the League on Attitudes 
towards the Domestic Analogy 
The League of Nations, which came into existence in January 1920, 
was an association of sovereign states, established 'to promote 
international co-operation and to achieve peace and security.'' It 
acted also as an agency for the enforcement of certain provisions of 
the peace treaties and supplementary agreements.
2 
Although the League, 
even in matters of peace and war, obtained some measures of success, 
especially in the first decade of its life-time, it could not 
withstand the worsening conditions of the 1930s. By 1940 only one 
Great Power was left in the League, Britain, and thirty-one smaller 
powers.
3 
In the chapter entitled 'The Lessons of the League' in his A History  
of the United Nations, Evan Luard remarked: 
All those involved in the deliberations ion how best to 
structure the world after the Second World WarJ had lived 
through the painful and disillusioning history of the League. 
All had shared, at least in some measure, the hope that that 
institution, revolutionary in its original conception, would 
be a means of abolishing war from the earth and substituting 
the saner procedures of international conciliation. Instead 
they had seen that brief and inglorious organization prove 
totally ineffectual.
4 
We need not enter the debate here as to whether the League's history 
truly deserves to be labelled one of 'failure . Suffice it to note, 
for our purpose, that its inability to cope effectively with the 
deteriorating international conditions in the thirties has been treated 
by a significant set of writers on international relations as indicating 
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its failure. 
Since the League of Nations, as we saw in Chapter V, was a clear 
attempt at ordering the world along the lines of the domestic analogy, 
the failure of the League might be expected to have produced, or 
reinforced, the opposition to this analogy particularly among the more 
articulate portion of public opinion. It is our primary aim here to 
examine this hypothesis with reference to a number of well-known 
writers on international law and relations who witnessed the League's 
inadequacies and eventual collapse. In particular, we shall examine 
whether, according to these writers, the 'failure of the League' 
signified the 'fault of the domestic analogy', and if not, what criticisms 
were given to the particular forms of domestic analogy as embodied in the 
League Covenant. 
The writers who considered the problem of world order against the 
background of the League's failure included the following four major 
types though these are not exhaustive: those who clung to the notion 
that despite its 'inglorious history' the League embodied an 
essentially correct answer to the problem of world order; those who 
saw the failure of the League as resulting not from its structure but 
from the inherent instability of the international system as such; 
those who criticized the League for its dependence on outdated liberalism; 
those who saw in the League's inability to maintain world order the 
superiority of the pre-1914 system of international law in the area of 
the control of force. In the following, we shall examine these four 
groups of thinkers in turn. 
Not all those who conceded the League's failure accepted the idea 
that it was based on an inherently wrong approach to the problem of 
world order. An example is found in the writings of Leonard Woolf. 
As a Fabian, Woolf was among those who actively supported the 
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League-of-Nations idea during the First World War. He had tenaciously 
adhered to the view that the League embodied an essentially correct 
approach to the problem of world order in the face of its failure to 
preserve peace.
5 
He maintained that the problem of international order was not sui 
generis. 6 There was no reason why, in his view, the interests of 
nation-states were inherently incompatible.
7 
Such an idea, to Woolf, 
was nothing but a 'realist' dogma, and he wrote, V47 priori there 
seems to be no reason to believe that power has a different nature and 
reality in international society from what it has in national society 
or that it is not equally amenable to elimination and control in both.'
8 
To him, war was therefore not a fixed and immutable feature of inter-
national life. He stated: 
Whether we have war or whether we have peace depends not 
upon the inevitability of war, the utopianism of peace, or 
the 'reality' of power, but upon the place which we assign 
to national power and force in our lives....
9 
Woolf was particularly anxious to show that E.H. Carr's attack on the 
League approach was mistaken. The idea of the League, Woolf insisted, 
was not formulated by an a priori reasoning, which Carr saw as a mark 
of utopianism, but was grounded in reason,and experience --- experience 
which mankind had gained in the domestic sphere through thousands of 
years with regard to the control of force. Because war was to him 
nothing but the use of force by a group of individuals against another, 
Woolf saw no reason why the same kind of method as employed in controlling 
the use of force by one individual against another, or one class of 
individuals against another within the domestic sphere could not be 
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applied to the control of war.
10 
The League of Nations did fail, 
Woolf conceded. But, to him, this no more proved that the League was 
based on an inherently wrong approach to the problem of world order 
than the failure of appeasement induced Carr, who gave a theoretical 
justification of it, to say that it was intrinsically utopian. 11 
The main cause of the League's failure, according to Woolf, was that 
there was not enough psychological motivation on the part of its members 
to uphold its principles. 12 But, he thought, another great war, which 
they were experiencing, might be enough to teach them a lesson.
13 
There were, Woolf admitted, certain modifications to be made to the 
League system. In particular, he argued for a two-tier organization, 
consisting of the world peace system and regional collective security 
system. The former was to be similar in its structure and functions to 
the League, except that the members were not to be obliged to come to 
the rescue of a victim of aggression unless the victim was a co-member 
of a regional collective security system.
14 
But these were points of 
detail. In the main, he thought, the answer given in 1919 was still a 
valid one.
15 
Woolf, and a number of other thinkers who shared his view, did not 
argue for ihe merger of the existing sovereign states into a world 
federation.
16 
To them, the problem of world order could be handled 
within the framework of the sovereign states system if the system could 
be equipped with those institutions derived by analogy from the domestic 
sphere. There were, however, those who went further. To these thinkers, 
the sovereign states system was itself the cause of instability and war. 
Partial solutions, such as the collective security system, would not 
solve the problem. Therefore, what was needed was a world state. 
Among the writers who adhered to such a radical view were Georg 
Schwarzenberger, Frederick Schuman, and Hans Morgenthau, whose , ideas 
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we shall set out below. 
In his William Ladd: An Examination of an American Proposal for an  
International Equity Tribunal, first published in 1935, Schwarzenberger 
did not in fact go very much further than suggesting the necessity for 
an international equity tribunal to operate alongside the Permanent 
Court of International Justice within the framework of the League of 
Nations.
17 
In the following year, in The League of Nations and World  
Order, he wrote a critique of the League, but he did not go so far as 
to suggest a world federation as the correct alternative. 18 
By 1941, however, when the first edition of his Power Politics  
appeared, with a subtitle, An Introduction to the Study of International  
Relations and Post-War Planning, he was no longer satisfied with the 
idea of a reformed League.
19 
By now, a confederal approach was not 
radical enough for him. 2° 'Power politics, international anarchy and 
war are inseparable', and war's 'antidote is international government', 
he wrote.
21 
He made it clear that by 'international government' he 
meant a 'super-State or world State', and for its constitution he 
considered federation as most suitable as it would balance the require-
ment of authority and liberty.
22 
However, in his judgement, an effective federation would be possible 
only among those national communities which shared the values of 
democracy and social justice.
23 
Thus, he suggested, post-war 
reconstruction required the establishment of an international community 
over as large an area as possible.
24 
This community was to be organized 
as a federation with a necessary minimum of supra-national government.
25 
The responsibility for moving the world in this direction lay, he 
concluded, with those national communities in which democracy and 
social justice had become a reality, which, in his view, were also 
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. 
Christian communities.
26 
 
Schwarzenberger's International Law and Totalitarian Lawlessness, 
published in 1943 is also noteworthy. By this time, the disgust with 
the cynical disregard of international law on the part of Germany, 
Japan and Italy had led him to suggest that these states be banned 
from international society as 'outlaws'. Although in his legal 
reasoning he characterized 'outlawry in international law' as an act 
of reprisal by withdrawal of recognition against unlimited lawlessness 
comparable to that of pirate states, the source of his inspiration was 
found in the institution of outlawry in various municipal legal systems 
of the past.
27 
Frederick Schuman was also a federalist as shown by the first 
edition of his International Politics (1933). Later, in 1946, he was 
to publish an article, 'Towards the World State', and in 1954, he 
dedicated a substantial book on the problem of world government under 
the title, The Commonwealth of Man: An Inquiry into Power Politics and  
World Government. 
In his work of 1933, Schuman stressed the extent to which international 
politics was a competitive struggle for power. 28 War was an incident 
of this struggle, and could not be eliminated by attempts at disarmament, 
arbitration, adjudication, conciliation, collective security, or the 
outlawry of war, pure and simple.
29 
Left to its own device, the inter-
national system would face a catastrophe in the form of the collapse of 
the social and economic foundations of the Western culture as the 
result of self-seeking nationalism, imperialism and militarism of the 
nation-states.
30 
The future therefore depended on the political 
unification of the world, he maintained.
31 
Schuman acknowledged that a world state could not be established in 
any foreseeable future, and stressed that political unity must therefore 
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'be achieved by institutionalized collaboration between States, by the 
gradual strengthening of the bonds of an "international government" 
resting upon States and gradually welding them together into a world-
wide political community of interests. '32 He was, however, critical of 
those advocates of international government who emphasized the aspect 
of machinery and paid little attention to the more fundamental problem 
of national attitudes, interests and values.
33 
He was fully aware that 
'the whole weight of the past, the whole force of habit and tradition 
[stood in the way of the transformation'.
34 
Yet, he concluded as 
follows: 
If those in authority fail to achieve a new orientation, 
they will not merely be endangering their own positions in 
western society, but they will be jeopardizing the very 
survival of western culture. This responsibility is over-
whelming in its implications. These implications will be 
appreciated and will be acted upon within the next decade, 
or catastrophe will become inevitable.
35 
It should be added here that in the post-war (Second World War) 
essay noted above, Schuman substituted 'the immolation of modern 
civilization in a vast Oluclearg holocaust', which he predicted 'with 
almost mathematical certainty' if the present system were to continue, 
for his pre-war prognosis of the inevitable collapse of the Western 
culture, and argued again for the political unification of the world 
through federation.
36 
In the same article, he came very close to 
drafting a blue-print for a world federation on the basis of the United 
Nations Organization which had by then come into existence.
37 
Faced 
with the apparent unrealizability of his goal, he wrote in his 
The Commonwealth of Man (1954): 'Zif the World Government remains 
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unrealized/ mankind must be judged to be not seriously concerned about 
its own salvation, or the meaning of Man to himself.'
38 
Like Schuman, Hans Morgenthau was also in favour of the idea of a 
world state. A lawyer by training, he had written on the theme of the 
limitations of the judicial settlement of disputes in international 
relations.
39 
This work, published in 1929, formed the basis of a 
chapter on the same theme in his Politics among Nations.
40 
This book 
did not appear until 1948, and Morgenthau included in his discussion 
the rising tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
Nevertheless, the book developed from lectures in international politics 
he had delivered at the University of Chicago since 1943, and 
consequently the experience of the first half of the twentieth century, 
especially the period leading to the Second World War provided a 
significant portion of his empirical materia1. 41 
In this book Morgenthau stated that '[tjwo world wars within a 
generation and the potentialities of mechanized warfare have made the 
establishment of international order and the preservation of inter-
national peace the paramount concern of Western civilization.'
42 
These goals, however, could not easily be achieved. Arguing along 
lines similar to Schuman's, Morgenthau arrived at the conclusion that 
the only road to peace was the creation of a world state. In his 
judgement, 'the argument of the advocates of the world state [wasj 
unarswerable', and 'A/here `could) be no permanent peace without a 
state coextensive with the confines of the political world.°
43 
Morgenthau, however, stressed that under the prevailing moral, 
social and political conditions of the world, the world state could 
not be established.
44 
A world community must antedate a world state.
45 
On the question of community-building, Morgenthau quoted David Mitrany 
and gave some support to the view that a world community could grow 
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through a gradual erosion of national loyalties encouraged by increased 
functional cooperation in the UN Special Agencies. " 
However, Morgenthau warned that functional co-operation would not 
succeed where nations were in conflict. 47 Therefore, in the end, the 
creation of a world community presupposed 'the mitigation and 
minimization of international conflicts so that the interests which 
unite members of different nations [might] outweigh the interests which 
separate them.'
48 
For this goal Morgenthau suggested the pursuit of 
skilful diplomacy divested of a crusading spirit, and based on the 
realistic calculations of national interest.
49 
This, in his view, was 
the first step in the long road to peace and order in the world 
community organized as a world state. 
It is to be noted that among the three adherents of the world-state 
idea discussed here, Schwarzenberger attached more significance than 
did the other two to the drafting of federal blue-prints; Schuman 
was more concerned to stress the magnitude of the disaster which he saw 
as lying ahead than to engage in the drafting of federal schemes; and 
Morgenthau found it more important to spell out what should be done in 
the immediate future than to frighten the readers into supporting the 
cause of federalism. Despite these differences, these writers all 
accepted the view that, whether or not immediately realizable, world 
government was in principle the most appropriate mechanism for the 
maintenance of world order.
50 
Whether these writers should be regarded as resorting to a stronger 
form of the domestic analogy than did reformed-League advocates, such 
as Woolf, or whether, on the contrary, their commitment to the world-
state idea should be treated as an instance of the rejection of this 
analogy will depend on how the term 'domestic analogy' is defined. 
We have already discussed this point in some detail in Chapter II, and 
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we need not repeat the argument.
51 
What is clear is that these three 
writers, together with a number of others who argued along similar 
lines, were objecting to the form of the domestic analogy as embodied 
in the Covenant of the League of Nations. 
This was true also of the third group of thinkers, who criticized 
the League for its reliance on nineteenth century liberalism. Among 
these critics were E.H. Carr, J.L. Brierly and David Mitrany. 
To the student of International Relations, Carr is well-known for 
his criticism of utopianism. He was indeed severely critical of inter- 
national constitutionalism many variations of which we have seen in this 
thesis. He was generally sceptical of an approach to the problems of 
international politics which tried to seek a 'set of logically 
impregnable abstract formulae', and, in particular, he dismissed the 
attempt to strengthen the rule of law in international society by 
increasing the formal power of its judiciary.
52 
Despite his attacks on utopianism, Carr in turn offered a number of 
prescriptions in his war-time publications. These included The Twenty  
Years' Crisis (1939), The Conditions of Peace (1942), and Nationalism  
and After (1945). In all these, Carr stressed the bankruptcy of 
nineteenth century liberalism, and lamented its application to the 
international sphere in the peace settlement of 1919. 53 
Nineteenth century liberalism held that the liberty of individuals 
could be secured by a liberal democratic constitution based on the 
separation of powers and representative government; it left the 
economic well-being of individuals to the working of an invisible hand, 
which, on the basis of the assumed harmony of interests, was supposed 
to produce well-being for each and all. When transposed to the inter-
national level, liberalism meant that an international government or 
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organization be modelled more or less along the lines of a liberal 
democratic constitution, with nation-states as its constituent units, 
while leaving economics to its own device through the institution of 
free trade. The liberal concern for the rights of individuals, and 
freedom from constraints, when translated into international theory, 
produced the idea of national self-determination, and the doctrine of 
the fundamental rights and obligations of states. 
Carr rejected this line of approach since he believed that nineteenth 
century liberalism had been shown to be inadequate even in the domestic 
sphere.
54 
According to him, the transition from the nineteenth century 
bourgeois democracy to the twentieth century mass democracy meant that 
the function of the state had to transcend the mere protection of the 
political liberty of propertied individuals, and encompass an attempt 
to equalize well-being and raise the living standards of the masses. 
Planned economy and 'social service' state were in his view the 
twentieth century imperatives in the realm of domestic politics. 55 
Such a perception, combined with his dislike of rationalism, led 
Carr to produce a vision of future international co-operation different 
from the proposals of the kind advanced by the old-fashioned liberal, 
and legalistic, thinkers of his time, as well as by their nineteenth 
century predecessors. 
Carr's suggestions for the future included prudential realism in 
foreign policy with regard to the problem of peaceful change between 
'have' and 'have-not' states, functional internationalism in European 
co-operation, and economic planning at the international level. We 
shall examine these in turn. 
First, Carr rejected a judiciary and legislature as a means for 
peaceful change in international relations. He nevertheless suggested 
that an instructive analogy might be found in domestic society.
56 
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This was the way in which in some countries the turbulent relations 
between capital and labour had eventually produced on both sides a 
willingness to submit their disputes to various forms of conciliation 
and arbitration. This, according to Carr, had resulted in creating 
'something like a regular system of "peaceful change'. ,57  Such a 
development had been possible through contest and compromise, and Carr 
noted, the ultimate right to resort to the weapon of the strike had 
never been abandoned except under the repressive regimes.
58 
He 
considered whether a parallel development was possible in the inter-
national sphere between the satisfied and dissatisfied nations. 
His conclusion was a tentative one. Whether such an analogy was 
valid or not was not something which could be answered in an a priori  
fashion. Such a question, in his view, would have to be settled by 
the test of experience.
59 
But if a parallel development were to take place, it would have to 
be the result of a long period of experience in which statesmen would 
learn to bargain without fighting. And such a development would be 
possible, Carr thought, only if statesmen did not lose sight of the 
element of power and that of morality. They would therefore have to 
yield to a threat when the prospect of war was hazardous. Carr's 
model here was an employer who conceded the strikers' demands by 
pleading inability to resist, and a trade union leader who called off 
an unsuccessful strike pleading that the union was too weak to 
continue.
60 
Moreover, in Carr's view, the statesmen would have to 
learn to give in when the demands faced were reasonable. He considered 
this as analogous to the peaceful solution of industrial disputes 
through 'a spirit of give-and-take and even of potential self-sacrifice' 
on the basis of the mutually perceived justice and reasonableness of 
the claims.61 
- 149 - 
Thus, skilful diplomacy, on the model of skilful bargaining in 
industrial disputes, which took full cognizance of the reality of power, 
and yet did not lose sight of the reasonableness of the claims, however 
difficult in practice, was, in Carr's opinion, the only realistic 
means for peaceful change in international relations.
62 
Here it may be suggested that Carr's commendation of prudential 
realism, while explained in terms of a domestic analogue, was not in 
fact based on analogical reasoning. Like C.A.W. Manning's remark, 
noted earlier, that the effective functioning of a social system 
presupposed a sufficiently prevalent disposition among its units at 
least to tolerate it, the idea that prudential realism was a key to 
success in peaceful change may be regarded as an axiomatic statement. 3 
 There is some truth in this interpretation: if the avoidance of war was 
a defining condition of 'prudential realism', and if every government 
acted prudentially and realistically by this criterion, then war would 
necessarily be ruled out. 
This, however, does not seem to be the true import of Carr's message. 
What he was suggesting was that statesmen should try to combine the 
considerations of power and morality as best they could, and that this 
would make the world a little more peaceful place to live in. If this 
interpretation is accepted, then Carr's commendation of prudential 
realism will not be treated as a logically impregnable abstract formula. 
If so, the strength of his commendation would depend on the 
persuasiveness of his empirical evidence. 
It may, however, still be insisted that his empirical evidence need 
not have come from the domestic sphere. Indeed it can be admitted that 
prudential realism is not &social technique which is distinctive of 
domestic society. Morgenthau, for example, suggested certain guidelines 
for diplomacy designed to mitigate international conflict, and these were 
- 150 - 
substantially similar to Carr's idea of prudential realism. But, unlike 
Carr, Morgenthau tried to show the effectiveness of his suggested 
guidelines in the light of various examples from diplomatic history 
itself, and not by any domestic analogues.
64 
However, given that Carr 
himself explained his prescriptions here in terms of what he regarded 
as a parallel experience in the domestic sphere, it would perhaps be 
unnatural to deny that his proposal was based on a domestic analogy. 
Second, Carr argued that under the twentieth century conditions of 
industrial production and military technique, the nation-state was no 
longer an appropriate unit for the assurance of military security and 
economic well-being. But he was equally critical of the idea of a 
universal political organization based on a well-defined constitution. 
What he favoured was regional co-operation in Europe, with regard to 
urgent, and practical matters, such as relief, transport, reconstruction 
and public works.
65 
He considered that international co-operation in 
these areas could be developed on the basis of the 'so-called "technical 
organs" of the League', whidh, in his view, displayed a far greater 
vitality than its political organs, and also on the basis of the 
existing machinery of Allied war-time co-operation in various fields. 66 
 In short, he adhered, at least partly, to the 'functional' approach. 
This approach is usually associated with the name of David Mitrany 
whose ideas will be discussed shortly. 
In line 	with functionalism, Carr maintained that the questrbon of 
the shape and size of the requisite international institution should be 
determined by the end in view.
67 
What is noteworthy is that he explained 
the functionalist vision of the multiplicity of overlapping international 
agencies along the lines of pluralism, as follows: 
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In the national community the concentration of all 
authority in a single central organ means an intolerable 
and unmitigated totalitarianism: local loyalties, as well 
as loyalties to institutions, professions and groups must 
find their place in any healtlysociety. The international 
community if it is to flourish must admit something of the 
same multiplicity of authorities and diversity of loyalities.
68 
It is clear that in Carr's view the liberty and well-being of the men 
and women of Europe could be best protected if they were to be governed 
by many functionally differentiated international institutions just as 
in the domestic sphere the power of government should not be concentrated 
in one body. 
It is of great interest to note here an incidental remark David 
Mitrany made on the doctrine of pluralism. According to him, there 
was a significant revulsion in philosophical outlook which marked the 
post-war (First World War) period. This writhe revulsion against the 
doctrine of sovereignty. He wrote: 
The doctrine of state sovereignty is now staggering under 
a double attack. It is being assailed from within by the 
pluraligt school of political thinkers, and at the same time 
the external side is being courageously assailed by a growing 
number of international jurists.
69 
No doubt, Carr was not in agreement with those 'courageous' jurists.
70 
On the other hand, his accommodation of the pluralist doctrine in his 
second approach to the problem of world order indicates that his 
proposal contained an application to the international sphere of what 
was at that time regarded as an important doctrine within the sphere of 
domestic politics. 
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His third approach to future world order was closely linked with'the 
second, but it is here that his rejection of nineteenth century 
liberalism in the domestic sphere clearly affected his international 
thinking. In his opinion, the 'substitution of the "service state" 
for the "nightwatchman state" meant that, internationally also, the 
truncheon ['would have to.7 be reinfarced by the social agency and 
subordinated to it.
,71 
 
In his Nationalism and After, however, Carr perceptively remarked 
that in the period after the First World War, it was as a means of 
enhancing their national strength that the policy of planned economy 
was substituted for laissez faire in major countries. In his view, 
planned economy was therefore 'a Janus with a nationalist as well as a 
socialist. face', and the 'socialization' of nationalism was accompanied 
by the 'nationalization' of socialism.
72 
 It was clear to him that 
internationally disruptive tendencies were inherent in the juxtaposition 
of a multitude of planned national economies. 73 
This did not lead Carr to say that economic planning would have to 
be abandoned. He argued that the internationally disruptive tendencies 
resulting from the co-existence of planned national economies should 
be mitigated by 'a reinforcement of national by multinational and 
international planning 
A line of argument in many ways similar to Carr's was put forward 
at about the same time by an eminent international lawyer, J.L. Brierly. 
Like Carr, he was against an a priori reliance on the domestic analogy 
and criticized the view that all disputes could be settled by compulsory 
arbitration. 75 In his judgement, the judicial machinery was already 
far ahead of international organization on any other side, and it was 
not likely that it would need any major amendment.76 
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While being critical of the domestic analogy, Brierly, like Carr ' , 
conceded that municipal law sometimes confronted situations which were 
fundamentally similar to those which were normal in international law. 
This was so, according to Brierly, whenever municipal law had to deal 
with demands by large groups and factions rather than by individuals. 
Thus industrial disputes and civil strifes were to domestic law what 
international disputes and wars were to international law.
77 
Being more legalistic than Carr, however, Brierly stressed that even 
in those states where revolutions and civil wars were quite as endemic 
as war was in international society, 'none of them ever [accepted] the 
view that for law to go on forbidding them Lwasj so unrealistic that it 
might as well admit the legality of actions which experience Diad7 
shown it LWas.7 unlikely to be able to prevent.' 78 Brierly condemned 
the defeatist attitude which international law alone took towards the 
reign of force. It was certain, he wrote, that any plan for strengthening 
the influence of international law would have to start by forbidding 
states to use physical force against one another except in circumstances 
which were to be defined by the law.
79 
Moreover, a general ban on the 
use of force, unlike the Kellogg-Briand Pact, he thought, would have 
to be supported by a system of sanctions.
80 
However, he saw no 
possibility in the near future of establishing anything more centralized 
than a system of collective security based on the co-operation of the 
Great Powers.
81 
Brierly's advice did not end here. He maintained that Machiavelli's 
maxim that the foundation of all states was good laws and good arms 
should be applied to international society. He contended that in 
addition to the general ban on the use of force backed by a system of 
collective security, international society would have to concern itself 
more positively with the general welfare of states. Brierly's' main 
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proposal here was the transformation of international law from the 
traditional laissez faire system towards a more creative system which 
would enable states to co-operate more closely for the welfare of their 
citizens.
82 
Brierly's prescriptions were therefore more radical than his initial 
rejection of the domestic analogy seems to indicate. None the less, 
he was in line with Carr in stressing that the solution of international 
disputes could not be left to the judicial methods alone, and that a 
system of collective security would have to be underpinned by a great 
degree of co-operation between states in the economic and social fields. 
This undoubtedly was a reflection of the transition which had taken 
place within the domestic sphere from old liberalism to the doctrine 
of the welfare state. 
The same transition provided a foundation also for Mitrany's 
functionalist approach to international co-operation. In his view, the 
difference between national government and international government was 
a matter of scale. The latter dealt with those things which could 
not be handled well, or without friction, except on an international 
scale. But the purpose of the two were the same: equality before the 
law, economic well-being and social justice. 83 
Mitrany criticized the League of Nations for being essentially an 
application of the philosophy of laissez faire in international society. 
He remarked strikingly: 'It is no use putting a policeman at the street 
corner to keep the traffic in order and to watch for burglars if at the 
same time the water and food supply for that street is being cut off.' 84 
 The Covenant was concerned primarily with defining the formal relation- 
ships of states, in a negative sense, and only vaguely with initiating 
common activities, he noted. The economic, financial and other sections 
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of the League were mere secretariats, and so in fact was the 
International Labour Organization.
85 
What he wished to see instead was 
executive agencies with autonomous tasks and power. They would not 
merely discuss but would do things jointly, he speculated. 86 
Here it is important to note Mitrany's own account of the two sets 
of experience which were vital in the making of his approach. Both 
these experiences were from within the domestic sphere, and Mitrany 
had studied them with great interest. 
The first of these he encountered when as an Assistant European Editor 
of the Carnegie Endowment's project, he edited European contributions to 
the economic and social history of the First World War. His study of 
the various manuscripts revealed to him that, under the impact of the 
new kind of warfare, which had made economic resources and industrial 
potential a decisive factor, the main belligerents, no matter how great 
the historical, constitutional and social variations, responded to the 
practical war-time needs in similar ways everywhere, by improvising similar 
and novel executive and administrative arrangements. This was a remarkable 
confirmation of the functionalist thesis that under given conditions there 
was a close working relation between the function of government and the 
structure of government, and that needs breed institutions without rigid 
advance planning. 87 
The second came from the United States, in the form of President 
Roosevelt's New Deal and the Tennessee Valley Authority, whose birth and 
progress Mitrany observed closely as a visiting professor at Harvard 
University. According to Mitrany, the 'New Deal was a functional 
evolution all along the line'.
88 
The TVA's central purpose was 'water 
control, with electric power as a corollary, affecting a river system 
that spread over seven of America's "sovereign" states', and which 
presented 'problems and opportunities too big for individuals or local 
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governments to handle'.
89 
This, he witnessed, transformed the 'Federal 
Government' into a 'national government' without any change in the text 
or forms of the constitution.
90 
This was possible, he thought, because 
the TVA 'was a new administrative but not a new political dimension'. 91 
 He described the experience of the TVA further as follows: 
Each and every action was tackled as a practical issue in 
itself; no attempt was made to relate it to a general theory 
or system of government. Every function was left to generate 
others gradually; and in every case the appropriate authority 
was left to develop its functions and powers out of actual 
performance. ... It has been a purely functional development 
at every point.
92 
Mitrany considered such a pragmatic approach, as opposed to the method 
of constitution-making, which he considered as a nineteenth century 
preoccupation, as an appropriate mode of international co-operation in 
future. Moreover, his concern for the international management of welfare 
issues, as in the case of Carr and Brierly, was a clear reflection of the 
change in perception which had taken place within the sphere of domestic 
politics at regards the proper function of the government. 93 
An important question arises here as to whether these three writers 
can be said to have resorted to the domestic analogy when, influenced 
by the change in the domestic political concern, they advanced proposals 
in favour of the international management of economic and social welfare. 
The answer to this will depend, as indicated in Chapter II, crucially 
upon whether any analogical reasoning was involved in their thought.
94 
The answer in fact seems to be in the negative on the whole. 
Admittedly, Brierly did argue partly along the analogical lines that 
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as domestic government was concerned with the general welfare of 
citizens so international society, through its laws and institutions, 
would have to be concerned more positively with the general welfare of  
states.
95 
Mitrany's use of the TVA as a model may also count as an 
instance of the domestic analogy. The place of the domestic analogy in 
the functionalist line of thought regarding community-building will be 
examined briefly a little later. However, to the extent that the three 
authors can be interpreted primarily as stressing the need for inter-
national co-operation for the satisfaction of the welfare needs of the 
individual men and women of Europe, or of the whole world, their 
thinking can be said not to involve analogical reasoning: what they 
stressed was the necessity for upgrading the level of management from 
national to international for the achievement of welfare goals in 
separate national communities. True, all these writers considered 
international co-operation in these areas as a means of ensuring peace 
among states, but the line of reasoning they adopted appears different 
from the domestic analogy proper.
96 
Thus, for example, Brierly argued that international law would have 
to concern i itself with the issue of human rights. He preferred a 
'relatively modest approach in this field, and suggested an international 
convention obliging states to incorporate in their own municipal laws 
a procedure for protecting certain basic rights of their own subjects.
97 
He considered that such an agreement would contribute towards the 
protection of basic rights, such as the freedom of speech, of the press 
and of thought, within separate national communities. This, according 
to Brierly, was in turn an indispensable condition of peace among them 
for it was through the infringements of such basic rights that 
totalitarian governments manipulated their peoples into fighting an 
aggressive war.
98 
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The aim of Brierly's proposal here was therefore at least partly 
'international'. Yet his reasoning was clearly not analogical. 
Analogical reasoning would have led him to suggest that as domestic 
constitutions often contained the declaration of the basic rights of 
citizens so would international law have to clarify the basic rights  
of states. This was not Brierly's idea here. His point was that the 
protection of basic rights of citizens would have to be reinforced by 
an international instrument clarifying the duties of states in this 
respect. 
The point that an institution proposed may have been inspired by a 
domestic organ, but that the argument which supports the proposal may 
not be analogical is also well illustrated by comparing strikingly 
similar passages from Immanuel Kant and E.H. Carr. As we already 
quoted in Chapter I, Kant stated as follows in his Idea for a Universal  
History from a Cosmo-political Point of View: 
What avails it to labour at the arrangement of a Commonwealth 
as a Civil Constitution regulated by law among individual men? 
The same unsociableness which forced men to it, becomes again 
the cause of each Commonwealth assuming the attitude of 
uncontrolled freedom in its external relations, that is, as 
one State in relation to other States; and consequently, any 
one State must expect from any other the same sort of evils as 
oppressed individual men and compelled them to enter into a 
Civil Union regulated by law.
99 
And now wrote Carr in Nationalism and After, arguing for the necessity 
of reinforcing national by international economic planning: 
The pursuit of "free competition", of an economic principle 
of all against all, inevitably tends to create those extreme 
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inequalities and forms of exploitation which offend the 
social conscience and drive the less privileged to measures 
of self-defence, which in turn provoke corresponding counter-
measures. By the end of the 19th century this process had 
led, as it was bound to lead, to the progressive development 
of combination at every level and in every part of the system, 
culminating after 1914 in the most powerful combination yet 
achieved --- the modern socialized nation.
100 
'Yet, what avails it to labour at the arrangement of a Commonwealth', one 
almost imagines Carr muttering to himself as he continued: 
But a further stage has now been reached. What was created 
by a cumulative process of combination between individuals to 
protect themselves against the devastating consequences of 
unfettered economic individualism has [through the process of 
'nationalization' of socialism,) become in its turn a threat 
to the security and well-being of the individual, and is 
itself subject to a new challenge and new process of change.
101 
What is striking is not only the remarkable resemblance of the two 
passages, but also the fact that whereas Kant had, in the passage cited 
above, talked in terms of the State in its external relations with 
others, Carr was seeing the hazardous impact of international economic 
anarchy with reference to the individual men and women living in 
separate national communities. While Kant's argument was analogical, 
Carr's clearly was not. Kant, while starting from the individual in 
his theorizing, nevertheless personified the State; Carr, by contrast, 
took the individuals as the units of his concern even in matters of 
international organizations.
102 
Mitrany, too, as we saw, considered national and international 
institutions as working in concert for the same ends: the difference 
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was simply a matter of scale. These points, however, should not be 
taken to mean that Carr, Brierly or Mitrany did not in any way resort 
to the domestic analogy. They did. Carr had resorted to it in discussing 
the method of peaceful change, as we noted. Brierly insisted that 
international law would have to ban the use of force just as any 
domestic legal systems. Even Mitrany, somewhat unexpectedly, maintained 
that a 'certain degree of fixity would not be out of place' in those 
areas related to 'law and order' and 'others of a more formal nature'.
103 
Under this category, Mitrany had in mind a hierarchy of international 
courts and security arrangements organized on an interlocking regional 
basis. For the latter, he hinted at the possibility of using the 
British Committee of Imperial Defence as a model.
104 
More fundamentally, there may be said to be an element of domestic 
analogy in the functionalist argument that just as domestic social order 
is underpinned by co-operation among its constituent units with regard 
to their practical needs so similarly world order must be reinforced by 
international (governmental and non-governmental) co-operation in the 
areas relative to these needs. To what extent international co-operation 
in such areas increases world order is uncertain. What underlies the 
functionalist argument here is the conception (or preconception) of 
human nature according to which human beings tend to show loyalty 
towards those institutions which satisfy their needs. To the extent 
that this untested hypothesis is designed from the start to apply to all 
human beings regardless of whether they live in the same national 
community, it is clearly not meant to be an analogical argument. 
However, those who stress the extent to which the process of community 
building along the functionalist path, which may be operative within a 
national community, does not succeed internationally, may tend to regard 
the argument as involving an unwarranted domestic analogy.
105 
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It will be recalled that to count as an instance of the domestic 
analogy the purposes to be achieved by the recommended process have to 
be primarily 'international' in nature.
106 
The difficulty with regard 
to functionalism is that its purposes appear to be at once 'cross-
national', 'transnational' and 'international': 'international' (or 
inter-state) peace is expected to follow from the emergence of a 
'transnational' community (a community of individuals and groups which 
transcends national boundaries), which in turn is expected to result 
from 'cross-national° satisfaction (satisfaction in different national 
communities) of welfare needs of the individuals. At any rate, the 
functionalist line differs from the domestic analogy in the usual form 
in that the former, unlike the latter, does not involve the 
personification of the state. 
Our fourth and final group of critics of the League comprised those 
who saw in its inability to maintain world order the superiority of 
the pre-League system of international law in the area of the control of 
force. According to Wolfgang Friedmann, there were some international 
lawyers who, with the League collapsing and the Kellogg-Briand Pact 
still-born, took this attitude.
107 
Unfortunately, Friedmann did not say 
who these were, but Edwin Borchard and his mentor John Basset Moore 
appear to fit this category well. The example of Borchard is particularly 
striking because of his uncompromising insistence on the superiority 
of the pre-1914 international law to its post-1919 counterpart which he 
expressed in numerous writings for over a quarter of a century well into 
the period after the Second World War.
108 
An anonymous reviewer of 
Neutrality for the United States, which Borchard published in 1937 with 
W.P. Lage, remarked that Borchard was well known as one of the foremost 
opponents of the American supporters of the League of Nations and perhaps 
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of all plans of international re-organization.
109 
 Similarly, an 
obituary note for Borchard in the American Journal of International Law  
(1951) described him as having been 'profoundly sceptical of general 
international organizations.'
110 
Borchard was not in fact critical of all aspects of international 
law developed since the Great War. He was not opposed to adjudication 
as a means of settling international disputes, although he saw no point 
in according the power of obligatory jurisdiction to international 
tribunals, and considered diplomacy as a more important mechanism for 
adjustment.
ll1 
Nor was he against a possible development, after the 
Second World War, of international co-operation in the economic and 
social fields facilitated by some international institutions, which, if 
appropriate, he thought, might gradually increase their measure of control: 142 
However, he did not see the absence of an international legislature 
as a major weakness of international law, for states had learnt to 
co-operate by treaty in hundreds of fields when the need arose.
113 
Moreover, he was firmly convinced that the contemporary trend in inter-
national law and legal thinking, according to which belligerents were to 
be divided into aggressors and victims, and the third party was expected 
to favour, or come to the rescue of, the victim states, was entirely 
mistaken. He stated: 
Many of the political errors of the recent years have been 
due to the easy assumption that there is a close analogy 
between the law within a state, whereby the unruly are hailed 
before the civil authorities, and the international system, in 
which no one can hail an unruly nation before the bar of 
justice without producing conflicts.
114 
Borchard added that the system of collective security was not only 
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unlikely to work, but also likely to extend and intensify conflicts 
without in any way resolving their underlying issues.
115 
What Borchard proposed instead was to return to the system which had 
prevailed before the First World War. According to him, the nineteenth 
century was not a period of 'international anarchy', and the Hague 
Conferences symbolized 'the high-water mark of the trend toward 
harmony.
,116 
The reformer of international law, according to him, made a grave 
error in 1919 by acting in hysteria, mistakenly assuming international 
society to be amenable to the kind of control operative in the domestic 
sphere, and ignoring those institutions which 400 years of history had 
cultivated in the international system. He concluded therefore that there 
was no way 	but to return to the pre-1914 system of international law 
supported by conciliation through diplomacy designed to eliminate the 
real sources of conflict. 117 
In presenting the views advanced by Borchard, however, it is 
important to point out that he was writing primarily from the angle of 
the United States. Neutrality for the United States shows his adherence 
to the position that the American national interests, as well as 
distinctively American contribution to the theory and practice of 
international relations, lay in her maintenance of strict neutrality 
vis-a-vis European wars.
118 
He desired the United States to be a 
leading neutral power, capable of protecting the rights of other neutral 
states, and acting as 'the trustee for civilization in a shell-shocked 
world'. 
119 
 Despite this American bias, however, it is also clear that 
Borchard considered the older system of international law to be more 
conducive, than the twentieth century system, to the maintenance of order 
in the international system as a whole.
120 
Thus his line of argument 
was diametrically opposed to that of Leonard Woolf with whose ideas we 
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began this chapter. 
In the next chapter, we shall examine which of the four lines of 
thought identified in this chapter contributed to the birth of the 
United Nations, paying special attention to the role played by the 
domestic analogy in the establishment of this new world organization. 
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Chapter VII 	The Domestic Analogy in the Establishment of the 
United Nations 
In Chapter VI we saw four major patterns of thought emerge against 
the background of the perceived inadequacies and the eventual collapse 
of the League of Nations. To recapitulate, these were: (1) a reformed-
League idea (e.g., of Woolf), which held that a new organization 
incorporating the basic features of the League, with certain necessary 
improvements made, should be established after the war; (2) federalism 
(e.g., of Schwarzenberger), a radical view, which stressed the necessity 
to replace the sovereign states system by a federal union, though not 
necessarily encompassing the whole world at the initial stage; (3) 
the approach (e.g.,of Mitrany) which stressed the importance of inter-
national co-operation in the economic and social fields; and (4) the 
view (e.g., of Borchard) that in the area of the control of force 
international law should revert to the pre-1914 system. 
These were not in fact exhaustive of all the ideas which developed 
in the period regarding how best to rearrange the framework of the 
states-system. For example, Carl Schmitt, a German legal theorist, 
notorious for his support of Hitler, formulated in 1939 the idea of 
non-intervention between a number of blocs, each led by a Great Power, 
as a basis of world order. What he envisaged was a reciprocal adoption, 
by each of the Great Powers, of the principle of inter-bloc non-
intervention on the model of the Monroe Doctrine. This was a barely 
disguised attempt to justify and protect German preponderance in Europe 
and was based on the Nazi doctrine of Lebensraum and Herrenvolk.
1 
None the less, the four approaches examined in the previous chapter 
are particularly noteworthy because they have provided a basis of 
contemporary theory and practice of international relations. 
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Clark and Sohn's World Peace through World Law shows that the idea 
of improving on the League, and now on the United Nations, still 
continues to find supporters.
2 
While a world federation may no longer 
be taken seriously as a practical option, Schuman's idea, underlying 
his commitment to the federal goal, that the international system is 
inherently unstable as a consequence of its fragmentation into sovereign 
states is a widely accepted assumption, and has been elaborated further 
by Kenneth Waltz, for example, in his Man, the State and War and Theory  
of International Politics. Moreover, Morgenthau's idea that, given 
the unattainability of a world state in the foreseeable future, the 
only practical alternative is found in the pursuit of skilful diplomacy 
has found great many supporters among the contemporary theorists and 
practitioners of international relations. 
Mitrany's functionalism has been seen by a number of international 
relations theorists as underlying the movement towards unity in Europe, 
although he is himself well known for having criticized regional 
integration as an attempt to create a larger sovereign state in one 
part of the world.
3 
The concern for economic and social welfare of 
men and women living in separate national communities, which underlay 
the writings of Mitrany, Carr and Brierly, is now in the forefront of 
international relations theory, as witnessed for example by Charles 
Beitz' Political Theory and International Relations, and is on the 
agenda of practical politics. 4 
At the progressivist extreme, we find Richard Falk's A Study of  
Future Worlds, which combines in an eclectic fashion a number of 
approaches noted above, while at the conservative end, Borchard's 
stress on the pre-1914 system of international law in the area of the 
control of force has found an elaborate re-statement in the writings 
of Hedley Bull.
5 
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These contemporary developments in the theory and practice of 
international relations, however, have taken place against the back-
ground of the continued existence of the United Nations. Although it 
may not have lived up to the expectations of some of the drafters of 
its Charter, this remains the nearest analogue of a written constitution 
in international society. 
As is well known, the Charter of the United Nations was signed at 
the end of the United Nations Conference on International Organization 
held at San Francisco in 1945. Like the League of Nations, the United 
Nations is an association of sovereign states organized for the purpose 
of international peace and security, but the goal of economic well-being 
and social justice is given a more prominent place in the Charter than 
in the Covenant.
6 
The proposals discussed at the San Francisco 
Conference of 1945 as the basis of the Charter had been prepared at 
Dumbarton Oaks in the previous year by the United States, Great Britain, 
the Soviet Union and China. Some further discussion on the structure 
of the new world organization was made at Yalta before the final 
conference at San Francisco. 
In this chapter, we shall examine which particular lines of thought 
that emerged against the background of the League's inadequacies and 
failure had influenced the making of the Charter, and pay special 
attention to the part played by the domestic analogy in the birth 
process of the United Nations. It is, however, not our purpose here 
to give a detailed account of the conferences which led to the creation 
of the new world organization. 
Of the four approaches enumerated at the beginning of this chapter, 
(2) and (4), the radical and conservative extremes, had little direct 
influence on those government officials who played a major part in the 
establishment of the United Nations. 
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It should not be ignored, however, that arguments for federalism 
were widely canvassed in the initial phase of the Second World War. 
The frontal attack on state sovereignty was seen as a new panacea for 
world ills. This violent flirtation with the idea of federal union, 
however, was a symptom of despair, a psychological escape from the war. 
After 1940 this tendency declined both in numerical support and 
propagandist activity. During 1943 and 1944, opinion veered away from 
federalism and swung towards a more favourable view of the revival of 
the League of Nations.
7 
The idea of reviving the League of Nations itself, however, was 
rejected at an early stage as being out of the question by those who 
directly participated in official post-war planning. Cordell Hull, who 
as the Secretary of State took the initiative in planning for post-war 
organization in the United States, remarks in his memoirs without any 
further explanation: 'As to whether to revive the League of Nations or 
set up a new international organization, we decided in favour of the 
latter.' 8 This decision was taken between the spring and summer of 
1943, and by 'we' Hull meant the Political Subcommittee of the non-
partisan Advisory Committee on Postwar Foreign Policy. 9 
It is generally understood that the reasons for not reviving the 
League itself were threefold. By 1942, as H.G. Nicholas puts it, 'the 
League reeked with the odour of failure'.
10 
The Soviet Union would have 
been too proud to consider rejoining the League after having been 
expelled from it over the Russo-Finnish war in the dying days of that 
institution. And in the United States it was commonly felt that it 
would be more prudent to seek public support for a new organization 
than to revive the old controversy over her entry into the League.
11 
A reformed-League idea, therefore, became the single most significant 
force in the process of planning and negotiations which led eventually 
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to the adoption of the Charter in 1945. This is not to say, however, 
that those who worked for the foundation of the United Nations never 
considered their effort as being aimed at the ultimate ideal of a 
world federal union. Some appear to have done so. 
A clear indication of an attachment to the ultimate goal of a world 
federation is found in none other than President Roosevelt. According 
to Thomas Greer, who studied Franklin Roosevelt's ideas closely, the 
President believed that 'at some distant time a world federation would 
evolve' and stressed that 'the conception of the United Nations was not 
that of an ultimate organization'. It was, in Roosevelt's view, only a 
stepping stone to greater security, and towards the greater unification 
of mankind.
12 
This is reminiscent of Woodrow Wilson's idea noted in 
Chapter V. 
The unconventional first words of the Charter, 'we the peoples of 
the United Nations',werederived from the federal Constitution of the 
United States, and they might also be taken to indicate the drafters' 
attachment to the ultimate goal of a world federation. Some might of 
course have read such an idea into these words. Senator Sol Bloom, a 
member of the U.S. delegation at the San Francisco Conference, at 
whose insistence the wording was adopted, certainly wished to impregnate 
what was essentially a loose association of sovereign states with a 
democratic sentiment, and a democratic ideal may be said to be more 
closely linked with a federal structure than a confederal or looser 
bond.
13 
Whether Bloom himself saw this new association as a first 
step towards a closer union, however, is uncertain from his autobiography. 
If the radical approach of federalism had only a negligible and indirect 
influence on the creation of the United Nations, the conservative out- 
look of the kind expressed by Edwin Borchard also had little direct 
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impact on the formation of the new organization. He was clearly 
against the tide of the mid-1940s in the United States inasmuch as it 
was one of the central concerns of the governmental planners of postwar 
arrangements to create an effective system of sanctions against 
aggressor nations and to secure American co-operation in such a system. 
Borchard, by contrast, was an isolationist, and favoured the traditional 
conception of war as embodied in the positive international law of the 
previous century, which saw no legal distinction between aggressors 
and victims, or to use the terminology of Hans Kelsen, 'delict' and 
1 sanctions' .14 
In this connection, it is pertinent to note the following observation 
by Evan Luard on Article 51 of the Charter which provides for the right 
of self-defence, individual and collective: 
It is arguable that [the insertion of this article at the 
San Francisco Conference/ brought a significant alteration in 
the emphasis of the Charter taken as a whole. ... /The United 
Nations] might now become a system in which breaches of the 
peace were met in the first place by action taken by individual 
states or groups of states, while only at some subsequent 
stage would the Security Council be called on to take action if 
necessary. In other words, it made it substantially ... more 
likely that conflict situations would be dealt with in the 
traditional way, as for hundreds of years before.
15 
In a similar vein, Alfred Verdross argued as follows: 
Since enforcement action under the Charter is impossible 
against a great Power, reactions against such a State, if 
guilty of an act of aggression, are not governed by the 
Charter, but by general international law. According to 
the spirit of Article 51 of the Charter, it is true that 
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measures of individual and collective self-defence are 
intended to be only provisional, until the Security 
Council takes the necessary steps to restore the peace. 
But if the Security Council is paralysed, these measures 
change their character. Nothing remains but collective 
self-defence, or the old measures of self-help. In such 
a tragic situation they replace the new system of 
collective security under the authority of a central organ 
of the international community.
16 
Thus, according to Verdross' interpretation, the institution of the veto 
enables the re-introduction of the old conception of self-help and war 
through Article 51, while according to Luard this Article tends by 
itself to resurrect the old system of dispute settlement. Josef Kunz 
has also advanced an argument similar to that of Verdross.
17 
It is important, however, not to confuse consequences with intentions. 
Whatever the legal and political implications of Article 51, the 
reason for its adoption was primarily to placate the anxiety of the 
Latin American states to protect their right to use force in collective 
self-defence without prior authorization by the Security Council.
18 
This, it may be argued, would amount to the retention of the old conception 
of war. But Article 51, as is well known, delimits the legitimate use 
of force in self-defence to those cases where an armed attack occurs 
against the member-states. This article, despite its reference to the 
right of self-defence as 'inherent', cannot therefore be taken by itself 
to preserve to the member-states the right of self-defence under 
general international law, let alone resurrect the nineteenth century 
institution of war as a whole.
19 
At any rate, there is no indication in 
historical sources, such as Ruth Russell's A History of the United  
Nations Charter, that this article was inserted at the San Francisco 
Conference because the member states preferred the nineteenth century 
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conception of war, and its concomitant institution of the laws of war 
and neutrality, to the contemporary trend towards collective security 
set by the Covenant and the Kellogg-Briand Pact. Moreover, crucially 
for our argument, a French proposal at San Francisco to specify in the 
Charter that 'the status of neutrality is incompatible with membership 
in the Organization' was accepted in principle as inherent in the 
Charter system.
20 
Thus while Article 51 may have opened the door for 
a revival of the traditional method of dealing with international 
conflicts, it was not the intention of the drafters of the Charter to 
follow the lines persistently advocated by such conservative writers 
as Borchard, and to reintroduce the nineteenth century system of the laws 
of war and neutrality. 
Even with respect to the veto, it is uncertain how far the power 
accorded to the permanent members of the Security Council reflected a 
general belief in the superiority of the old-type international law and 
of the method of conflict resolution reflected in it. True, the idea 
of the Concert is implicit in the principle of the Great Power unity. 
But the veto appears primarily to have been a concession made to the 
reality of the might of the Great Powers who each wished to preserve 
their freedom of action in joining a new world organization. 
Stalin wished to avoid repeating in the United Nations the Soviet 
experience of expulsion from the League.
21 
The United States Senate, 
Roosevelt feared, would not ratify the Charter if the veto power could 
not be secured.
22 
Churchill, Harry Hopkins suggests in his memoirs, was 
also in favour of the veto as a means of preventing any encroachment on 
the British Imperial interests.
23 
It appears primarily to have been 
the coincidence of these wishes and fears, rather than coherent 
adherence to the theory advocated by writers like Borchard, which led 
to the adoption of the veto in the Charter of the United Nations. 
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In addition to the reformed-League idea, which was a predominant 
factor in the formation of the United Nations, the third approach 
noted above, which stressed international co-operation in the economic 
and social spheres, was also influential in postwar planning. 
In comparison with Woodrow Wilson's 'Fourteen Points', the main 
concern of which was to establish international order on the basis of 
national self-determination, the Atlantic Charter, drawn up by 
Roosevelt and Churchill in 1940, is noteworthy for the stress it placed 
upon international co-operation for 'economic advancement and social 
security ' . 24 According to Thomas Greer, Roosevelt had accepted the 
view in 1937 that the best chance of peace lay in a co-operative effort 
to solve the social and economic problems of the day.
25 
In line with 
such a belief, and apparently also in accordance with the view that 
habits of co-operation should expand gradually through institutionalized 
collaboration on practical issues, Roosevelt decided that first steps 
should be taken by a series of conference on food and agriculture, 
monetary relations, and other economic and social subjects.
26 
Thus, at Roosevelt's insistence, a plan was developed early in 1943 
for the convocation of a conference on food and agriculture at Hot 
Springs, Virtinia, which led to the establishment of the Food and 
Agriculture Organization. 27 This was followed in July 1944 by the 
United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference at Bretton Woods in 
New Hampshire, which led in December 1945 to the creation of the 
International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development. Similarly, an international conference 
on civil aviation held in Chicago in 1944 led to the establishment of 
the International Civil Aviation Organization provisionally in 1945 and 
permanently in 1947.
28 
The United Nations Educational, Scientific, and 
Cultural Organization was formally agreed upon in November 1945, and 
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was established in the following year, while the World Health 
Organization was created by the United Nations Organization itself 
in 1948.
29 
In the meantime, there was also a move in the International Labour 
Organization, which had survived the collapse of the League, to expand 
its role in economic and social affairs, and, in particular, to concern 
itself with the problem of unemployment. The United States, however, 
strongly opposed such a move in view of her other proposals for dealing 
with the general question of international economic co-operation. In 
the event, at its 1944 Philadelphia Conference, the I.L.O. adopted a 
declaration, which among other things pledged the full co-operation of 
the organization with other international bodies which would also be 
working for effective international and national action to achieve 
general objectives of full employment, higher standards of living and 
other social and economic goals.
30 
In view of the fact that a number of 'specialized agencies' were 
being negotiated and established in the economic and social spheres, 
the planners of the postwar general organization acted on the 
assumption that provisions would have to be made to co-ordinate these 
agencies as well as the technical organizations active before the war, 
such as the I.L.0. 31 This was in line with the Bruce Report of August 
1939, whose main proposal was to establish for the League of Nations 
a Central Committee for Economic and Social Questions. Though the war 
in Europe prevented the implementation of this Report, the Central 
Committee was to exercise control over the economic and social agencies 
of the League.
32 
The planners of the new organization in effect put 
the Bruce Report into practice in suggesting the establishment of the 
Economic and Social Council as one of the principal organs of the 
United Nations.33 
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The way these 'specialized agencies' of the United Nations emerged 
has been compared by Evan Luard to the manner in which 'the British 
Empire is supposed to have done, in a fit of absence of mind.'
34 
 
The creation of these agencies, however, may more appropriately be 
compared to the setting up of numerous agencies in the United States 
under Roosevelt's 'New Deal' policy. 35 It will be recalled that David 
Mitrany, whose idea may be said in effect partly to have been followed 
in the creation of the UN specialized agencies, had himself been much 
inspired by the 'New Deal' policy in developing his approach.
36 
 
It is uncertain, however, how far American proposals for new inter-
national agencies were consciously derived from domestic sources. 
Indeed it is doubtful that proposals for the specialized agencies 
involved the use of the domestic analogy, although there may have been 
some exceptions and also domestic experience may have provided some 
useful guidelines.
37 
The idea which underlay the establishment of 
these agencies was that in social and economic matters an efficient 
handling of the problems required upgrading the level of management 
from national to international. This form of reasoning, as we saw, is 
different from domestic analogy proper. 
The stress placed on international co-operation in economic and 
social affairs was an important feature of postwar planning. Another 
innovation, which the planners of the new organization considered as 
vital, was in the area of enforcement. They in effect followed an advice 
given by Brierly, according to whom, as we saw, Machiavelli's maxim 
that the foundation of all states was good laws and good arms should be 
applied to international society.
38 
And it is here, in the ideas about 
enforcement, that reliance on the domestic analogy was most conspicuous. 
The analogy used was that of a police force as shown by Roosevelt's 
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term, 'Four Policemen'. 
Roosevelt wished to establish an enforcement agency consisting of 
the United States, the Soviet Union, Great Britain and China as one of 
the central organs of the new institution 'with power to deal 
immediately with any threat to the peace or any sudden emergency ' . 39 
In explaining his ideas to Stalin at the Teheran Conference of November 
1943, the President cited the Italian attack on Ethiopia in 1935 as an 
example of the League's failure to deal promptly and forcibly with an 
act of aggression. The President remarked that had the Four Policemen 
existed at that time it would have been possible to close the Suez Canal 
and thereby prevent Mussolini from attacking Ethiopia. " 
Later, Roosevelt stated in his speech to the Foreign Policy 
Association: 'The Council of the United Nations must have the power to 
act quickly and decisively to keep the peace by force, if necessary. 
A policeman would not be a very effective policeman if, when he saw a 
felon break into a house, he had to go to the Town Hall and call a 
town meeting to issue a warrant before the felon could be arrested.'
41 
The Town Hall' here, however, was a metaphor for the United States 
Congress, not a central organ of the proposed United Nations.
42 
From the viewpoint of the domestic analogy, it is interesting to note 
Cordell Hull's remark that Roosevelt often expressed his views on 
international relations in terms of the situation in the United States. 
For example, the President said that he wished to have the United Nations 
located somewhere 'in the nature of an international District of 
Columbia'.
43 
 When confronted with the Soviet demand at the Dumbarton 
Oaks Conference that a member of the Security Council, even when 
involved in a dispute,should be entitled to vote, Roosevelt is reported 
by Hull to have said to Ambassador Gromyko that 'when husband and wife 
fell out with each other they stated their case to a judge and abided 
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by his ruling: they did not vote in the case.'
44 
Hull continues: 
'This principle, that any party to a dispute could be heard but could 
not vote, [the President] said, had been imbedded by our forefathers in 
American law.'
45 
In spite of these few examples, an explicit reliance on the domestic 
analogy is in fact extremely rare in the birth process of the United 
Nations. This is in clear contrast to the case of the League of Nations 
where, as we saw, there were abundant instances of this analogy in 
explicit forms. This is hardly surprising since the major powers, the 
United States and Great Britain in particular, had commonly accepted 
that a new organization to be established after the war would have to 
be something resembling the League of Nations. Therefore, inevitably, 
in formulating their ideas about the new organization they consciously 
built on the League. Since they were not creating a new organization 
from nought there was no need to conceptualize it in terms of domestic 
models unlike in the case of the establishment of the League of Nations. 
Thus, for example, Ruth Russell's detailed account of the creation 
of the United Nations reveals that the United States Department of 
State planners, who had decisive influence on the eventual outcome, 
consistently referred to the League of Nations Covenant as a basis, and 
tried to reform it in whatever direction they considered as appropriate.
46 
In Great Britain, too, the importance of the Covenant as a basis for any 
future security organization was fully acknowledged. Thus Churchill, 
while himself emphasizing the importance of regional security arrange-
ments, warned against casting aside 'all the immense work' accomplished 
by the League of Nations.
47 
And a Cabinet memorandum of July 1943 
entitled 'United Nations Plan for Organizing Peace' stated: 'It is 
improbable that the League of Nations can be revived in its old form, 
but it is highly desirable that some international machinery, embodying 
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many of the good features of the League, should be established on the 
conclusion of hostilities.'
48 
 
The birth of the United Nations Charter thus gives a very clear 
illustration of the tendency for the domestic analogy not to be used 
explicitly when a proposal for a new organization can be conceived of 
as a modified version of an institution already existent in the inter-
national sphere. 
Despite the fundamental agreement on the need to endow the new 
League-like organization with the effective power of enforcement against 
aggressor nations, there were some initial disagreements among the 
leading figures over the extent to which the new institution should be 
based on the regional principle. Prime Minister Churchill held that 
Great Britain, the United States, Russia, and possibly China, should 
form a Supreme World Council together with certain other powers. 
Subordinate to this, he argued, there should be three Regional Councils, 
for Europe, for the American Hemisphere and for the Pacific, respectively.
49 
The European Council, he urged, should be organized as a 'really effective 
league, with all the strongest forces concerned woven into its texture, 
with a High Court to adjust disputes, and with forces, armed forces, 
national or international or both, held ready to enforce these decisions 
and prevent renewed aggression and the preparation of future wars.'
50 
The European Council, he suggested elsewhere, should be 'a form of 
United States of Europe' along the lines suggested by Count Coudenhove 
Kalergi. 51 The Council was to consist of twelve or so states and 
confederations, the latter comprising Danubian, Balkan and Scandinavian 
blocs. France was to be strengthened, while Prussia was to be divided 
from the rest of Germany. Bavaria, Churchill thought, might join the 
Danubian Confederation. The members of the World Council, he proposed, 
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should sit on the Regional Councils in which they were directly 
interested, and he hoped that the United States would be represented 
in all three Regional Councils.
52 
Churchill remarked that 'the last 
word would remain with the Supreme World Council, since any issues that 
the Regional Councils were unable to settle would automatically be of 
interest to the World Council.'
53 
However, he also stated that he 
attached great importance to the regional principle. According to him, 
'flit was only the countries whose interests were directly affected 
by a dispute who could be expected to apply themselves with sufficient 
vigour to secure a settlement. '54 Such a consideration, it will be 
recalled, was contained in Leonard Woolf's suggestions discussed in 
the previous chapter.
55 
James Brierly had also made an identical 
point in The Outlook for International Law.
56 
President Roosevelt's initial ideas about the postwar organization is 
a little unclear. His early essay, 'A Plan to Preserve World Peace', 
submitted in 1923 for the American Peace Award, shows that he broadly 
endorsed the principles of the League of Nations.
57 
However, by the 
beginning of the Second World War, he was in favour of the Anglo-American 
policing of the world, and after the Pearl Harbor attack, he talked of 
the four powers policing the world against the renewal of aggression. 58 
 According to Hull, in the spring of 1943, Roosevelt still favoured a 
four-power establishment to enforce peace. All other nations, including 
France, were to be disarmed. Hull wrote: 'At that time he did not want 
an over-all world organization. He did favour the creation of regional 
organizations, but it was the four big powers that would handle all 
security questions.
,59 
 
Hull contends that while he himself did not object to regional and 
other special arrangements supplementary to the general international 
organization, he considered the formation of a powerful world-wide 
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association of nations as of supreme importance. He suggests that he and 
his associates presented their arguments against regionalism in various 
meetings at the White House, and as a result, the President, by the 
summer of 1943, began to turn towards their point of view. 60 
According to Harry Hopkins, however, the President, and the Under 
Secretary of State, Welles, in their meeting with the British in 
March 1943, were already emphatic that the United States could not be 
a member of any independent regional body such as a European Council, 
that they felt that all the United Nations should be members of one 
body for the purposes of recommending policy, and that this body 
should be world-wide in scope. They also held that regional councils 
should have advisory powers and that the real decision should be made 
by the United States, Great Britain, Russia and China. 61 
At any rate, by the time Roosevelt explained his conception of the 
postwar international organization to Stalin at the Teheran Conference 
of November 1943, the President seems to have moved towards the idea 
of a global international organization. It was to consist of three 
main bodies. First, a world-wide Assembly of all the members of the 
United Nations, which would meet at various places at stated times for 
the discussion of world problems and for the recommendation of 
solutions. Second, an Executive Committee, to consist of the Big Four, 
together with the representatives of a number of regions. The 
Committee was to deal with all non-military questions such as 
economy, food and health. The third body was the Four Policemen, an 
enforcement agency.
62 
Stalin indicated that he preferred the idea of 
regional organizations, but Roosevelt replied that the United States 
would be unlikely to wish to participate in a purely European Council.
63 
We noted above Hull's version of how he and his associates persuaded 
Roosevelt to accept the need for an over-all global institution by the 
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summer of 1943. In Britain, C.K. Webster played an important role in 
postwar planning as a member of the newly established Research Depart-
ment of the Foreign Office, and later seconded to Gladwyn Jebb of the 
Economic and Reconstruction Department.
64 
Webster reveals in his 
diary his strong opposition to the regional principle. His opposition 
to the Churchillian regional approach is clearly stated in one of the 
papers which Webster prepared. He wrote: 'A World Council with final 
responsibility for the preservation of peace in every part of the 
world is of greater importance than any regional organization such as 
the "Councils of Europe and Asia"'. 65 Webster was indeed extremely 
scathing about Churchill's conception as the following remark in his 
diary reveals: 'The PM talked the vainest nonsense advocating among other 
things a World Court to settle all disputes i.e. a sort of equity 
tribunal like the New Commonwealth of which he is President. The 
regional councils with nothing to do and the 3 Powers running round first 
to the Council of Europe, then Asia, then Pan America. It would be 
exceedingly funny if it were not so tragic. '66 In the event, as 
Webster shows, at the May 1944 Dominion Prime Ministers' Conference, 
Churchill was confronted by concerted opposition to his ideas, and was 
forced to accept the plan prepared by the Foreign Office for the 
Conference. Webster had played a substantial part in drafting this 
plan.
67 
It is noteworthy that in his diary he refers to this plan as 
'my plan', and also comes very close to claiming the authorship of the 
Charter itself.
68 
Across the Atlantic, Cordell Hull was praised by 
Roosevelt as the 'Father of the United Nations'.
69 
Indeed, by the 
summer of 1944 there was no fundamental difference between the official 
American and British lines. Webster described the American proposals 
for the Dumbarton Oaks Conference as 'simply a reformed Covenant°, 7° 
 and in essential respects so also was the British plan. 
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The history of the Dumbarton Oaks Conference, and the San Francisco 
Conference need not be dealt with here, since the outline of this 
history is readily available in many works on the United Nations, and the 
detailed analysis of the kind contained in Russell's work is beyond the 
scope of the present discussion.
71 
 At this stage in the emergence of the 
Charter, the general framework had been agreed on, and the discussion 
tended to be on matters of detail. Even with respect to the veto, 
the controversy over which was finally settled while the powers met in 
San Francisco, there was agreement from the start that none of the Great 
Powers should be subjected to enforcement measures by the Security 
Council.
72 
At any rate, in its essential respects, the final outcome 
remained the body which the four powers had conceived at Dumbarton Oaks, 
and this in turn, following the American line, was closely based on 
the reformed-League idea. 
Thus, in the place of the Council of the League was established the 
Security Council, and the Assembly was replaced by the General Assembly, 
while the new Secretariat remained, as in the League, permanent and 
international, under an elected Secretary-General. In addition, in the 
place of the Permanent Court of International Justice was created the 
International Court of Justice. These were virtually identical in 
structure and functions, but while the Permanent Court was not actually 
a League body in that the members of the League were not automatically 
parties to the Statute of the Court, the International Court of Justice 
was made an integral part of the United Nations. As we noted, the 
Economic and Social Council was added in line with the Bruce Report of 
1939 which, had it not been for the war, would have led to the 
establishment of a comparable body under the League. And the League's 
Mandates Commission found its U.N. counterpart in the Trusteeship 
Council 
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There were some significant differences between the Covenant and 
the Charter, however. Here we may focus on the issue of the control 
of force since this was the aspect with respect to which the makers 
of the Charter were most anxious to make progress beyond the Covenant 
on the basis of closer approximation to domestic society.
74 
 
Whereas the Covenant did not prohibit resort to war completely, the 
Charter bans the threat and use of force by member-states against the 
territorial integrity and political independence of any state, or in any 
other manner inconsistent with the purposes of the United Nations. 
Moreover, whereas under the League each member retained the competence 
to decide whether the conditions for an enforcement action existed, 
under the Charter this competence is vested in the Security Council. 
In the League, each member was obliged to take non-military sanctions, 
and authorized to resort to military measures when it decided that a 
member-state had resorted to war in breach of the Covenant. By 
contrast, in the United Nations, the Security Council makes binding 
decisions on what enforcement measures, military or non-military, 
should be taken when it determines that there exists a 'threat to the 
peace, breach of the peace, or act of aggression'. But the Security 
Council are'not required to determine the existence of these conditions 
in the light of whether any state is in breach of the law, unlike under 
the Covenant, where sanctions were to be directed only against those 
states resorting to war unlawfully. Therefore, enforcement measures 
under the Charter, unlike those under the Covenant, cannot necessarily 
be interpreted as having the character of 'sanctions' against 'delicts' 
or unlawful acts.
75 
The Security Council was to be equipped with Military Staff Committee 
composed of the Chiefs of Staff of all the permanent members. This body 
was to make advance plans for the organization and deployment of military 
- 184 - 
forces which member states would place at the disposal of the organization, 
and when the Council acted, the Committee would serve as its strategic 
adviser.
76 
Thus the United Nations was to be equipped with something 
close to what the French wished to see built into the League system.
77 
But already in April 1947 the Military Staff Committee reported to the 
Security Council its inability to agree on the armed contributions that 
permanent members should make. By August 1948 the Committee announced 
the virtual cessation of activity.
78 
Roosevelt's 'Four (and now Five) 
Policemen' never came into existence. 
Another important difference is that the League principle of unanimity, 
both for the Assembly and the Council, was abandoned in the Charter. 
But precisely because the League of Nations was a decentralized system 
the effectiveness of the League did not depend upon its organs being 
able to reach decisions, but on the observance by the individual members 
of their obligations under the Covenant. By contrast, since under the 
Charter enforcement action can only be taken if the Security Council so 
decides, it was necessary to provide against the possibility of deadlocks 
by introducing some form of majority voting. But the Charter could do 
this only at a very high price, the Great Power veto on non-procedural 
issues.
79 
Indeed, the institution of the veto has been criticized as having 
made the United Nations more backward than the League. James Brierly, 
one of the critics, has remarked: 'we must realize that what we have 
done is to exchange a scheme :i.e., the Covenant] which might or might 
not have worked for one which cannot work fin those circumstances in 
which there is a real threat to world peace].' 80 In his view, we 
have returned ... to the idea which underlay the Concert of Europe in 
the nineteenth century. '81 The United Nations, which is apparently 
more centralized than the League, and can be regarded as attempting 
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to transform the structure of international society one step closer to 
that of domestic society, was made from the start to depend on the 
age-old principle of the unity of the Great Powers.
82 
In the more 
sympathetic words of C.K. Webster, the Charter embodies an attempt at 
'harmonizing the Great Power Alliance theory and the League theory'.
83 
In the last years of the Second World War there was still enough hope 
for continued solidarity among the Great Powers allied against the 
Axis Powers to enable a distinguished historian-diplomat to make such a 
remark with confidence and pride. It is ironic that Carl Schmitt's 
idea noted at the beginning of this chapter, to which the liberalism 
and universalism of the Charter are opposed, has come to resemble what 
might be seen as an unwritten code of conduct of the superpowers in 
the postwar era.
84 
Against the background of the continudd existence of the United 
Nations, the latter part of the twentieth century has seen a phenomenal 
increase in the number and types of international institutions. But 
the investigation into the ways in which the domestic analogy has 
shaped postwar institutions must be left to another study. Instead, 
L 
we shall now move on to an assessment of a number of different 
approaches underlying the numerous proposals which we have discussed 
so far in this thesis. 
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Chapter VIII 	An Assessment of the Proposals: Part One 
A detailed examination of some of the well-known proposals for 
world order, produced between the early nineteenth century and the 
middle of the twentieth century, has revealed a number of noteworthy 
features. 
First of all, we have witnessed a remarkable tendency among the 
publicists whom we have studied to employ as their models their own 
indigenous constitutions, or those of which they have first-hand 
knowledge. Thus, we argued, Saint-Simon's model for a re-organized 
Europe may well have been the Charte Constitutionnelle of 1814. In 
the case of William Ladd, there is little doubt that the principle of 
the separation of powers, which he saw as a distinctive feature of his 
plan, was a product of the constitutional history of the United States. 
Likewise, James Lorimer's scheme for an international government* 
incorporated the basic structure of the English Parliament, and J.C. 
Bluntschli appears to have modelled his project for a unified Europe 
on the German Imperial Constitution of 1871.
1 
At the Iieginning of the present century, Walther Schticking used as 
his models for what he proposed to call the 'Union des Etats de la 
Haye' (or the Hague Union) various constitutional instruments of 
Germany, such as the German Act of Confederation of 1815, the Vienna 
Final Act of 1820, and the German Imperial Constitution of 1871.
2 
As we noted, ex-President Taft, who headed the League to Enforce Peace, 
argued for the creation of a world court on the model of the United 
States Supreme Court. President Wilson and Colonel House incorporated 
in their pan-American project a provision which they most certainly 
copied from the United States Constitution. A similar provision was 
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included in their League plans, and this later became the basis of the 
tenth article of the Covenant. Robert Cecil referred to English legal 
history in support of his proposal for an international court, and the 
Conference system of the British Empire inspired Alfred Zimmern and 
General Smuts in their respective League proposals.
3 
The Committee of 
Imperial Defence was mentioned as a potential model for an international 
institution for the maintenance of law and order even by David Mitrany.
4 
And President Roosevelt, in explaining to the Soviet Ambassador at the 
Dumbarton Oaks Conference the idea that a party to a dispute can be 
heard, but not vote, characterized it as a principle 'imbedded by our 
forefathers in American law.'
5 
However, the tendency to present a detailed blue-print for an ideally 
organized world along the lines of a specific constitution appears to have 
declined in the twentieth century insofar as we can judge from our 
examples. There are various reasons for this. 
First, as we noted, since about the turn of the century, gradualism 
became predominant among the writers on future world order. As was 
shown by the case of SchOcking, this did not necessarily mean that the 
goal of a closely integrated world was abandoned altogether. But 
instead of working out the constitutional details of a perfectly 
organized world society, leading writers on world order began to 
concentrate on how to build gradually on the foundations which had come 
to exist in the international system.
6 
Moreover, as was shown by the 
case of Oppenheim's pre-1914 view, some writers considered it 
unnecessary to develop international law beyond a certain limit in its 
gradual approximation to municipal law. In the case of Oppenheim, this 
threshold lay at the level of introducing organized sanctions into 
international law. This was because he considered the growth of 
liberalism within the domestic sphere as having made states so law- 
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abiding as to make unnecessary an international mechanism of 
law-enforcement.
7 
Second, the growth of international law and institutions since the 
turn of the century meant that the need to add to the existing system 
became less strongly felt. Indeed, as was shown by the ideas of 
Thomas Baty, some writers insisted that international law was already 
perfect as it stood. 8 Moreover, even where the need to add to the 
existing system was recognized, a schemer could formulate his project 
on the basis of what already came to exist in the international sphere 
rather than, as in the nineteenth century, borrowing institutions 
ready-made from the domestic sphere. This point is illustrated well 
by the pre-1914 proposal of Otfried Nippold. The stage in the 
development of international institutions at which he produced his 
scheme was such that he could present his project as a systematization 
of the existing international methods of settling disputes rather than 
as one involving the transfer of domestic institutions.
9 
The case of 
the emergence of the United Nations Charter provides an even more 
striking example. As we saw, when plans for a new organization were 
advanced during the Second World War, not many schemers resorted to the 
domestic analogy explicitly, apart from a relatively frequent use of 
the police analogy by President Roosevelt in particular. What the 
planners of the United Nations did was to use the League of Nations 
as a prototype.
10 
Of course, the very act of using the League as a 
prototype meant that the planners of the United Nations were resorting 
to the domestic analogy indirectly and implicitly in many ways. Had the 
League not existed, those who contributed to the drafting of the Charter 
would have had to resort to this analogy far more explicitly and directly. 
Third, constitutionalism itself has become less fashionable in the 
twentieth century among the writers on international relations '. Thus, 
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the setting up of a constitutional machinery at the international level, 
unlike in the case of a number of well-known nineteenth century writers, 
was no longer treated as a panacea for, or even a necessary condition 
of, world order. A constitutional approach was considered by David 
Mitrany, for example, as inadequate and misguided.
11 
Moreover, E.H. 
Carr's critique of 'Utopianism', which appeared in his influential work, 
The Twenty Years' Crisis, intensified the opposition to a legalistic 
approach to international relations, and, with it, any attempt to draw 
up a constitutional blue-print of a future world.
12 
The functionalist 
approach, which Mitrany advocated in opposition to old-style 
constitutionalism, and which Carr supported in his writings, appears 
to have underlain the creation of various international institutions 
in the mid- to late 1940s. Among them are FAO, IMF, IBRD, ICAO, and 
UNESCO.
13 
However, scepticism among leading academic writers about the 
value of constitutionalism was not influential enough to prevent the 
creation of the United Nations on the model of the League of Nations. 
The needlbr a reformed League was taken for granted by the United States 
Department of State and the British Foreign Office both of which exerted 
decisive ipfluence in the shaping of the new world organization.
14 
One observation which should be added here is that those who produce 
a scheme for world order, based in some way upon a domestic model, do 
not necessarily admit that there are elements of domestic analogy 
underlying their projects. This might be because the elements of this 
analogy in a given project are negligible. However, as we tried to 
argue in the case of the Bryce Group proposal for a League of Nations, 
a tactical concern might be added to this. If a project could be 
explained without reference to the fact that it aimed to transplant 
institutions from the domestic soil, it might be made to look more 
viable in the international environment.
15 
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In this respect, it is also interesting to note that our nineteenth 
century writers appear themselves to have been less than fully candid 
about their real models. Saint-Simon said his model was the English 
Constitution. There is no mention in his essay of the French Charte 
Constitutionnelle which, in our view, is just as likely a model. Ladd 
said of his Court and Congress of Nations that they found their closest 
working models in the Court and the Diet of the Helvetic Union presumably, 
as we indicated, in order to stress the viability of his project. 
Lorimer's characterization of his international government that it was 
to fulfil the functions similar to those of the Delegations System of 
the Austro-Hungarian Empire is inaccurate, and was perhaps meant to 
play down the ambitiousness of his scheme. Bluntschli's suggestion that 
the German Imperial Constitution was unsuitable as a model for European 
unification may have been due to his concern to protect the scheme 
against the charge of parochialism. 16 
While therefore there may be various reasons why a schemer avoids 
modelling his project on a specific constitution, or plays down the 
extent to which his project is inspired by one, it is noteworthy that 
ideas for iorld order advanced by a number of writers examined in this 
thesis reflect the contemporary domestic political concern of their 
countries, and others similarly situated. 
Thus a close examination of the proposals of Saint-Simon, William 
Ladd, James Lorimer, J.C. Bluntschli, E.H. Carr, James Brierly and 
David Mitrany reveals that their suggestions were significantly 
influenced by the political concerns and ideas of their respective 
countries, and others in similar positions, in the period of their 
writing. It is of great interest to note that political theories 
which underlay the proposals of those writers show a historical trans-
ition from the theory of the mixed state (in the case of Saint-Simon), 
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through the theory of the separation of powers and representative 
government (Ladd, Lorimer and Blutschli), to the idea of planned 
economy and welfare state (Carr, Brierly and Mitrany). It is tempting 
to suggest here that the proposals of these writers reveal that, as 
the domestic society has become more democratized, and the idea of 
bourgeois democracy has become challenged, or superseded by the idea 
of mass democracy, international ideas themselves have shown a 
parallel transition. 
Two qualifications are necessary here, however. First, there are 
expected to be many proposals which will not fit this pattern. Thus 
the parallelism of the two realms of thought cannot be advanced as a 
general proposition in a statistical sense. What we can say about 
those writers' proposals is that together they form a set of 
important historical signposts. However, secondly, it will be objected 
that it is illegitimate to string together a history of one nation in 
a particular period (say, post-Napoleonic France) and a history of 
another nation in another period (say, mid-nineteenth century America), 
and to construe a universal history out of such manipulation.
17 
 This is 
an important qualification to bear in mind. It will be meaningful to 
argue that parallelism obtains in the two realms of thought with respect 
to the writers noted above, and others like them, only to the extent 
that a degree of cross-national unity can be assumed in the history of 
Western political thought, encompassing that of France, America and 
Germany since the early decades of the nineteenth century. These 
qualifications, however, do not undermine the power of the examples 
discussed to illustrate the ways in which domestic political ideas can 
exert influence upon proposals for world order. 
Another important feature revealed by our study is the influence 
of international circumstances or events upon the character of proposals. 
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Very clear-cut instances of this are found in the writings of the 
Great War period. The examples of Oppenheim, Nippold and Liszt are 
particularly striking. It will be recalled that before their experience 
of the War they were all opposed to the idea of organized sanctions in 
international law. But both Oppenheim and Nippold openly admitted that 
the experience of the War had made them abandon their pre-war confidence 
in the law of nations without organized sanctions. Liszt changed his 
attitude in the same way. The idea that the freedom of states to resort 
to war would have to be legally restricted, and that coercive measures 
were as necessary in international law as in municipal law became the 
guiding principle of the period. This convergence of opinion could not 
be understood without reference to the Great War itself, which was 
commonly interpreted as having resulted from, among other things, the 
anarchical structure of international relations.
18 
When compared with the convergence of opinion in the Great War period 
in favour of coercion in international law, it is noteworthy that, 
before the War, there was no strongly felt urge, among the writers on 
international law and relations, to argue for the introduction of 
organized qanctions to the international sphere. In line with 
gradualism, writers such as Schticking and Lawrence envisaged the 
establishment of an international police in the distant future. But 
neither of them appears to have thought of an enforcement agency as a 
necessary condition of world peace. As we saw, Oppenheim and others 
were strongly opposed to such a device. This degree of complacency 
was undoubtedly a reflection of the relatively peaceful character of 
international relations at that time. Moreover, as we tried to argue, 
gradualism predominant in the period was no doubt itself partly due to 
the gradual progress which international law began to make at the 
turn of the century.
19 
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Thus the perception of peace and progress at the turn of the 
century produced confidence in the relatively anarchical system of 
international law, while the Great War brought about a sudden revision 
of this attitude. As we saw in some detail, the League of Nations, 
established in reaction to the War, embodied several ideas derived 
primarily from domestic sources. 2° 
It is interesting to observe, however, that there were some writers 
whose views on world order were relatively unaffected by the experience 
of the Great War. Thomas Baty and Philip Marshall Brown continued to 
stress the anarchical nature of international law as being not only its 
unique, but also commendable, feature.
21 
Throughout the period of the 
League, and well into the second half of this century, Edwin Borchard 
steadfastly clung to the view that the makers of peace at the end of 
the Great War had acted in hysteria, that the pre-1914 system of 
international law was superior to the post-1919 counterpart with respect 
to the control of force, and that the laws of war and neutrality were 
a distinctive institution of international society which should not be 
interfered with by a misguided use of the domestic analogy.
22 
Such a perception of international law and relations had existed in 
an embryonic form among certain classical writers on political philosophy 
and the law of nations, and became influential particularly before the 
outbreak of the First World War as the doctrine of the 'specific 
character of international law'. It is interesting to note that this 
doctrine finds its counterpart in the view of certain writers on 
International Relations who stress the uniqueness of international 
society as the central feature of their subject-matter. Among them are 
such influential writers as C.A.W. Manning, F.S. Northedge and Hedley Bull 
who are responsible to some extent forthe negative attitude towards 
the domestic analogy prevalent among the contemporary students of 
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International Relations.
23 
The foregoing summary indicates that in order to understand ideas 
for world order it is important to know the domestic and international 
backgrounds against which proposals are formulated. These factors 
influence, though they do not determine, each author's attitude towards 
the domestic analogy, and the overall character of his project. Some 
writers, however, are relatively insulated from the changing 
circumstances in the domestic and international spheres. Dominant 
political ideas, or immediate international experience may not 
critically influence their views on how best to organize the world. 
They tend to see relative permanency in the nature and scope of inter-
national problems, and in the ways they could effectively be handled. 
Baty and Borchard exemplify such an attitude. But even these writers 
were not totally insensitive to the transition which they perceived in 
the domestic and international spheres. Thus Baty defended his 
opposition to the idea of an international legislature on the basis of 
his belief that even within the domestic sphere legislatures were 
increasingly under attack.
24 
And Borchard, despite his thorough-going 
opposition,to any move towards the creation of an international 
government, still conceded that functional organizations might increase 
their role in the period after the Second World War.
25 
The interpretations of domestic and international backgrounds on the 
basis of which ideas for world order are formulated can be diverse. 
This was clearly the case with various opinions expressed in the face 
of the failure of the League of Nations. All those whom we examined 
in Chapter VI had acknowledged that the League had failed in its 
primary purpose. Yet some, like Leonard Woolf, insisted that one 
instance of failure was insufficient to prove any approach intrinsically 
wrong. Some, like Schuman, thought that the League failed because it 
- 195 - 
did not go far enough, while others, like Borchard, argued that it was 
bound to fail because it had gone too far, in the direction of municipal 
legal order. Yet others, like Mitrany, saw in the League's failure 
the reaffirmation of the bankruptcy of laissez faire liberalism. A 
causal analysis and prescriptions went hand in hand in each of these 
cases. 
The approach most influential in the creation of the United Nations, 
however, was the reformed-League idea. Just as the shock of the Great 
War had produced the view that international law must be equipped with 
some form of coercive machinery, so the experience of the Second World 
War provided the leading politicians and government officials with a 
further confirmation of the view that international society must be 
organized in such a way as to respond effectively to any aggressive 
behaviour by its members. It is, however, to be noted that while the 
drafters of the Covenant put a great deal of stress on the idea of 
'cooling off', those of the Charter were more concerned with the 
creation of a machinery which could respond in a forthright manner to 
an act of aggression. This is no doubt a reflection of the fact that 
while there was a strong impression particularly in Britain, that the 
July 1914 crisis could have been defused, and the Great War averted, 
had the Great Powers been able to confer on the issues of the day, a 
predominant opinion during the Second World War blamed for what had 
developed the lack of early and decisive response to the aggressive 
policies of the Axis Powers.
26 
The makers of the Charter in effect 
attempted to create what the French were eager to build into the 
League, a form of international police.
27 
However, the attempt to 
make the constitutional structure of international society a little 
closer to the domestic system than had been achieved by the Covenant 
was to a great extent counter-balanced by the institution of the veto. 
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As we noted, Brierly, for example, saw in this the return of the nine-
teenth century principle of the Concert of Europe.
28 
How are we to discuss the merits of those numerous proposals which we 
have seen so far? The foregoing study shows the recurrence of broadly 
similar ideas across different historical periods as well as the diversity 
in the character of proposals reflecting historical changes. Rather than 
examine them individually, it is more sensible to conduct our discussion 
in terms of some classificatory scheme. However, a system of conjointly 
exhaustive and mutually exclusive categories is difficult to devise in 
relation to the material in hand. Yet a comparative analysis of a large 
number of ideas for world order which have emerged since the early part 
of the nineteenth century up to the middle of the twentieth century 
reveals that they are clustered around five ideal-types. These are 
Type I ('confederal'), Type II ('anarchical'), Type III ('democratic 
confederal'), Type IV ('world state') and Type V ('welfarist'). In the 
remaining part of this chapter, we shall examine Types I and II, the 
'confederal', and 'anarchical' approaches. Types III, IV and V will be 
discussed in the next chapter. 
Both the Type I ('confederal') and Type II ('anarchical') approaches 
support the idea that the sovereign states system should remain intact. 
They are concerned primarily with the issue of creating order in the 
relations of states. And they accept in principle the idea that the 
official intercourse between states be conducted by those representatives 
of states who act under instruction from the executive branches of their 
respective governments. These features of the two approaches are 
criticized by the other three, more radical, approaches (Types III, IV 
and V) as will be shown in the next chapter. 
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The difference between Type I and Type II is that, while the 
supporters of the Type I ('confederal') approach argue in favour of the 
domestic analogy, those of Type II, the 'anarchical' approach, are 
strongly critical of it. The Type I approach suggests the creation of 
a confederation equipped with a government for its sovereign members. 
Hence the label 'confederal'. By contrast, the Type II approach 
prescribes the maintenance of international order through the operation 
of those institutions, such as diplomacy, war and neutrality, which are 
claimed to be indigenous to international society. The supporters of 
this approach consider international society as capable of sustaining 
order without a government. Hence the label 'anarchical'. 
The Type I approach advocates a confederal solution, but many 
proposals for the development of international law and organization do 
not go so far. Those proposals which fall short of advocating a 
confederal union of states, but nevertheless favour the domestic analogy, 
can be regarded as 'negative surrogates' of Type I.
29 
At the same time, 
it is important to note that even those who favour the Type II approach, 
and are critical of the domestic analogy, would not deny that there 
existed soap institutions, rules or practices which were necessary or 
desirable both for the domestic and international spheres. 
To say that there are some institutions, rules or practices of this 
sort, of course, is not necessarily the same as endorsing the domestic 
analogy as we defined the term in this thesis. This is because, in 
order to count as resorting to this analogy, the institutions, rules or 
practices in question must belong primarily to the domestic sphere.
30 
 Thus, to suggest, for example, that pacta sunt servanda is necessary 
both for the domestic and international spheres is not an instance of 
the domestic analogy. This rule was already accepted in international 
relations between sovereigns before these relations came to be treated 
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clearly separately from domestic affairs, and therefore it cannot be 
regarded as belonging primarily to the domestic sphere.
31 
Because the Type II approach does not say that there are no 
institutions, rules or practices which are necessary or desirable both 
for domestic and international systems, the Type I and Type II approaches 
are not disparate, unconnected positions. Rather, they can be seen as 
forming two ends of a spectrum. Between the two ends we find those 
proposals which are the 'negative surrogates' of Type I, with varying 
degrees of concession made to the domestic analogy. 
It was somewhere along this spectrum that Oppenheim drew a sharp 
demarcation line between the 'legal school' and the 'diplomatic school'. 
It will be recalled, however, that Oppenheim, who stood at the 'diplomatist' 
end of the 'legalists', and Nippold, who was apparently at the 'legalist' 
end of the 'diplomatists', were very close in their views about the 
desirable content of international law.
32 
This example reinforces our 
view that the Type I and Type II approaches should be regarded as forming 
a continuum rather than separate circles, so to speak. In the following, 
therefore, we shall assess the merits of various proposals along what 
we shall term the 'Type I - Type II spectrum' rather than attempt to 
separate them into two classes with the view to determining their 
relative values. 
Proposals along the 'Type I - Type II spectrum' suggest the creation 
of one or more of the following three types of institution : a machinery 
for the peaceful solution of international disputes, a mechanism of 
law-enforcement, and a law-making assembly. Thus, closer to the 
'confederal' end of the spectrum. William Ladd proposed the establish-
ment of the first and third types of institution, and Oppenheim, after 
the experience of the Great War, added the second. Many plans of the 
Great War period stressed the vital necessity of the first two types, 
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while in the period of the League of Nations writers often debated on 
whether the problem of peaceful change should be solved by the third 
type. Towards the 'anarchical' end of the 'Type I - Type II spectrum' 
are ideas of Nippold, Baty and Stengel, whose views we examined in 
Chapter IV as representing Oppenheim's 'diplomatic school'. These 
writers, however, either proposed, or at least did not object to having, 
some form of machinery for the peaceful solution of international disputes. 
The argument in favour of setting up a machinery for the peaceful 
solution of international disputes, especially when the proposal is of a 
more far-reaching kind, usually takes the form that just as a court is 
indispensable for the peaceful solution of disputes between individuals 
so a comparable body should be established in international society to 
settle disputes between states. However, a proposed court may be a 
court of arbitration or a court of justice. It may or may not be 
equipped with the power of compulsory jurisdiction. It may be a single 
court, or may be part of a hierarchy of courts. There is therefore a 
great variety here, and supporters of different types of proposal are 
in some cases in deep disagreement with each other. 
Thus, for example, Nippold maintained in his proposal before the 
Great War that arbitration, mediation, and inquiry by commission would 
be sufficient for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, if 
a general treaty could be concluded obliging states to resort to one of 
these methods. By contrast, Oppenheim insisted that a court of justice 
was an essential ingredient of world order. This, according to him, 
need not be equipped with compulsory jurisdiction from the start, but 
states would eventually agree to it, and would also welcome the creation 
of appeal courts.
33 
Nippold's defence of his position was rather dogmatic. He subscribed 
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to the definition of international law as law between sovereign states 
whose binding nature derived from the coincidence of the will of states. 
Therefore, just as an international legislature capable of making laws 
against the will of a state would be contrary to the definition of 
international law, so, he maintained, would be an international court of 
justice where decisions were made by judges not appointed by the 
disputing states themselves. To be consonant with the definition of 
international law, he thought, the judges would have to be chosen in 
accordance with the will of the contesting states, and he therefore 
considered arbitration as a procedure suitable to the law of nations.
34 
Unlike the case of Nippold, Thomas Baty's argument in support of 
arbitration, as against adjudication, was not derived from the 
definition of international law. He argued that there was no point in 
creating an elaborate machinery unless there was a strong commitment 
on the part of the member-states to make it operative, and that in the 
final analysis the effectiveness of an international machinery would 
have to depend on the extent to which states took heed of world public 
opinion in support of the machinery. The more legal freedom the 
machinery would leave to states, the more censure a delinquent state 
would receive, in his judgement. Therefore, he favoured a very open-
ended general treaty which obliged states in a dispute, unresolved by 
diplomacy, simply to find an arbitrator in whom they would have 
confidence to come to a just decision. 35 
As we saw, Karl von Stengel's position was even more conservative. 
In his view, states should preserve the legal freedom to go to war when 
diplomacy failed to solve their differences. Although his own position 
was rooted in German nationalism, a general proposition could be 
extrapolated from it as to how the world should be organized.
36 
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Because of their minimalist character, Stengel's prescriptions can 
be regarded as standing very close to the 'anarchical' end of the 
'Type I - Type II spectrum'. Here states can resolve their disputes by 
diplomacy, arbitration, or by war. The problem is how far the legal 
freedom of states to resort to war should be restricted. Those who 
favour the nineteenth century system of international law like Borchard 
would not go very much further than Stengel in this respect. Borchard 
was not opposed to an international court of justice, but did not 
support the view that compulsory jurisdiction could contribute to the 
peaceful settlement of international disputes.
37 
Hersch Lauterpacht, 
at the other extreme, argued strongly in favour of the compulsory 
adjudication or arbitration of all disputes unresolved by other peaceful 
means, and wished to see international law take the same resolute 
attitude to violence as any municipal legal system would.
38 
Such a line 
of thouit was denounced by E.H. Carr as 'utopian', but Brierly, himself 
sceptical of the value of compulsory jurisdiction by an international 
court, nevertheless insisted that there should be a legal ban on the use 
of force by states.
39 
The central question here is, therefore, whether or not an international 
court of arbitration or justice should, and could profitably, be equipped 
with compulsory jurisdiction, and whether there should be a legal 
prohibition on the use of force by states other than as a means of law-
enforcement and self-defence. Stengel, Carr and Borchard replied 
negatively, Baty and Brierly positively in part, and Lauterpacht 
answered emphatically in the affirmative. How might we choose between 
these different opinions? 
One thing that is clear is that whether international law should 
incorporate compulsory jurisdiction and whether it should prohibit the 
use of force by states cannot be answered dogmatically with reference 
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to the supposed 'nature' of international law. Those who see international 
law as a unique kind of law, having a 'specific character', tend to speak 
negatively of the domestic analogy, and are opposed to those who see the 
anarchical structure of international law as a historical condition, 
and its gradual approximation to municipal law as constituting progress. 
But the question of whether the decentralized state of international law 
is unique and commendable, or primitive and deplorable, cannot be answered 
a priori in terms of some preconception about the essence of international 
law. What we need to do is to see what persuasive empirical argument 
might be advanced in favour of, or against, the transfer of a given 
institution from the domestic to the international sphere. Terry Nardin 
has criticized certain international lawyers, such as Hersch Lauterpacht, 
who confuse the conceptual question of what principles international law 
ought to embody in order to satisfy the definition of law, and the 
empirical question of what principles it should contain in order to 
contribute effectively to world order. 4° It is important to note that 
this error is committed not only by those, like Lauterpacht, who insist 
that international law, in order to satisfy the definition of law, must 
emulate the standards of municipal law, but also by those, like Nippold, 
who insist on the uniqueness of international legal order. 
As regards the incorporation of the principle of compulsory jurisdiction 
into international law, there are at least three grounds for criticism. 
In the first place, while it is true that all international disputes 
are justiciable, they are not necessarily profitably so from the view-
point of their solution. They are justiciable in the sense in which 
Lauterpacht insisted them to be so, namely that there is nothing in the 
nature of any international dispute which makes it intrinsically non-
justiciable: an international court, just like any municipal court, can 
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in principle either pronounce on the merits, or definitely dismiss a 
given claim on the ground that it is not entitled to protection and 
enforcement by the law.
41 
However, while law can give an answer to 
every dispute, not all disputes can effectively be resolved thereby. 
This point was clearly argued by Hans Morgenthau.
42 
According to 
him, international disputes are of three types: 'pure disputes', 
'disputes with the substance of a tension', and 'disputes representing 
a tension'. 
As an illustration of 'pure disputes', Morgenthau refers to a 
hypothetical case where the United States and the Soviet Union are in 
disagreement over the exchange rate between dollars and rubles for the 
diplomatic personnel of the two countries. It is conceivable that despite 
the existence of a tension between them, the two states treat the dispute 
as a separate issue, that is to say, as an issue which has no relation 
to the sources of their tension. In such circumstances, the dispute, 
according to Morgenthau's terminology, is a 'pure dispute'. 
As an example of 'disputes with a substance of a tension', Morgenthau 
uses another hypothetical, but perhaps a little more realistic, case, 
namely a dispute over the interpretation of the Potsdam Agreement. He 
explains this as follows: 
One of the main issues of the tension between the United 
States and the Soviet Union is the distribution of power in 
Europe. The Potsdam Agreement is a legal document that 
endeavored to settle the aspects of that issue connected with 
the occupation and administration of Germany by the Allies. 
The subject matter of the Potsdam Agreement, then, is identical with 
a segment of the issue that constitutes the subject matter of 
the tension between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
A dispute over the interpretation of the Potsdam Agreement 
has a direct bearing upon the over-all power relations between 
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the United States and the Soviet Union. An interpretation 
favorable to one nation will add so much power to one side 
and deduct that much power from the other side, since the 
issue is one upon which the power contest between the two 
countries has seized as one of its main stakes.
43 
As an illustration of 'disputes representing a tension', Morgenthau 
returns to the aforementioned case between the United States and the 
Soviet Union concerning the exchange rate of dollars and rubles for the 
diplomatic representatives of both countries. While it is conceivable 
that such a dispute takes place without any relation to the tension 
between them, it is also likely that the two states, so keenly engaged 
in a contest of power, seize upon this dispute and make it the concrete 
issue by which to test their respective strength. In such a case, the 
subject matter of the dispute has still no relation to the subject matter 
of the tension. Yet the dispute fulfils a symbolic and representative 
function in relation to the tension between the contestants. 
It is unclear whether these three types are meant to be classificatory 
categories or ideal-types. But undoubtedly it is only where a given 
dispute falls into the first type, or closely approximates it, that a 
legal settlement can be of much use. In the second and third types, the 
contestants are not seriously interested in being offered a legal 
answer to the question involved. On the contrary, one of the contestants 
will be seriously interested in challenging what the law has to say. 
As Morgenthau puts it, a court is, in a sense, itself a party to such 
a dispute.
44 
One of the weaknesses of the argument in favour of 
compulsory jurisdiction therefore is that it depicts all international 
disputes as if they were analogous to a dispute between two citizens 
regarding some private property. Many cases of international dispute 
are so unlike this paradigm that an argument built upon it, even implicitly, 
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is of doubtful value. 
A second argument against compulsory jurisdiction is that it may not 
be effective unless backed by a system of sanctions, and may lead to 
unfair consequences unless accompanied by a system of peaceful change. 
According to this argument, therefore, compulsory jurisdiction on its 
own does not go far enough in the direction of a domestic model, and 
partial reliance on the domestic analogy is useless or worse than useless. 
Lauterpacht, without showing any persuasive grounds, simply asserted 
in his work of 1933, The Function of Law in the International Community  
that the absence of centralized sanctions would reduce, but not 
substantially impair the function of judiciary, equipped with compulsory 
jurisdiction, as an instrument of peace. 45 He was more seriously 
concerned to refute the other suggestion that, due to the absence of an 
international legislature, an international tribunal might perpetuate 
injustice by giving effect to an existing international legal right. 
In the work of 1933, however, he argued that the judicial process was 
not as rigid as was suggested by this criticism, and that there were 
certain means of peaceful change already available within the existing 
system.
46 
He believed that the existing tendencies in the political 
integration of the community of states pointed to the future establish-
ment of an effective international legislature. This would relieve 
obligatory judicial settlement of the strain imposed by the present 
imperfection of the legislative process. None the less, he wrote, 'it 
is improvident to reject a working minimum because the maximum cannot 
as yet be obtained': the rejection of obligatory arbitration or 
adjudication, in his view, would in the last resort amount to a 
sanction of the reign of force.
47 
Lauterpacht's argument that the absence of centralized sanctions 
would reduce, but not substantially impair, the function of judiciary 
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endowed with compulsory jurisdiction is too wishful. It is difficult 
to subscribe to such a position unless one believes optimistically 
in the capacity of law to determine states' behaviour even against 
their power and desire. Lauterpacht's argument that it would be improvi-
dent to reject a working minimum because the maximum could not yet be 
obtained presupposes that a judiciary endowed with compulsory jurisdiction 
would constitute a 'working minimum'. While his implicit assumption that 
the minimalist goal of the avoidance of the reign of force should precede 
the maximalist goal of the creation of just peace might be accepted, there 
is still no good reason to suppose that a judiciary endowed with 
compulsory jurisdiction would actually constitute a 'working' system 
in the absence of organized sanctions. 
Athird ground for criticism is that compulsory jurisdiction, when 
ineffective, may in fact make the situation worse. John Westlake had 
argued that between unfriendly nations an arbitration treaty without 
reservation was undesirable since it would not only be ignored by one 
party, but also it might add a charge of bad faith to the original 
source of difference.
48 	
While we should not exaggerate the impact of 
this undesirable side-effect since it is difficult to establish its 
magnitude, we should at least bear this point in mind. 
These considerations lead us to the view that the transfer of the 
principle of compulsory jurisdiction from the domestic to the international 
sphere, by itself, will not be a desirable move unless some drastic 
change can be made to the political conditions of the world at the same 
time. 
As regards the legal prohibition on the use of force by states, at 
least three lines of argument have been advanced against it by those 
who stand close to the 'anarchical' end of the 'Type I - Type II spectrum'. 
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In the first place, the legal ban on the use of force is said 
inescapably to be ineffective in the world of states where there is 
only a limited amount of trust, and abundance of military capability. 
Moreover, the argument runs, we need to be concerned with the undesirable 
side-effect of having such a ban. One of the side-effects is said to be 
that under the system of international law based on the prohibition on 
the use of force, each contestant will necessarily see the other as the 
violator of this prohibition, and as a result the conflict will intensify 
because both sides assume themselves to be legally in the right, and 
become more uncompromising. 49 
Secondly, the system of international law based on the ban on the 
use of force is assumed to be at least hostile to, if not necessarily 
logically incompatible with, the institution of neutrality, and to 
encourage states to adopt the policy of 'qualified' neutrality in favour 
of what they consider as the victim state. However, the argument runs, 
this tends to expand the conflict either because the belligerents may 
retaliate against those 'neutral' states who discriminate against them 
or because the 'neutral' states in their support of the victim state 
may themselves decide to join in the war to suppress the delinquent state. 
Because there is no assurance that 'neutral' states would agree on which 
of the belligerents is legally in the right, the conflict can expand into 
a confrontation between the two camps supporting the original belligerents. 
This is said to be another negative side-effect of the ban.
50 
Thirdly, it is suggested that the legal ban on the use of force will 
deprive states of the traditional methods of maintaining international 
order and achieving a degree of justice. 51 
These considerations, however, require a careful re-examination. 
As regards the first of the three criticisms noted above, while it is 
clear that a legal ban on the use of force is bound to be violated in 
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some cases, it will be a little unrealistic to suggest that it has 
absolutely no impact at all on the behaviour of states. If it is 
admitted that it will have some impact on their behaviour, the question 
then is whether the positive impact of cutting down the frequency of the 
use of force is outbalanced by the negative side-effect of making the 
contestants more uncompromising. Self-righteousness can be expected of 
any state in a dispute whatever its international legal commitments, 
and it will be exceedingly difficult, if possible at all, to determine 
how far this tendency is attributable to the particular content of the 
law under which it lives. Those who insist that a legal prohibition on 
the use of force will inevitably make the contestants more intense 
and entrenched in their hostility appear to argue without any empirical 
evidence, and are therefore suspected of dogmatism. 52 
The second criticism noted above is a standard defence of the nine-
teenth century system of the law of neutrality, and is used by various 
writers, such as Edwin Borchard, and, more recently, by Hedley Bull. 
Morgenthau has used a similar line of argument in his criticism of 
the collective security system.
53 
The argument appears reasonably persuasive, but exaggerates the 
firmness with which neutrality is established as an institution of 
international society. It will be recalled that Borchard exalted 
this institution as one which 400 years of history had cultivated in 
the international system, and which was eminently more suitable to the 
international environment than was a League-type institution based on 
the domestic analogy.
54 
James Brierly, however, was critical of those 
who considered neutrality as a well-established and well-adapted 
international institution. 
According to Brierly's analysis, the institution of neutrality does 
not possess the kind of inevitable permanency in the international 
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system which writers like Borchard attributed to it. Brierly argued 
that neutrality was very much a product of the circumstances of the 
nineteenth century. These circumstances included: the existence and 
growing influence of a power which favoured neutrality, namely the 
United States; the relatively peaceful character of the nineteenth 
century in which most states were inclined to regard themselves as more 
likely to be neutral than belligerents if war should break out; and a 
temporary balance between the political division of Europe and the means 
of warfare which had made respect for neutrality and the efficient 
prosecution of war consistent with one another.
55 
However, the institution 
of neutrality was already precarious when it was supposed to have reached 
its high water mark at the turn of the century. Brierly wrote: 
In the nineteenth century ... would-be neutral states did 
enjoy a fair degree of security against the risk of being 
drawn into war against their will and merely to suit the 
interests of a more powerful neighbour, and it was easy to 
attribute to the laws of neutrality a security which they 
really owed to contemporary, and as we can now see also 
temporary, conditions. When the process of building up 
these layis had culminated in the Hague Conferences of 1899 
and 1907, they doubtless looked to the casual observer a 
solid and imposing structure. Yet for all its impressive 
facade the cracks in the edifice had begun to appear even 
before the turn of the century. In the practice of nations 
at war neutrality had never been quite so strictly applied 
as the books said that it ought to be and were inclined to 
assume that it was; it was often not truly impartial, but 
'qualified' or 'benevolent', much as it had been in the 
eighteenth century and as it is again today. ... /goreoverj 
the right of a state to be neutral in the war of other states, 
if it so chose, had again become insecure. The German 
General Staff is believed to have adopted the Schlieffen Plan 
in or about 1897, and by that plan German armies were to pass 
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through Belgian territory in the event of a war with 
France; so that even while the lawyers were talking at 
The Hague it seems likely that the Chancelleries of 
Europe knew that in the next war Germany, if it suited 
her, would violate the neutrality of a little state 
which she had herself guaranteed.
56 
Because of these considerations, and because of the experience of two 
world wars in one generation, Brierly, writing in the middle of the 
twentieth century, saw neutrality as having been a transient and obsolete 
institution. It is open to debate whether his perception was itself a 
short-sighted one. Yet Brierly's argument does point us to the 
important fact that those who support the institution of neutrality as 
against those institutions based on the domestic analogy must argue their 
case in the light of the particular historical conditions of international 
society rather than treat neutrality as a permanently best-adjusted, unique 
institution of that society. If, in future, the rules in the United 
Nations Charter concerning the use of force continue to work semi-effectively, 
states may tend to adopt a policy of 'qualified' neutrality. On the 
other hand, the danger of escalation into a nuclear holocaust may increase 
the number of states who wish to stay out of an ongoing war, and this may 
result in the growth in the power and influence of neutral states — 
something which Brierly in the middle of the twentieth century did not 
envisage. 
A third argument against the legal ban on the use of force by states 
was that such a ban would deprive them of the traditional means of main-
taining international order and achieving justice. This cannot entirely 
be the case since even under the system of international law embodying 
a ban on the use of force it will still be legitimate to resort to force 
in self-defence or as a means of law-enforcement against the violator 
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of the ban itself. However, to the extent that a legal ban encompasses 
preventive war, anticipatory self-defence, intervention for the main-
tenance of the balance of power, use of force for just change, and 
humanitarian intervention, it may be suggested that the ban interferes 
with the mechanism of the balance of power, or rules out one effective 
means of achieving justice. 
Indeed, circumstances are conceivable where a reasonably persuasive 
case can be made to the effect that, despite its illegitimacy from the 
viewpoint of the United Nations Charter, force was used in a manner of 
anticipatory self-defence, producing thereby a satisfactory outcome 
from the viewpoint of the balance of power and international order. 
Circumstances are also conceivable where the use of force by a state 
against another might have been defended on the grounds of justice. 
The American naval blockade of Cuba in the Missile Crisis may be counted 
as an instance of the former, and India's use of force against Goa, 
or Tanzania's intervention in Amin's Uganda are possible instances of 
the latter. 
However, even if such interpretation of these three cases were 
accepted, -iL t would still be open to question whether these and other 
possible exceptions were significant enough to make it advisable to do 
away with the general ban on the use of force altogether. 
The foregoing discussion shows that none of the three lines of 
argument against the legal prohibition on the use of force is overwhelming. 
None the less, it will have to be conceded that international society 
will not necessarily turn into chaos simply because the legal ban on the 
use of force is lifted, or exceptions are made in the case of 
anticipatory self-defence and so on. It may seem difficult not to suppose 
that a legal prohibition on the use of force contributes to the sustenance 
of the climate of opinion which sees peace as the normal condition of 
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international life and the use of force as an exception. But even in 
the nineteenth century when states enjoyed unrestricted legal freedom 
to resort to force, war was not thought to be the normal, let alone 
permanent, state of affairs in the life of states.
57 
Since we cannot show conclusively that we should prefer the nine-
teenth century system of international law to what has developed in this 
century in the area of the control of force, there is a clear case for 
continuing with what we now have. At any rate, it is unrealistic to 
assume that we can go back to where we were in 1914 since the idea that 
states do not have unrestricted legal freedom to resort to force has 
become part of the orthodox diplomatic assumptions of our century. 
It must however be acknowledged that the system under which states have lived 
since the end of the Great War has shown itself to be largely unworkable 
with respect to law-enforcement. 
The mechanism of law-enforcement is a second of the three types of 
institution we set out to consider. Collective security and international 
police are the two noteworthy institutions of this kind proposed by those 
who stand close to the 'confederal' end of the 'Type I - Type II spectrum'. 
It is doubtful whether those at the 'anarchical' end of the spectrum have 
a coherent conception of law-enforcement in international relations since, 
according totheir view, states are to be legally free to resort to war 
for purposes other than law-enforcement. However, the argument against 
collective security and international police is overwhelming. 
For collective security to work, every member of the system must be 
ready to react quickly, through diplomatic, economic or military means, 
even against its perceived short-term interest, on the principle of the 
'indivisibility of peace', to defend the status quo against any other 
state in the system who attempts to violate it. Moreover, for such a 
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system to work, there must not be a sharp disparity in the military 
capabilities, or economic vulnerability, among the member-states. Nor 
must there be any special historical enmity or friendship between 
particular states. The mode of aggression prevalent in the system must 
be such that it is relatively easy to determine whether or not violation 
has taken place, and who the violator is in each instance. Furthermore, 
the state of military technology and the level of armament must be such 
that it is possible for a violator to be met by a quick, overwhelming 
response. These conditions, which encompass attitudinal as well as 
objective factors, are virtually impossible to obtain or endure in the 
real world.
58 
Moreover, when those factors which make the collective 
security system operative do not exist, the system may also be counter-
productive in that it may interfere with the working of the balance of 
power system.
59 
As for an international police, it presupposes such a high degree of 
trust among states that it is difficult to imagine how it can be created 
for a foreseeable future. Even when it has been created, its effective-
ness as a means of maintaining international order is in grave doubt unless 
comprehensive disarmament has also been achieved. Even then, an inter-
national police will have to cope with the kind of problem which, within 
the domestic society, are normally dealt with by the military rather than 
the police, namely the suppression of violence committed by a large 
and organized group against the authority of the state. Therefore, 
unless the police are equipped with considerable military strength, its 
effectiveness will be in doubt, but the more formidable its strength, 
the more difficult it will be to keep it under political control to 
secure its impartiality. 
If the idea of communal law-enforcement at the international level 
appears so obviously inappropriate, how is it that so many thinkers 
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have supported it? Blind reliance on the domestic analogy, in the 
absence of international experience, seems to be the answer. Moreover, 
this form of domestic analogy was influential during the period of the 
Great War and its aftermath because, as we saw, the War was interpreted 
as having resulted from, among other things, the anarchical structure 
of the international system. The shock of the First World War was 
particularly pronounced precisely because of the pre-1914 confidence 
in the power of the old-style international law to maintain world order. 
TI-ere is therefore some truth in Borchard's scathing remark that the 
peace-makers of the Great War period acted in hysteria. When inter-
national experience had been gained through the failure of the League 
of Nations, writers like Borchard merely saw their view reaffirmed. 
However, some League supporters, like Woolf, insisted that oneinstance 
of failure was insufficient to prove any approach intrinsically wrong. 
His conviction was based on the belief in the correctness of the domestic 
analogy which he claimed was derived from 4,000 years of experience. 
The following passage from his The War for Peace explains the idea 
underlying collective security or international police so well that it 
may be quoted at length: 
To prevent war is a problem of politics and government, 
not essentially different from the problem of preventing 
duelling or cock-fighting or of regulating the relations 
between the inhabitants of Middlesex and those of Surrey. 
It may be easier to prevent cock-fighting than war or to 
regulate the relations between Middlesex and Surrey or 
England and Scotland than those between France and Germany. 
But there is nothing in the last problem which makes it 
essentially different from the others. To alter the 
international system so as to prevent war is si mpl y a 
problem of human government; if the object is attainable, 
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it can only be attained, like the objects of Bismarck, 
by applying reason to experience. 
The idea that experience is not available from which 
we may learn what we shall have to do in Europe if the 
existing state of affairs is to be altered and wars 
prevented is ridiculous. It was mentioned above that a 
Civil Servant in Asia, as an officer of the British 
Government watching to see that a murderer was hanged by 
the neck until he was dead in accordance with the law, 
might be conscious that 3,800 years ago the officers of 
the Government of Sumer and Akkad were doing exactly the 
same thing not so very far away. That means that for 
4,000 years, at least, human beings have had experience 
of communal government. All that time they have been 
posing themselves problems of government, and solving 
them or failing to solve them. What are these problems 
of government? They are simply questions of how the 
relations between individuals and groups shall be ordered 
and controlled - relations between individual and 
individual, between classes, nations, races, between 
groups living in villages, towns, districts, states, or 
continents. This experience is so ancient and so catholic 
that there is nothing which we cannot learn from it about 
human government if we wish to do so. And among the things 
which we could most certainly learn from all this 
experience is what we must do in the year 1940 if we wish 
to prevent another European war.
60 
Woolf's argument is noteworthy since it so eloquently discloses the 
problematic assumptions of his type of approach, which, as we saw, 
contributed to the formation of the United Nations. In the first place, 
the punishment of a murderer is treated as if it were a central problem 
of government. And, secondly, the problem of maintaining order between 
two individuals is seen to be identical to the problem of maintaining 
order between two large, organized groups of individuals. 
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The weakness of the first assumption is revealed by Inis Claude who 
characterizes it as a 'schoolboyish' view. 61 The error of the second 
assumption has been noted by many, including Claude, Carr and Brierly.
62 
As these writers have pointed out, individuals, when united, acquire 
strength qualitatively different from what they each enjoy, and the 
central task of a government is to cope, not with individual robbers, 
but with the demands, often illegal, made by various strong groups 
within the state. If 4,000 years of domestic experience can tell us 
anything about how to create order in international society, in these 
writers' view, it is how some states were more successful than others 
in avoiding a civil war, rather than how they have dealt with murderers. 
The foregoing discussion shows that even if there is a case for 
having a legal prohibition on the use of force in international society, 
we cannot expect this to be backed by a mechanism of communal law-
enforcement, such as collective security. Woolf, taking note of the 
failure of the League, therefore suggested that law-enforcement should 
be organized on the regional basis. 63 The regional principle was also 
strongly supported by Winston Churchill. Needless to say, this principle 
is based on the assumption that the world can be divided into regional 
sub-systems in each of which we can expect a degree of solidarity 
comparable to that which obtains within the domestic sphere, and sufficient 
to make collective enforcement of law operative. This appears a somewhat 
less unrealistic assumption to make than the idea that all nations of 
the world had an equal interest in fighting against aggression in any 
part of the world. Even then, it is difficult to find a region of the 
world in which collective security is workable, given the conditions 
spelled out earlier for its effective functioning. There are some regions, 
North America or Scandinavia, for example, where social cohesion between 
states is very strong. But in these areas, sometimes called 'security 
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communities', a collective security system is not likely to be 
necessary.
64 
There remain proposals for a law-making assembly yet to be discussed. 
As in the case of William Ladd's Congress of Nations, the proposed 
law-making assembly may be no more than a regularized form of diplomatic 
conference, one which writers at the turn of the century, like 
Oppenheim and Schlicking, wished to see the Hague Conference develop into.
65 
There will be little harm in such an arrangement, though the fixity of 
procedures and membership might be thought undesirable. In fact, so 
long as the idea of having a conference to conclude treaties of general 
interest is accepted and practised by international society, there may 
be little need to insist on having a single assembly. Borchard, for 
example, did not see the absence of an international legislature as a 
major defect of international law, for he believed that states learnt 
to co-operate by treaty in hundreds of fields when the need arose.
66 
This is the line adopted by those who stand close to the 'anarchical' end 
of the 'Type I - Type II spectrum'. 
Withoutta doubt a periodic meeting of the representatives of states 
is valuable, and the United Nations General Assembly has already become 
a quasi-legislature in some writers' judgement.
67 
It may therefore be 
asked whether a full-fledged international legislature capable of making 
international law without the unanimous consent of the member-states is 
still to be desired. 
As far as we can tell from our examples, an international legislature 
was predominantly a nineteenth century concern, no doubt reflecting 
both the awareness of the uncertainty and incompleteness of international 
law in many areas, and the confidence in the power of domestic legislatures 
to create harmony within the borders of states. In the League period 
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and thereafter, an argument in favour of an international legislature 
has tended to come from those who see in it the only satisfactory solution 
to the problem of peaceful change.
68 
Legislatures can be oppressive, as Baty so outspokenly pointed out. 69 
 Indeed it is often said in praise of international law that the absence 
of a legislature is paradoxically a source of its strength.
70 
On the 
other hand, it cannot be ignored that the voluntaristic character of 
international law contributes to the perpetuation of unfair or unjust 
arrangements in international relations. These arrangements could be 
modified through diplomatic and other methods short of 'legislation', 
but there are some writers, like Hersch Lauterpacht, as in his lecture 
of 1937, who would profess not to be satisfied with anything less. 
In order to avoid the tyranny of the legislature, Lauterpacht 
suggested, among other things, that the vested rights of states would 
have to be made to yield 'only to such an overwhelming impact of 
justice and expediency as /ould be] expressed by a practically unanimous 
vote of the other members of the community'.
71 
Moreover, Lauterpacht 
was aware that peaceful change by international legislation would be 
precarious and unreal unless it formed part of a system of collective 
security 'conceived as a system of collective repression of unlawful 
war ' . 72 He went further still and wrote: 'An international system of 
peaceful change ... runs the risk of being unreal unless it forms part 
and parcel of a comprehensive political organization of mankind'.
73 
Lauterpacht, at this stage, was no longer so optimistic as he was 
in 1933 when he published The Function of Law in the International  
Community.
74 
He doubted whether such an organization would ever be 
created. In a desperate but austere mood, he concluded his lecture 
with the following remarks: 
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n/s a student of ethics and politics I would risk the 
assertion that we are not at liberty to regard inter-
national legislation in its true meaning as an infinite 
ideal. It may not be compatible with the dignity of 
human life to act on any other assumption than that 
reason and order are bound to prevail not only ultimately 
but in our own day.
75 
Andrew Linklater has argued in his work Men and Citizens in the  
Theory of International Relations that mankind ought to transcend 
primitive tribalism and modern nationalism, and progress towards the 
ultimate goal of the universal moral community in which men treat one 
another as moral equals by virtue of their humanity.
76 
This universal 
moral community will have its appropriate institutional expression as 
a global legal and political system. 
Linklater, while characterizing this ultimate system as a replacement 
for the sovereign states system, does not appear to equate it with a 
world state. In his judgement, this global system ought to restrict 
the freedom of states to resort to force, govern international 
relations by consent, permit humanitarian intervention, replace the 
balance of power with a 'more centralised and principled form of 
international government', protect the economic and social rights of 
individuals and enable the equalization of wealth and resources between 
societies. 77 
However, such a system must be an institutional expression of the 
underlying change in men's moral outlook from particularism to 
universalism. Without the universalist moral outlook prevailing, a 
comprehensive political organization of mankind will be unrealizable or 
inoperative. 
Lauterpacht's concession that the system of peaceful change will be 
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unworkable unless it is backed by collective security seems to indicate 
that he was advocating the creation of an international government 
prior to the requisite transformation in the moral beliefs underlying 
the foreign relations of states. Although a new institution may help 
sustain a new moral outlook, the former by itself cannot be expected 
to bring about the latter. Moreover, a collective security system, as 
we argued, is not a suitable means of law-enforcement in international 
relations. For these reasons, Lauterpacht's prescriptions are of 
doubtful value. 
The foregoing examination of the proposals along the 'Type I - Type II 
spectrum' leads us to the following conclusion: (1) that the transfer 
of the principle of compulsory jurisdiction from the domestic to the 
international sphere is not desirable in the present circumstances; 
(2) that, none the less, the legal ban on the use of force may continue 
to operate with some positive consequences; (3) that those who reject 
the domestic analogy and favour the institution of neutrality may 
exaggerate the firmness with which that institution had been established 
in international society; (4) that the collective enforcement of law 
through a system of collective security or international police is 
based on a misguided use of the domestic analogy, and is likely to be 
either unworkable or unnecessary; and (5) that a full-fledged inter-
national legislature requires for its operation a significant shift in 
the moral outlook of mankind from national particularism to universalism. 
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Chapter IX 	An Assessment of the Proposals: Part Two 
In this chapter, we shall discuss the remaining three types of 
approach. The supporters of Types III, IV and V attempt to overcome 
what they see as the limitations of those proposals which are placed 
along the 'Type I - Type II spectrum'. These proposals, we saw, 
accept the sovereign states system as the appropriate structure for the 
world. They are concerned primarily with the issue of creating order 
in inter-state relations. And they accept in principle the idea that 
the official intercourse between states be conducted by those represent-
atives of states who act under instruction from the executive branches 
of their respective governments. 
Indeed even the more far-reaching schemes along the 'Type I - Type II 
spectrum' accept that a law-making assembly should consist of such 
representatives, and that a mechanism of law-enforcement should operate 
in accordance with the views expressed by the executive branches of 
the governments of the member-states. Also with respect to the peaceful 
solution of international disputes, these schemes expect the executive 
branches to play a major role since only those disputes which diplomacy  
fails to solve are to be brought to a court. 
The Type III ('democratic confederal') approach subscribes to the 
confederal alternative, and might therefore be seen as a variation of 
Type I. However, the supporters of Type III stress that their proposed 
confederations should reflect more closely than do ordinary confederations 
the wishes of the peoples divided into separate states. For this 
purpose, they advocate a confederal union of states closely controlled 
by the legislative branches of the member states. 
Indeed the adherents of Type III are critical of any proposal along 
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the 'Type I - Type II spectrum' since they see it as leaving too much 
power to the executive branches of the national governments. This they 
consider as contrary to democracy, which they wish to extend, since in 
their view (representative) legislatures more closely reflect the 
popular will than the (often autocratic or authoritarian) executives. 
Murray Forsyth has remarked that confederations tend to be 'anti-
democratic' since their law-making congresses are not closely controlled 
by the national parliaments.
1 
Type III attempts to overcome this, and 
hence the label 'democratic confederal' to refer to this approach. 
'Populist confederalism' may also be a suitable term. 
The Type IV ('world state') approach, as the label indicates, objects 
to the sovereign states system as such (which is accepted by Types I, 
II and III), and suggests a radical transformation of the present system 
into a single polity, federal or unitary. 
The Type V ('welfarist') approach is critical of the tendency of the 
proposals along the 'Type I - Type II spectrum' to be concerned primarily 
with the narrow objective of securing orderly relationships between 
states. It also objects to the constitutional 	approach common to 
Types I, III and IV. It argues instead for multiplying and reinforcing 
those international institutions which are concerned with the welfare 
of men and women living in separate states, gradually and pragmatically 
in accordance with the rising needs. 
In the following we shall examine in turn various proposals 
approximating these three ideal-types, 'democratic confederal', 'world 
state' and 'welfarist'. 
The Type III ('democratic confederal') approach is exemplified well 
by James Lorimer's project. It will be recalled that his proposed 
international parliament was bicameral, and its two houses were to 
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consist of those who were sent by the legislatures of the member states. 
Unlike, for example, Ladd's Congress of Nations, which is placed along 
the 'Type I - Type II spectrum', the members of Lorimer's international 
parliament were not to act under instruction from the executive depart-
ments of their respective national governments. Lorimer's critic, 
Bluntschli also allowed the principle of popular representation to 
guide him in his own proposal, but, we noted, to a lesser extent than 
in the case of Lorimer.
2 
At the beginning of the twentieth century, 
Schlicking, inspired by the German experience, and Bluntschli's example, 
suggested that at a later stage in the development of his 'Hague Union', 
a second chamber might be added to the periodic Hague Conferences. This 
was to be composed of delegations from the parliaments of the contracting 
parties, and they were to vote without instructions from home, though they 
were expected as a rule to represent the presumed will of their respective 
national parliaments.
3 
A more radical suggestion that a periodical 
congress of delegates sent by the parliaments of states might take over 
the role of the Hague Conferences was contained in Robert Cecil's Draft 
Sketch of a League of Nations.
4 
The principle of popular representation incorporated in Type III can 
be interpreted in a number of ways. Lorimer interpreted it primarily 
as a means of the democratic control of international affairs, believing 
that an international government left to the co-operation of the 
executive branches of national governments would be untrustworthy, and 
that matters of inter-state relationships should be subjected to public 
scrutiny.
5 
SchOcking stressed the principle of popular representation 
as a means of closer integration than could be expected of ordinary 
international organizations. He wrote: 
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Pacifism has ... proceeded from the people and not grown 
up in the cabinets of ministers; on the contrary, official 
diplomacy is at the present day frequently just as much 
opposed to it as were the diplomats of the individual 
German states at one time to the demand for a great united 
German nation. Professional diplomacy works under far too 
many restrictions to be able to carry through by itself the 
work of the organization of the civilized world. Within 
the last few decades the impression has often been produced ... 
that, when war has been about to break out and all sensible 
persons on both sides were agreed that an understanding must 
be reached, the diplomats, as the saying goes, 'could not 
yet find a basis of agreement,' and in the meantime millions 
were lost upon the stock exchanges and the whole economic 
life crippled! It is characteristic of our time that the 
governed, who have already obtained with the help of parliamentary 
institutions a decisive influence in domestic politics, are now 
seeking means of publicity committees, &c., to exercise an 
influence over foreign politics, and it seems to me it can only 
serve to bring nations closer together if the Hague union also 
were to take into account these efforts. It was not without 
reason that ... in all the projects for the reorganization 
of the deplorable conditions of the old German Confederation, 
a national parliament was proposed, because it was seen that 
such a parliament would furnish the force needed to overcome 
the difficulties and differences of opinion common to 
diplomats as representatives of states.
6 
As this quotation amply indicates, the Type III approach is very much 
an outcome of the rise of parliamentary democracy in the domestic sphere 
and of the desire of the progressive thinkers of the late nineteenth 
century and the early twentieth century to expand the realm of democratic 
control. However, the inclination to see peoples as a progressive, 
universalist force still continues, and is found in the writings of 
Richard Falk, for example. Although he is not in full agreement with 
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the constitutional approach of the kind adopted by Lorimer or SchOcking, 
he nevertheless endorses the view that non-governmental groups and 
individuals should actively participate in the articulation of the 
international normative standards. ? 
To the extent that Type III, like Type I, envisages a confederal 
union of states, arguments against those proposals which are located 
close to the 'confederal' end of the 'Type I - Type II spectrum' apply 
equally well to those which belong to or approximate Type III. However, 
there remains a question specific to this type. It is whether in 
setting up an international organization states should introduce the 
idea of popular representation rather than base it solely on the 
orthodox international principle of representation by diplomatic agents. 
Gladstone had long ago put forward a standard defence of the orthodox 
method of diplomacy when he stated that diplomatic negotiations would 
be obstructed if they were publicized at every stage, and that the 
representatives of the people and the people themselves were often more 
impulsive than the executive. 8 According to Gladstone, what was needed 
was not merely the improvement of the machinery by which the central 
authority controlled its diplomatic agents, but the improvement of 
the central authority itself, namely the 'formation of just habits of 
thought'. 9 By this Gladstone meant the cultivation of the idea that 
'every other State, and every other people [stood on the same level or 
right as ourselves'.
10 
Lorimer, however, commenting on this, maintained that 'the chief 
obstacle to the formation of "just habits of thought" on international 
questions, [wa7 the secrecy which Lovered7 them, till, by assuming 
the character of faits accomplis, they glad7 lost all practical 
interest for the public'.
11 
He continued: 
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[[7t is to ignorance of foreign affairs thus engendered 
that we must ascribe those alternations of indifference 
and passion which impel the most cultivated nations, like "dumb, 
driven cattle," to rush blindly into disastrous wars, and to 
maintain those still more disastrous warlike preparations which 
sap the resources and threaten the very existence of civilization. 
If, in place of sending one plenipotentiary to determine the 
policy which it should adopt in accordance with the views of 
the executive department at home, each of the six great Powers 
were to send, say twenty, and the smaller Powers a corresponding 
number of representatives of the national will, to discuss 
international politics annually, and bound itself by treaty 
to shape its policy in accordance with the results of their 
deliberations, as ascertained by a general vote, I believe 
that a means of international education, and an element of 
international conciliation, would be thereby called into 
activity, the importance of which it is scarcely possible 
to exaggerate.
12 
In short, Lorimer's argument here was that popular representation in 
international government would lead to international education of 
peoples, and that this in turn would contribute to international 
conciliation. A major presupposition here is that when educated, 
peoples would become more co-operative towards one another. 
As we noted, SchOcking assumed that peoples were on the whole more 
progressive and universalist than the executive branches of their 
governments. But he was also aware that in some cases the reverse was 
true. Yet he clung to the view that a second international legislative 
chamber consisting of the delegations from the parliaments of the 
member-states would be desirable. His point here, however, differed 
from Lorimer's. SchOcking explained his ground as follows: 
/Wince the governments belonging to the 5roposed Hague 
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Union] are in every case republican or constitutional 
in character, it is not enough that the representatives 
sent by the executive department to an international 
conference at The Hague be in accord, but in all important 
matters the government of each individual state will be 
bound by the approval of its own parliament, and in 
consequence in each state the case may occur in which a 
national opposition to the new international rules may 
make itself felt. 	... In this case it is conceivable 
that the organs of the executive department might sub- 
sequently find that the parliamentary forces of the country 
were simply unwilling to co-operate in respect to the 
concessions which national law must make to international 
law. Such conflict of opinion between the executive and 
legislative departments in respect to the problems of 
internationalism can not only render futile the whole work 
of future conferences but can throw a very unfortunate apple 
of discord into the domestic life of the state. Accordingly, 
it would be actually much better if from the start a 
delegation from the home parliament were invited to 
co-operate with the world parliament in the legislative 
functions of the 5roposed Hague Uniog.
13 
The reasoning underpinning Type III is therefore more complex than it 
might at first appear. Moreover, it is to be noted that the idea 
underlying this type of approach is not quite as utopian as it might 
seem. It is, albeit in a diluted form, embodied in the European 
Parliament. The idea that those other than the official representatives 
of the executive departments of member-states should participate in the 
decision-making process of an international organization is incorporated 
in the International Labour Organization, and underlies the 
consultative status accorded by the United Nations to various non-
governmental organizations.
14 
Does the Type III approach indicate how international institutions 
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should be arranged in future? 
It can be said that Gladstone's defence of the orthodox principle, 
noted earlier, as Lorimer himself acknowledged, is a weighty one. 
Lorimer's counter-argument seems to exaggerate the extent to which 
the education of peoples in international affairs depends on, and can 
be achieved by, the adoption of the Type III approach, and the degree 
to which peoples, thus educated, can contribute to international 
conciliation. Schbcking seems to be overly concerned with the 
antagonism between a popular legislature and the executive department 
(no doubt reflecting the circumstances of Germany in his time), and at 
the same time seems too optimistic about the extent to which a bicameral 
international legislature can contribute to harmonizing their 
relationships. Both these writers appear to exaggerate the virtues of 
the Type III approach, while they remain overly pessimistic about the 
extent to which international co-operation can be achieved by inter-
national organizations constituted in the orthodox fashion. 
The democratic principle which underlies Type III is appropriate 
where there is a strong sense of unity among the peoples concerned. 
Indeed it may be argued that this principle is workable only where there 
is a people, as opposed to peoples, capable of sustaining unity whatever 
the outcome of the ballot box. Where, as in the European Communities, 
there is a sufficient degree of unity among the peoples of a given 
region to make a supranational institution operative, there is a case 
for accommodating the democratic principle in its organization. Indeed, 
given the supranational legislative competence of the European 
Communities, it may be necessary that Community policies be scrutinized 
by a Parliament elected in such a way as to reflect the wishes of the 
peoples closely. 
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However, where the sense of unity is relatively weak, an institution 
embracing different peoples must be correspondingly more de-centralized 
in its organization. In such a context, if there is to be a legislative 
or quasi-legislative assembly within that institution, it cannot but be 
expected to approximate a diplomatic conference in its structure. It 
is unlikely that in this sort of circumstance delegations of national 
legislatures, taking decisions by a majority vote, as Lorimer had 
envisaged, can be viable or useful, for we cannot expect a sufficient 
degree of unity among the separate national communities to make 
democracy operative. 15 
Thus the appropriateness of the Type III approach would appear to 
depend on how closely integrated a given institution is to be, and this 
in turn would be a function of how much solidarity there already exists 
between the peoples to be embraced by the institution concerned. 
Within a relatively closely integrated community of nations, as in the 
case of the European Communities, the degree of popular representation 
may be permitted to approach what SchOcking or Bluntschli envisaged 
in their bicameral proposals. Alternatively, as the example of the 
International Labour Organization shows, an institution specific in its 
scope might allow participation by those other than government 
representatives. 
However, 'democratic confederalism' as an approach to order at the 
global level cannot be accepted. The approach, applied to this level, 
commits the error of attempting to transfer a domestic political 
principle to the domain where the conditions are either unsuitable or 
as yet not ripe enough. This error the 'democratic confederal' 
approach shares with those proposals based on the domestic analogy 
standing close to the confederal end of the 'Type I - Type II spectrum'. 
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If Type III attempts to overcome the limitations of Types I and II 
by introducing 'democratic confederalism' into the relations of states, 
the Type IV ('world state') approach in turn objects to Types I, II and 
III for their common acceptance of the division of the world into 
sovereign states. The Type IV approach is critical of the sovereign 
states system itself, and suggests a radical transformation of the 
present system into a single polity, federal or unitary. Hence the 
label 'world state'. 
Saint-Simon's proposal approximates Type IV. Those critics of the 
League of Nations who accepted the world state as the ideal solution 
to the problem of world peace, among whom we counted Schwarzenberger, 
Schuman and Morgenthau, may be said at least in principle to endorse 
the ideas embodied in this type of approach. It will, however, be 
recalled that unlike Schwarzenberger and Schuman, Morgenthau treated 
a world government not as a means by which to improve the conditions 
of the world but as an ideal end state.
16 
Saint-Simon described his proposed body as an organization similar 
to a federal community united by common institutions, subject to a 
common government which was in the same relation to the different 
peoples as national governments were to individuals. 17 This he said 
was the only approach which could effect a complete cure to the problem 
of Europe. In a similar vein, Morgenthau maintained that there could 
be no permanent international peace without a state coextensive with 
the confines of the political world, and said that the idea of a world 
state rested upon an analogy with national societies.
18 
Inis Claude, 
while not subscribing to world state as a necessary or sufficient means 
of the management of power, none the less described the theory of world 
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government as essentially analogical.
19 
Similarly, Hedley Bull talks 
of the domestic analogy as supporting the idea of a world government. 2° 
However, the Type IV approach can be said to be based on this 
analogy only if a broader definition of this analogy is adopted. By 
this definition, the 'domestic analogy' is an argument according to 
which domestic-type institutions should be employed to govern the 
relationships of communities at present divided into sovereign states. 
On the other hand, if it is insisted that the 'domestic analogy' means 
that domestic-type institutions should be employed to govern the 
relations of sovereign states as such, a Type IV approach cannot be said 
to involve this analogy. 
Because of this ambiguity, it is conceivable, for example, that 
those who claim to be opposed to the 'domestic analogy' turn out to 
favour vastly different solutions. Thus, on the one hand, some writers 
may say that the domestic analogy is mistaken, and subscribe to the 
view that the sovereign states system should be abolished, and replaced 
by a world state. On the other hand, some writers may say the same 
thing, but mean quite the opposite, namely that the sovereign states 
system should remain intact, and be organized by its own unique 
institutions dissimilar to those of domestic society. In discussing 
the domestic analogy, therefore, it is important to separate its two 
basic forms, corresponding to its narrower and broader definitions. 
However, a terminological debate need not detain us here. A more 
important question is what argument may be advanced in favour of a 
particular alternative such as the Type IV approach. The argument 
along the Type IV lines that there cannot be true co-operation between 
sovereign states was advanced most vividly by Saint-Simon in a 
passage which merits lengthy quotation: 
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A congress is now assembled at Vienna. ... The aim of 
this congress is to re-establish peace between the powers 
of Europe, by adjusting the claims of each and conciliating 
the interests of all. Can one hope that this aim will be 
achieved? I do not think so, and my reasons for so 
predicting are as follows. None of the members of the 
congress will have the function of considering questions 
from the general point of view; none of them will be even 
authorized to do so. Each of them, delegate of a king or 
a people ... will come prepared to present the particular 
policy of the power which he represents, and to show that 
this plan coincides with the interest of all. On all sides, 
the particular interest will be put forward as a matter of 
common interest. Austria will try to argue that it is 
important for the repose of Europe that she should have a 
preponderance in Italy, that she should keep Galicia and the 
Illyrian provinces, that her supremacy in the whole of 
Germany should be restored; Sweden will demonstrate, map in 
hand, that it is a law of nature that Norway should be her 
dependency; France will demand the Rhine and the Alps as 
natural frontiers; England will claim that she is, by nature, 
responsible for policing the seas, and will insist that the 
despotism which she exercises there should be regarded as 
the unalterable basis of the political system. 
These claims, presented with confidence, perhaps in good 
faith, in the guise of means to ensure the peace of Europe, 
and sustained with all the skill of the Talleyrands, 
Metternichs, and Castlereighs, will not, however, convince 
anybody. Each proposition will be rejected because nobody, 
apart from the mover, will see in it the common interest 
since he cannot see in it his own interest. They will part 
on bad terms, blaming on each other the lack of success of 
the assembly; no agreement, no compromise, no peace. 
Sectional leagues, rival alliances of interest, will throw 
Europe back into this melancholy state of war from which vain 
efforts will have been made to rescue her. ... Assemble 
congress after congress, multiply treaties, conventions, 
compromises, everything you do will lead only to war; you will 
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not abolish it, the most you can do is to shift the 
scene of it.
21 
 
With such a pessimistic estimate of the degree of co-operation 
attainable within the system of sovereign states, it is not surprising 
that Saint-Simon should have suggested its radical transformation. 
When re-organized according to his plan, Europe will not do away with 
nations, but these will no longer be divided into sovereign states. 
Consequently, while the relations between nations are part of the 
concern of the proposed European Parliament, its members will not 
represent separate sovereign states. In the case of Saint-Simon's 
project, we noted, they were to represent transnational social classes 
of Europe as a whole.
22 
Saint-Simon did not seriously confront the problem of how such a 
radical transformation was possible when by his own account no real 
co-operation was to be hoped for between sovereign states. Naturally, 
an agreement would have to be reached between their governments in 
order to create the type of organization which he had favoured, yet 
he had himself argued that no substantial agreement was possible 
between them. He suggested, however,that because France and England 
were both equipped with a liberal constitution they could unite 
themselves to form a kernel of European unity.
23 
Implicitly therefore 
he was committed to the view that between liberal states international 
co-operation was possible. Despite this, he did not spell out the 
full implications of this crucial assumption in his work of 1814. It 
will be recalled here that nearly a century later Oppenheim, impressed 
by the degree of co-operation between liberal states, argued strongly 
against a radical departure from the existing system.
24 
Saint-Simon in fact soon grew out of his infatuation with the 
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'English-type' constitution, and developed the doctrine of 
'industrialism'. According to this doctrine, the decision-making 
function of a society should be transferred from the political 
institution of the state to an administrative body consisting of the able 
members of the 'industrial' class, namely those who were engaged in 
production as opposed to those who were idle parasites of a society.
25 
He considered that national bellicosity was the remnant of the feudal 
policy of the state, and believed that there would be no conflict 
between the industrialists of different countries. 26 What form of 
institutional framework was desirable at the international level when 
a plurality of European states developed the industrial-administrative 
system within, Saint-Simon did not answer. 
EmileDurkheim, however, has suggested that Saint-Simon never in fact 
abandoned the fundamental position expressed in the 1814 proposal that 
the national governments and the common European government must be 
homogeneous, and that they must therefore be based on the same 
institutional principles. Thus, in Durkheim's view, Saint-Simon would 
have argued that the common parliament of Europe should be recruited in 
accordance with the rules set out for the national councils, and that 
it should administer the common affairs of Europe in the spirit of 
industrialism, thereby placing the constitution of European Confederation 
in harmony with the national governments.
27 
By contrast to the case of Saint-Simon who envisaged growing 
ideological unity among nations, Morgenthau wrote against the background 
of the apparent division of the world into two ideological camps.
28 
Morgenthau saw little hope of real co-operation between them, and 
suggested that prudential diplomacy, devoid of the spirit of 
ideological crusade, would be the first necessary and practical step 
towards a more co-operative world in which alone moves towards closer 
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integration of the existing states might be contemplated. 29 However, 
he left unanswered whether, or for what purpose, international society 
would still require a radical transformation into a world state when 
the relations between existing sovereign states had become relatively 
peaceful and co-operative in accordance with his prescriptions, which 
included the expansion of 'functional' co-operation among friendly 
nations.
30 
It is a common characteristic of those who see in Type IV the best 
approach to the political organization of mankind that they are extremely 
pessimistic about the degree of co-operation realizable within the 
system of sovereign states: they see this system as unstable, 
destructive, and incapable of realizing true harmony. Along with 
Saint-Simon's argument quoted above, Frederick Schuman's pessimistic 
prognosis will also be recalled in this context. In his judgement, 
all states-systems of the past had collapsed, and the Western states- 
system was destined in the near future to destroy itself with or without 
nuclear weapons unless radical change could be achieved through the 
political unification of the world under one government. 31 
These characterizations of the states-system may be said to 
exaggerate its defects. 'Le Congres ne marche pas, it danse' is indeed 
a well-known description of the Congress of Vienna, yet most of the 
demands which Saint-Simon had attributed to Austria, Sweden, France 
and England in the passage quoted earlier were in the end conceded 
to them through diplomatic bargaining. 32 Saint-Simon seems not to 
have seen that between sovereign states there could be such a thing 
as 'reciprocal' interest in contradistinction to 'common' interest. 
Schuman's prognosis, even more pessimistic than Saint-Simon's, may 
in the end turn out to have been accurate. There is no doubt that in 
the latter part of the twentieth century mankind lives under the 
- 236 - 
constant threat of its own annihilation. The point, however, is 
whether the situation would be improved, and annihilation avoided, if 
the world was united under one government. 
In considering such a question, we must make sure to avoid 
circularity. By the phrase, 'united under one government', we cannot 
mean 'united so effectively under one government as to rule out the 
real likelihood of any major disturbance'. 
Walter Schiffer's argument that an international organization, such 
as the League of Nations or the United Nations, could not work unless 
states were reasonable, and that if states were reasonable there would 
be no need for such an organization, may apply equally well to a world 
state.
33 
If the peoples of the world were so hostile to one another as 
to require coercion by the world government, then the world state would 
be in constant danger of a global civil war. If, on the other hand, 
the peoples of the world were so reasonable towards one another as not 
to require coercion then they could live in harmony even without a 
world government. 
This line of argument might be thought a little too crude and 
dismissive. Can it not be said that a world state can contribute to 
the achievement of peace and security more effectively than can the 
states-system, and that the danger of a global civil war is 
relatively small? 
One writer, Henry Usborne, according to Inis Claude, has said that 
civil war is not inherent in the state but that war is inherent in 
inter-state relations if those relations are based on national 
sovereignty.
34 
It is unclear what is meant by the phrase 'based on 
national sovereignty' here. However, it is plainly untrue that civil 
war is not 'inherent' in the state. It is just as 'inherent' in the 
state as (international) war is in the states-system. This is so in 
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the sense that the conceptual or logical link between 'civil war' and 
'the state' is just as certain as that between 'war' and 'the states-
system'. By definition, it is only within a state that a 'civil war° 
can be said to take place, and the logical possibility of 'civil war' 
can never be ruled out within a state. Likewise, by definition, 
'(international) war' can take place only between sovereign states, and 
its logical possibility can never be ruled out within the states-system 
whatever its legal structure. 
If Usborne's point is that war is more 'probable' within the states-
system than civil war is within the state, then the answer will have to 
be that the 'probability' of a civil war varies from one state to 
another, and that in some states it is considerable. Moreover, one 
cannot expect from the world as a whole a much higher degree of social 
cohesion than one expects from a relatively poorly governed community 
where civil war is a real threat.
35 
Those who are critical of the states-system, and who implicitly or 
explicitly favour the world state as an ideal solution, tend to see in 
the notion of 'state sovereignty' the source of irreconcilable conflict. 
It is undeniable that the conception and the organization of the state 
such that it can command the allegiance of its citizens is itself a 
necessary condition of war: no war is possible between two sets of 
individuals unless each set is socially cohesive. And if by 
'sovereignty' is understood the ability (either in a normative or 
factual sense) of a society to command the allegiance of its members, 
it is clear that 'sovereignty' is a necessary condition of war. It does 
not follow from this, however, that between 'sovereign states' there 
cannot be any co-operation. Indeed, co-operation between two sets of 
individuals, too, will require 'sovereignty' in this sense. 
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It may be thought that it is in the nature of 'state sovereignty' 
that when State A's policy goal clashes fundamentally with State B's 
policy goal, they will not seek a compromise solution. This type of 
statement can be true only if 'state sovereignty' has been defined in 
advance to make it true.
36 
While it is undoubtedly the case that some 
states pursue fundamentally irreconcilable goals, such as the 
exclusive possession of an identical piece of territory, it is not true 
that all sovereign states always pursue irreconcilable goals. 
It may of coure be objected here that two states can fight over an 
identical piece of territory precisely because a piece of land cannot 
simultaneously belong exclusively to two states, and that the abolition 
of the idea that a piece of territory can be governed exclusively by 
one of the contenders will rule out the possibility of such a dispute. 
A world state would be a means to such an end. But if two states are 
genuinely concerned to establish an exclusive sovereignty over a piece 
of territory, rather than concerned merely to frustrate each other's 
policy, it is not likely that the abolition of the idea of exclusive 
sovereignty as such can satisfy either of them. 
But is there not a definite limit to international co-operation 
because of state sovereignty? Those who support the Type IV approach 
will think so. However, in answering this question, it is vital to 
separate two questions. One is a conceptual question as to whether 
there is a definite limit beyond which institutional arrangements, 
facilitating international co-operation, cannot go without contradicting 
the 'sovereignty' of the member-states. The other is a factual question 
as to whether a given set of states may come to accept such 
institutional arrangements. An affirmative answer to the first 
question might be used as a political weapon against the supporters 
of such institutional arrangements by those who are opposed to their 
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creation. But there is nothing in the fact that State A and State B 
have certain international legal rights, or enjoy international legal 
freedom in certain areas,that make it impossible for them to alter their 
circumstances. They can even decide to conclude a treaty to merge into 
one state, thereby doing away with their legal independence altogether. 
Thus when those who support the Type IV approach are sceptical of the 
extent to which co-operation is possible between sovereign states, what 
they are pointing to is the tendency of states jealously to protect 
their existing legal rights, freedoms and independence, and not the 
limitations logically inherent in the notion of sovereignty itself. 
Of course it has to be admitted that this tendency is in turn 
cultivated and reinforced by the division of mankind into separate 
sovereign states, but it is impossible to see how a world state can 
ever be established through consent if states are so jealous of their 
legal rights, freedoms and independence as to make international 
co-operation such a difficult task as is suggested by some adherents 
of the Type IV approach. 
One observation which may be added here is that those supporters of the 
Type IV approach, who are pessimistic about the degree to which 
co-operation is possible between states because of their 'sovereignty' 
may be using domestic analogy of a kind we have not examined in this 
thesis. This is the idea that the word 'sovereignty' means the same 
thing when transferred from the sphere of domestic politics to the 
international sphere. 
Inside the state 'sovereignty' may be regarded as an attribute of 
its government, and may be taken to mean 'supreme political authority'. 
But, when the same word is used in the external relations of states, 
the word is being used as a predicate of the states themselves. It is 
clear that an adjective may point to different qualities when it is 
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predicated to different entities, and this rule applies to the 
adjective 'sovereign'. When it is used as a predicate of a state, it 
refers not to the status of 'supreme political authority', but to that 
of 'constitutional independence'.
37 
It may be partly because they ignore this point, and assume the word 
'sovereignty' to have identical meaning domestically and internationally 
that those supporters of the Type IV approach are so pessimistic about 
the degree of co-operation realizable between sovereign states: between 
'supreme political authorities' only conflict is possible, since none 
of them will accept the legitimacy of the others. Whether or not such 
an error can be said to involve 'domestic analogy' depends on how the 
term is defined. The definition adopted in this thesis does not cover 
such an instance. 
None the less, the adherents of the Type IV approach can be said to 
resort to the domestic analogy in the sense specified in Chapter II when 
they assume that the maintenance of order at the world level requires 
the reproduction of those political institutions found necessary for 
the governance of individuals at the national level. In so doing they 
underestimate the prospect of co-operation between sovereign states, and 
are uncritical of the extent to which institutions workable at the 
national level will be ineffective once extended to cover the whole globe. 
There is at least one other line of argument against the Type IV 
approach which we have not discussed so far. It is that a world state 
endangers individual and national liberty. As Walter Schiffer put it: 
'Single persons who have to fear their rulers have an opportunity to 
save themselves by leaving their countries; a world state would 
eliminate this opportunity'.
38 
And F.S. Northedge, among others, has 
remarked that the present international system, for all its failings, 
has produced the least unsatisfactory combination yet discovered of order 
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in the whole and freedom for the subordinate parts.
39 
By 'freedom 
for the subordinate parts', he means 'the liberty to lead our national 
lives as we think best'.
40 
The potential tyranny of the central government is a problem which 
the supporters of the Type IV approach would have to consider 
seriously. Yet it can be said against Northedge's defence of the 
states-system that it is too sanguine. His is a view which only those 
who are satisfied with their national regimes can fully endorse. It 
is oblivious of the fact that in many parts of the world people do not 
have the liberty to lead their lives as they think best. It also pays 
insufficient attention to the extent to which the division of mankind 
into separate political communities institutionalizes such a sanguine 
outlook on human conditions. 
It will be recalled that proposals along the 'Type I - Type II 
spectrum' are concerned primarily with the issue of creating order in 
international relations. The Type V ('welfarist') approach, to which 
we now turn, is strongly critical of this, and argues for strengthening 
those institutions concerned with the welfare of men and women 
living in separate states. 
Moreover, it will be noted, the institutions envisaged by Types 
I, III and V (or the 'confederal', 'democratic confederal' and 
'world state' approaches) are systematic entities expressed in single 
blue-prints or well-defined schemes. The same can be said also of 
some of those 'negative surrogates' of Type I located along the 
'Type I - Type II spectrum' closer to the 'confederal' end. 
The Type V approach objects to the idea that the desirable goals 
of mankind can be obtained by a systematic, all-embracing 
constitutional project. Instead of suggesting a unified scheme, 
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therefore, the supporters of the Type V approach stress that all forms 
of institution should be created to cope with multifarious problems 
requiring international co-operation. It is interesting to observe 
that in clear contrast to Type IV, the Type V approach is based on the 
assumption that there is no limit to the range of co-operation within 
the sovereign states system. 
The degree of centralization, membership, representation, 
decision-making procedure and other structural or procedural aspects 
of the institutions are to be worked out case by case. However, a 
Type IV sort constitution in particular is supposed by the adherents of 
the Type V approach not to come about, if ever, until the final stage 
in the development of international institutions, and is, at any rate, 
rejected as an initial means for facilitating co-operation. 
It may be thought appropriate to give the label of 'functionalism' 
to Type V since David Mitrany, who adopted this approach, is associated 
with that term. However, E.H. Carr commended Type V for its pluralism 
and pragmatism, and Type V's concern for welfare issues is shared by 
Carr and Brierly, neither of whom is usually labelled ifunctionalist 1 . 41 
 Moreover, so-called 'neo-functionalism' will not be excluded from 
Type V.
42 
Since 'pluralism' has been used in different senses by 
writers of international relations, such as Bull, Pentland and Pettman, 
and 'pragmatism' appears a little too value-laden, 'welfarism' has 
been chosen as a label for the Type V approach here.
43 
This is 
consonant with the fact that the circumstances which commonly 
stimulated Carr, Brierly and Mitrany to adopt the Type V approach was 
the bankruptcy of laissez faire liberalism in the domestic sphere.
44 
'Welfarism', as it is defined here, maintains that the welfare of 
individual men and women living in separate states, which it regards 
as vital, cannot be left to the activities of separate national 
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governments, that the effective control of welfare issues in many 
cases requires upgrading the level of management from national to 
international, but that the institutional structure of international 
co-operation in this field should be determined pragmatically in 
accordance with the needs in view. Such a position may be said to be a 
common denominator of the views held by Carr, Brierly and Mitrany, 
but does not exhaust them. In particular, Mitrany's 'functionalist' 
assertion that co-operation along the 'welfarist' lines will lead to the 
erosion of national loyalties, and hence, to the gradual emergence 
of a transnational community is not integral to 'welfarism' as such as 
defined here.
45 
It will be recalled that Types I - V are all 
'ideal-types'.
46 
It follows that they are not necessarily identical 
with any of the approaches adopted by the writers discussed in this 
thesis. 
Consequently, it is not suggested here that what might be termed 
'welfare issues' are not included in other types of proposal. Thus, 
Saint-Simon's European parliament, which we associated with the 
Type IV approach, was to direct 'L-4711 undertakings of common 
advantage to the European community', including linking of the Danube 
to the Rhine, and the Rhine to the Baltic, by canals. State education 
in the whole of Europe was to be under the direction and supervision 
of the great parliament, which was also to draw up a code of ethics. 47 
 Even William Ladd's Congress of Nations, which we located along the 
'Type I - Type II spectrum', was expected to settle principles of a 
'civil and pacific nature affecting the intercourse of the world and 
the happiness of mankind'.
48 
The issues to be treated by the Congress 
were to include, among other things: diplomatic immunity, extradition, 
the treatment of refugees, slave trade, piracy, the use of railroad 
and canals, free navigation of bays and rivers, maritime safety and 
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salvage, copy-rights, postal service, weights, measures and coinage, 
the right of discovery and colonization, and disarmament. Many of 
these issues overlap with the concerns of the 'welfarist' writers. 
However, what distinguishes Type V is that instead of setting up one 
supreme legislative authority to make laws for all purposes, it 
suggests a pluralistic approach. Those states who have a common set 
of problems are to create their own institutions specifically 
adjusted to their needs. The membership and shape of each institution 
are to be determined in accordance with the purposes which it is 
required to serve. The absence of an overriding authority above these 
separate institutions is thought to be even advantageous since they 
can modify their shape in response to changing circumstances without 
involving a cumbrous process of decision-making at the universal level. 
Only the members of each institution need to agree to its modification 
in accordance with its own provisions.
49 
It is important not to mistake the proliferation of Type V 
institutions for the emergence of a world state. Inter-state relations 
may begin to take on a more community-like character if these 
institutions are successful, but this does not produce a single 
sovereign state at the global level. Mitrany's statement that 'a slice 
of sovereignty' is transferred from the old authority (the member 
states) every time a new institution is established is as misleading 
as his other oft-quoted characterization of 'functionalism' as a 
'federalism by instalments.' 50 In the sense that is relevant to the 
present context, 'sovereignty' can be said to have been abandoned by 
the member states only when the mode of obligation and authorization 
specific to 'international law', which Hans Kelsen called 'indirect 
obligating and authorizing of individuals', has been superseded by 
supranational arrangements, and accordingly the constitutional 
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independence of the member states has been undermined.
51 
Since Type V 
institutions are not necessarily supranational, their expansion in 
number and scope will not lead to the creation of a world state. 
Moreover, since membership varies from one institution to another the 
cumulative effect will be a complex network of legal relationships 
between states, very different from a tidily organized world federation. 
It was this schematic tidiness of the federal and other approaches 
which writers like Mitrany and Carr opposed. 
While the proliferation of Type V institutions by itself does not lead 
to the creation of the world state, it might be thought at least 
subversive of the sovereign states system because of its concern with 
the welfare of individuals. One of the major concerns of the Type V 
approach is indeed the issue of human rights, and Hedley Bull has 
cautioned that Vb7arried to its logical extreme, the doctrine of 
human rights and duties under international law is subversive of the whole 
principle that mankind should be organized as a society of sovereign 
states', the principle which he in fact endorses.
52 
However, it is important to note Bull's qualification to this 
argument. He wrote: 
ilif the rights of each man can be asserted on the world 
political stage over and against the claims of his state, 
and his duties proclaimed irrespective of his position as 
a servant or a citizen of that state, then the position of 
the state as a body sovereign over its citizens, and 
entitled to command their obedience, has been subject to 
challenge, and the structure of the society of sovereign 
states has been placed in jeopardy.
53 
What this amounts to is simply that supranational protection of human 
rights goes against state sovereignty. This is a statement true 
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by definition. 
However, supranationalism is not a necessary ingredient of the Type 
V approach. Brierly, for example, in suggesting the international 
legal protection of human rights, specifically rejected the supranational 
approach as unworkable, and proposed instead a simple convention 
obliging states to incorporate in their municipal laws certain rights 
which they would all undertake to maintain for their own subjects, and 
which each of them would interpret and apply according to its own forms 
of procedure.
54 
There is nothing in such an approach that is subversive 
of state sovereignty, and Bull's objections noted above would not 
therefore apply to it. Type V institutions are thus not necessarily 
subversive of the society of sovereign states. 
There will be little objection to the central argument of the Type V 
approach that the world state is not likely to be realizable, that 
nevertheless states can and should co-operate on all kinds of problem, 
and that in the contemporary world, economic and social welfare of 
individual men and women living in separate national communities is 
among the important issues to be dealt with through international 
co-operation. However, it has to be noted that the Type V approach 
as such does not clearly state in which specific area states need to 
co-operate, or can co-operate withoutengendering counter-productive 
frictions. Nor does it clarify what form of institutional arrangement 
is best suited to a given need. There is therefore no guarantee that 
an institution designed by an adherent of the Type V approach will 
succeed in enabling the member-states to satisfy their needs. 'Trial 
and error' is the cost of pragmatism. 
Arguments against Type V would gain strength if it were to be 
identified with Mitrany's doctrine of 'functionalism'. 
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Mitrany believed that the proliferation of 'functional' 
institutions would cumulatively contribute to the achievement of 
international peace through the gradual growth in the awareness of common 
interest in peace and in the development of the habit of co-operation. 55 
 This optimistic expectation is challenged by those who argue that it 
is within the framework of peaceful relationships that functional 
institutions can proliferate.
56 
The extent to which, and the process 
through which successful co-operation within functional institutions 
can strengthen peace is a much disputed issue among contemporary 
theorists on international organization.
57 
The following statement by 
Hedley Bull is noteworthy in this respect: 
The expansion of the scope of international law to encompass 
economic, social, communications and environmental matters 
represents a strengthening of the contribution of inter-
national law to international order in the sense that it 
provides a means of coping with new threats to international 
order. The growing impact of the policies of states on each 
other in these fields is a source of conflict and disorder 
among them which international legal regulation serves to 
contain. If international law had not responded to these 
developments by expanding its scope, the threats to inter-
national order arising from the growth of interdependence 
in the economic, social, communications and environmental 
fields would be greater than they are.
58 
In clear contrast to Mitrany, the expanding scope of international 
legal regulation is seen by Bull not as a means of community-building, 
but as a way of controlling or preventing international conflict which 
has also expanded in accordance with increased international inter-
dependence. However, Bull's pessimistic, deterministic view is in turn 
devoid of solid empirical substantiation. 
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Finally it may be observed that while the 'anarchical' approach 
which we examined in the previous chapter is supported by those, like 
Bull, who strongly oppose the domestic analogy, the 'welfarist' approach 
can be adopted as part of the prescriptions by those who make some con-
cessions to this analogy as well as by those who attempt to exclude it. 
Thus, James Brierly, while supporting the 'welfarist' approach, also 
argued in favour of the legal ban on the use of force and some form of 
collective security, while Edwin Borchard, likewisaendorsing the 'welfarist' 
approach, was strongly critical of both such institutions.
59 
These 
contrasting cases show that whereas the 'anarchical' approach defines 
itself in terms of its opposition to the domestic analogy in all 
forms, the 'welfarist' approach is not so much against this analogy as to 
some extent independent of the 'domestic analogy debate' itself. This 
explains why a staunch opponent of the domestic analogy like Bull, 
while not agreeing with Mitrany's optimism, can still, however negatively, 
appreciate the merits of the 'welfarist' institutions. 
In this chapter, we examined the merits of three approaches to world 
order: 'democratic confederal', 'world state', and 'welfarist'. The 
'democratic confederal' approach may have some merits when applied to 
the relations of those nations among whom transnational solidarity 
is exceptionally strong. But as an approach to world order it commits an 
error 	of attempting to transfer a domestic political principle to the 
international sphere where the conditions are unsuitable or not yet ripe. 
The 'world state' approach also involves the mistake of assuming that 
those political institutions operative at the national level will be 
workable at the global level. Moreover, it underestimates the extent 
to which international co-operation can take place among 'sovereign' 
states. It was suggested that this underestimation may stem from the 
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tendency of the adherents of this approach to assume that the word 
'sovereignty' means 'supreme political authority' internationally as 
well as domestically. However, the defender of the states system, such 
as Northedge, we noted, may exaggerate the virtues of the present 
system. The 'welfarist' approach, an ideal-type not to be identified 
with Mitrany's 'functionalism', remains relatively unscathed, but the 
method of 'trial and error' is the price it pays for its pragmatism. 
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Conclusion  
In the previous two chapters an attempt was made to examine the 
merits of various types of proposal which emerged since the end of the 
Napoleonic Wars up to the creation of the United Nations. We conducted 
our analysis in the light of five ideal-types: the 'confederal', 
'anarchical', 'democratic confederal', 'world state' and 'welfarist' 
approaches. 
Putting the five approaches in perspective, we may say that the 
'confederal', 'democratic confederal' and 'world state' approaches are 
based on the view that states in their relations with one another are 
analogous to the individuals in the state of nature which Hobbes had 
imagined to be a state of war. These approaches personify states 
implicitly, and prescribe that states should leave their international 
state of nature by entering into a social contract writ large. ' 
However, states, unlike natural persons, are legal, and hence 
artificial, entities. Thus two forms of social contract are possible 
between them. One, supported by the 'confederal' and 'democratic 
confederal' approaches, is a contract between states which leaves 
their sovereign statehood intact. The other, as in the 'world state' 
approach, is a contract which dissolves existing sovereign states into 
one state. Hence the two basic forms of domestic analogy we have noted. 
The 'democratic confederal' approach involves the use of the domestic 
analogy in the first form, but attempts to extend the principle of 
popular representation, accepted as legitimate within many states, to 
the international sphere where, traditionally, problems are handled 
primarily by diplomats acting under instruction from the executive 
branches of their respective governments. 
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The 'welfarist' approach might be thought to be an attempt to ameliorate 
the harsh conditions of the international state of nature through the 
proliferation of covenants for limited purposes among interested members. 
However, in the foregoing, we have considered Type V as an approach to 
improve the conditions of the lives of individuals separated into 
sovereign states by expanding the scope of international co-operation. 
This may or may not lead to the improvement of international conditions. 2 
In contrast to the 'confederal', 'democratic confederal' and 'world 
state' approaches, the 'anarchical' approach, as Hedley Bull clearly 
reveals, is based on the idea that the state of nature among individuals 
and the state of nature among states are different in character. This 
line of thought, as we noted, had existed already in Hobbes himself, and 
was inherited and expanded by a succession of political philosophers 
and theorists of international law, such as Spinoza, Pufendorf, Wolff 
and Vattel. Bull's argument closely follows the ideas developed by these 
earlier thinkers. According to Bull, 'anarchy among states is tolerable 
to a degree to which among individuals it is not', and 'the fact that 
states form a society without government reflects features of their 
situation that are unique'.
3 
It may be observed that the 'anarchical' approach offers an effective 
counter-balance to some of the prescriptions based on the 'confederal', 
'democratic confederal' and 'world state' approaches which in varying 
ways 	are all dependent on the domestic analogy. 
However, the 'anarchical' approach is not entirely flawless. 
Especially when advanced with exaggerated confidence, this approach 
produces unwarranted conclusions. Thus, as we saw, the argument 
against the legal ban on the use of force advanced by the supporters 
of this approach is alarmist to the extent that it is based on the 
fear of turning the contestants more uncompromising. They also 
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exaggerate the value of the institution of neutrality and the firmness 
with which it had been established in international society. Moreover, 
Northedge's evaluation of the 'anarchical' states-system, we noted, 
seems too sanguine about the extent to which it enables its constituent 
units to live 'as they think best'.
4 
The strength of the 'anarchical' 
approach lies in its critical attitude towards the domestic analogy. 
But this can in turn harden into a dogmatic premise similar to the 
doctrine of the 'specific character of international law' influential 
at the turn of the century. The parallel between this legal doctrine 
and the 'anarchical' approach should warn us that a puritanical concern 
to preserve the unique realm of International Relations from 
contamination through reliance on the domestic analogy may itself turn 
into futile dogmatism devoid of empirical substantiation. 5 
It may be pertinent to recall here that C.A.W. Manning, determined 
not to allow the domestic analogy to creep into his argument, 
apologetically admitted that he was resorting to it 'for once' in the 
lecture he gave in 1935 at the Geneva Institute of International 
Relations. Yet, our analysis showed, he was mistaken in thinking that 
he was resorting to the domestic analogy, and his error was due to 
his anxiety to separate out what is international from what is domestic. 
As we pointed out, this might be an instance where Manning's 
determination to exclude the domestic analogy clouded his analytical 
power.
6 
The 'weTfarist' approach remains relatively unscathed insofar as it 
is not subject to the kind of criticism directed against excessive 
reliance on the domestic analogy. This approach is indeed to some 
extent independent of the 'domestic analogy debate' itself. Yet, as 
we saw, one of its limitations lies in its inability to spell out in 
detail what kind of institution is appropriate for a given need.
7 
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Moreover, in Mitrany's version of 'welfarism', namely 'functionalism', 
the approach gains an extra dimension of optimistic expectation about 
the extent to which 'welfarist' institutions can contribute to world 
peace. This added element, however, is harder to accept in the absence 
of further evidence supporting the hypothesis that international 
institutions, when seen to be satisfying the welfare needs of men 
and women, will tend to curtail their national loyalties, and that the 
habits of co-operation will make them ready to co-operate more. This 
may be a common-sense assumption, but its validity has not so far been 
fully tested.
8 
Since the 'welfarist' approach rejects the 'world state' alternative, 9 
 one important question which arises is how far the former can contribute 
to welfare and justice in the life of mankind divided into separate 
states. Do these goals in fact require the transcendence of the 
sovereign states system? The question is important since if the 'welfarist' 
approach is shown to produce desired effects fully only through the 
abolition of the sovereign states system the value of the approach is 
seriously undermined. 
Clearly, however, the 'transcendence of the sovereign states system' 
in the sense of the structural reform of the present system would not 
solve the problem of welfare and justice, unless the new arrangement was 
to be accompanied by what Gladstone had called 'just habits of thought'.
1° 
 By this he meant the cultivation of the idea that 'every other State, 
and every other people 5toodi on the same level of right as ourselves'.
11 
which may be paraphrased as the growth in the sense of community among 
mankind. It must, however, be noted that the growth in the sense of 
community among mankind, or the transition towards the ultimate universal 
moral community, is itself to some extent hindered by the division of 
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mankind into sovereign states which tends to reinforce national 
parochialism. 
Some of the measures recommended by the proposals along what we 
called the 'Type I - Type II spectrum' may encourage mankind to move 
towards a higher sense of unity. Among them, for example, are the 
enshrinement in the law of the idea that states do not have 
unrestricted freedom to use force against one another, the institution 
of voluntary arbitration and adjudication, and the regular assembly of 
states to discuss issues of common interest and to articulate the 
standards of international conduct. Between states which already share 
an exceptionally high sense of solidarity, as well as democratic values, 
the 'democratic confederal' approach might help enhance these values 
and bring the states closer together. 'Welfarist' institutions might 
also protect or strengthen unity, or act as a symbol of progress towards 
unity, in a divided world. However, none of these approaches are by 
themselves sufficient to bring about the change in the moral outlook 
of mankind from particularism to universalism without which 
institutions based on the domestic analogy, as well as 'welfarist' 
institutions, are likely to remain limited in their scope and effective-
ness. 
It is important to note, however, that even within the present system 
there are some elements of moral universalism. Without this, the 
human rights ideology, for example, would not exist, nor perhaps the 
very notion of the society of states.
12 
Yet the area in which the 
citizens of another country are held to be of equal worth to those of one's 
own country is severely restricted under the present regime as the 
North-South problem amply illustrates. The gradual expansion of this 
area is what constitutes the transition from particularism to 
universalism.13 
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The ultimate moral community of mankind, in which moral universalism 
prevails over national parochialism, is therefore one where the area in 
which the citizens of another state are treated in the same way as those 
of one's own state has expanded to the full. The last phrase, 'to the 
full', taken literally, suggests that in the ultimate moral community 
the citizens of separate states should be treated totally without 
prejudice to their nationality. 
If such a community were to continue to be organized as a system of 
states, its constituent units would not have the character of those 
which constitute the present international system. This is because 
the conception of the state underlying the system would have altered 
radically from what it is now. States would no longer exercise their 
legal independence selfishly, but accept it as their principle to act 
as though they were bound by a supreme legislative authority enacting 
laws for the common good of mankind. 
Even in such a situation, the laws would still have to be made 
rather than left to the spontaneous concurrence of national wills. 
Thus a law-making assembly of some form would be required, probably 
together with certain other elements of an international government. 
Whether this new global arrangement can be classified as a world 
state, in contradistinction to the sovereign states system, in terms 
of its constitutional characteristics, is an elusive question. This 
can only be answered if we can work out the requisite degree of 
centralization for the global system, which it is difficult to do in 
the abstract. Moreover, it is perhaps possible to envisage a 
decentralized and pluralistic global association in which the 
citizen/non-citizen dichotomy is not institutionalized in the same way 
as it is in the present sovereign states system.
14 
Thus in reply to our question as to whether welfare and justice 
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in the life of mankind can be obtained fully within the framework of 
the sovereign states system we can tentatively conclude as follows. 
The realization of welfare and justice in the life of mankind 
presupposes the prevalence of moral universalism over national 
parochialism. This will lead to a new global arrangement, which may 
not necessarily be a world state. If the moral community of mankind 
takes the form of a states-system, its constituent units will not have 
the character of those which constitute the present international system. 
This is because the conception of the state will have altered radically 
from what it is now. Likewise, if the ultimate end takes the form of a 
decentralized and pluralistic association of a large number of 
communities, these will not resemble the present sovereign states. 
Whatever the ultimate institutional structure, it seems clear that in 
the initial stages of the transitional process towards the ultimate 
goal, the legal freedom of action enjoyed by each state vis-a-vis other 
states will diminish progressively since each state will share an 
increasing amount of responsibility for the common good of mankind. Even 
those currently poor countries, which will be placed at the receiving 
end of the globally re-distributed wealth, will be subject to the 
curtailment of their legal freedom inasmuch as the issue of domestic 
distribution of wealth will in turn be under the surveillance of the 
international community. 
In fact, the knowledge of the ultimate structure matters far less 
than the awareness of the general direction in which international society 
must progress. Just as it would be absurd to try to envisage the 
ultimate state of our knowledge, so it would be unwise to concentrate on 
the speculation of the ultimate institutional structure of the world. 
It might, of course, be objected that this analogy is not perfect: 
whereas the ultimate state of our knowledge, if there can be such a 
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thing at all, can be known only when we get there, the knowledge of 
what the ultimate institutional structure should be could contribute 
to our getting there. This objection, however, ignores the point that 
the knowledge of the ultimate structure of the world is itself likely 
to be part of the ultimate knowledge. James Lorimer's claim to solve 
the ultimate problem of international jurisprudence through the 
transfer to the international sphere of certain domestic institutions 
of the nineteenth century liberal type ignores the historical 
limitations of the answer being given.
15 
The idea of the expansion of the area in which the citizens of 
another state are treated in the same way as those of one's own state 
was supported by E.H. Carr although what he had in mind was a regional, 
rather than universal, international co-operation. He wrote, in a 
striking passage which should be noted as well as his critique of 
idealism: 'British policy may have to take into account the welfare 
of Lille or DOsseldorf or Lodz as well as the welfare of Oldham or 
Jarrow'.
16 
He wrote of his own vision as itself a utopia, although 
he was hopeful that 'a direct appeal to the motive of sacrifice would 
[hot] always fail'. 17 In a world in which a direct appeal even to the 
motive of enlightened self-interest would not always succeed, the 
vision of separate nations sharing an increasing amount of responsibility 
for the common good of mankind would remain realized only to a limited 
degree for a foreseeable future. 
None the less, it seems clear that the move towards the universalist 
goal is more likely to come from among those national communities 
which share the values of welfare and justice. In this respect, it is 
of considerable importance to note Michael Doyle's recent observation 
that no liberal states have ever been engaged in a war among themselves. 18 
 Although Doyle's explanation of this striking phenomenon is not adequate 
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by itself, he considers that three factors have contributed to peace 
among liberal states: a degree of democratic control of foreign 
policy; the sharing of values, and mutual trust on the grounds of 
ideological unity; and vested interest in peace as a result of 
commercial interdependence.
19 
It may be that these circumstances and 
the expectation of peace contribute to the gradual overcoming of 
national parochialism among some liberal states, if not necessarily 
all of them, which may in turn strengthen the chances of co-operation 
in the realm of welfare and justice. 2° 
There are a number of ways in which this thesis can be expanded. 
First, the time span. The period covered by this thesis is between 
1814 and 1945, or between Saint-Simon's proposal at the time of the 
Congress of Vienna and the establishment of the United Nations, although 
ideas expressed after 1945, when relevant to the evaluation of the 
proposals produced before 1945, have been referred to. A century and a 
half is a period sufficiently long to provide us with a reasonably wide 
range of proposals as Chapters III - VII have shown. Moreover, domestic 
and international circumstances of this period were varied enough to 
enable us to observe the influence of the changing conditions in the 
two spheres upon the proposals produced. At the same time, the writers 
of this period are relatively close to us in terms of their experience 
both in the domestic and international spheres as well as in the realm 
of science and technology. This renders their ideas relevant to our 
present concern in the sphere of international relations.
21 
Nevertheless, the time span can be expnded either into the pre-1814 
period or into the post-1945 period or both. 
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One difficulty involved in expanding the time span into the pre-1814 
period is that it becomes harder to identify domestic models which 
may have inspired the peace-schemers to be examined. Even if we were 
to go back to the eighteenth century, in order to ascertain whether or 
not a writer, such as Saint-Pierre, had used any particular domestic 
model in constructing his project, we are required to know extensively 
about the constitutional structures of the Powers and Confederations 
of the period, as well as earlier ones, and this is in itself a 
considerable task for a researcher.
22 
However, it will be of great interest to compare, say, pre-1648 
proposals, those between 1648 and 1789, and those after 1814.
23 
One difficulty which arises when we move forward into the post-1945 
period is that there are so many international institutions, and writings 
about International Relations that the weight of the material is 
extremely heavy. We will have to look into European unification, though 
admittedly this is regional rather than global. Once we allow regional 
arrangements to enter into our survey there are many other instances. 
Writings about International Relations are also vast in quantity, and 
we must certainly include in our discussion the often mentioned World 
Order Models Project, and probably also the writings on international 
law inspired by the Yale Law School approach.
24 
None the less, such an effort will be worthwhile and fruitful in 
order to assess critically our present state of knowledge and practice. 
We have approximated this goal to a limited degree by examining in 
some detail those patterns of thought in International Law and 
Relations which arose in the face of the felt inadequacies of the League 
of Nations and its eventual collapse. These patterns of thought, we 
suggested, provided the bases of post-1945 approaches. 
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Second, we may expand the scope of analysis by bringing in proposals 
for world order from outside the liberal (and social democratic), 
chiefly Anglo-American, tradition. We have included in our survey 
some German writings, and to a lesser extent French proposals, but we 
have not taken into consideration ideas emanating from Marxism, 
Anarchism, or National Socialism. One small exception was Carl Schmitt, 
a Nazi legal theorist, mentioned briefly. Another exception was 
Stengel (a German nationalist in the mould of Treitschke,) whose ideas 
we considered in more detail.
25 
Moreover, we may include in our discussion ideas about world order 
coming from the non-Western tradition, such as Confucian or Islamic. 26 
 This will clearly enrich our material, but a thorough investigation 
concerning such a broad range of ideas is far beyond the capacity of an 
ordinary researcher. 
Third, we may go beyond the institutional form of domestic analogy, 
to which we have confined our attention, to incorporate in our survey 
those ideas which concern the transfer of values from the domestic to 
the international sphere. This requires some explanation.
27 
Convenient 
examples to use to illustrate the point here are two contemporary 
theorists of international relations, Hedley Bull and Andrew Linklater, 
although writers from earlier periods can be included. Bull's The 
Anarchical Society and Linklater's Men and Citizens in the Theory of  
International Relations represent two opposite tendencies in contemporary 
international theory, conservatism and progressivism, respectively. 
It must be stated at the outset that neither of these writers resorts 
to the domestic analogy in the institutional sense. Bull, as we saw, 
rejects this totally. Nor is Linklater engaged in an analogically 
constructed institutional peace-scheming many of whose varieties we 
have seen.
28 
Indeed, neither of them resorts to the domestic analogy 
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as we defined the term in this thesis. 
None the less, a close examination of the two writers' books reveals 
that they both select out as of fundamental importance a certain value 
or set of values which they see as being pursued and to some extent 
realized within the domestic sphere. They then go on to argue that the 
satisfaction of this value or set of values should be regarded as the 
goal of the community of mankind to be pursued at present by the 
co-operation of sovereign states. In the case of Bull, the set of 
values selected are security against violence, observance of agreements 
and the stability of property. Linklater, by contrast, argues for the 
expansion of the realm of freedom as a historic goal of mankind. 29 
In fact, we have seen the 'welfarist' writers resort to the same 
mode of reasoning: the welfare of individual citizens pursued in 
separate national communities is transferred by them to the international 
arena as the goal of the international community. 
It should be clear that Bull and Linklater share a method of reasoning 
with the 'welfarists'. Their differences arise from their disagreement 
regarding the choice of values. If we go beyond the confines of the 
domestic analogy in the sense in which we have dealt with this concept 
in this thesis, and examine various ideas regarding the 'transfer of 
values', we will open a new field of enquiry. 
Although, therefore, there are a number of ways in which this thesis 
can be expanded, this thesis itself may be said to have made some 
contribution to the understanding of the nature, the role and the 
limitations of the domestic analogy. 
Chapter I has traced a debate about the domestic analogy between 
those apparently opposed to it and those apparently in support of it. 
Since the division of writers into these two camps cannot be accepted 
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unless what is to count as an instance of the domestic analogy has 
been clearly defined, we attempted in Chapter II to identify the range 
and types of proposals which this analogy may be said to entail. 
Chapters III - VII investigated in detail how the use of the domestic 
analogy was influenced by the changing conditions in the domestic 
and international spheres, and how some writers stood above these 
changes by stressing the unique and relatively unchanging nature of 
the system of states. 
We have not only examined the use of the domestic analogy by those 
writers whose proposals were not put into practice by the governments of 
their time, but studied the ways in which the analogy was used by those 
who, producing their ideas at more pregnant epochs, contributed more 
directly to the establishment of the two major world organizations of the 
twentieth century, the League of Nations and the United Nations. It 
should be noted that our approach was not one of finding 'analogies' 
or points of correspondence between these institutions on the one hand 
and a domestic model on the other. What we attempted was to reconstruct 
the mode of reasoning on the part of those who participated more or less 
directly in the creation of these institutions, and to examine the 
part played by the domestic analogy in their thinking. 
And, as summarized in the first part of the Conclusion, Chapters 
VIII - IX investigated in the light of five ideal-type approaches the 
merits of those proposals which were discussed in earlier chapters. 
It was shown that proposals involving the domestic analogy are often 
defective, but that the ideas of those who attempt to reject this 
analogy are not entirely flawless, and that the 'welfarist' approach, 
when supported by the expansion of universalism, will become more 
successful. 
Throughout, care has been taken to present the outline of each 
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proposal accurately, and we have shown the extent to which and the 
ways in which the domestic analogy influenced the formation of ideas 
about the conditions of world order. This complements Walter 
Schiffer's major work, The Legal Community of Mankind in which he 
showed what made the twentieth century conception of world organization 
possible. We have provided an explanation of the vicissitude of thought 
since the early part of the nineteenth century which led eventually to 
the creation of the two twentieth century world organizations, the 
League of Nations and the United Nations. It may be that the history 
of ideas which led to the establishment of these institutions, like 
proverbial roads to Rome, can be traced back in other ways. This 
thesis drew special attention to the place of the domestic analogy 
in that history. The course we took, however, was not one of any 
number of equally important routes. The domestic analogy was 
significant in the period of our concern, despite its weaknesses 
revealed by our analysis, because many travellers we encountered en 
route themselves relied on this analogy. 
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